UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak in this debate and a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde and the International Relations and Defence Committee on their fascinating report on the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic. I congratulate my noble friend on his excellent introductory speech.

I admit that I was not very well informed on this matter before I read the report, and I found it very illuminating. I have always had a fascination with the Arctic because, when I first lived in Japan in the 1980s, we flew over it and refuelled at Anchorage. From the mid-1990s we would fly over Russia, but in recent years we have reverted to flying over the North Pole.

It is always a little surprising to see just how close eastern Siberia is to Alaska. We are so used to looking at a Mercator projection view of the planet, but a globe gives a much better perspective of proximity and shows the significance of the Arctic. It also shows that, of the eight members of the Arctic Council, Russia possesses almost half of the shoreline of the Arctic Ocean. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has paralysed the work of the Arctic Council. Given the close alliance between Russia and China, the remaining members of the “Arctic seven” are increasingly cautious about Chinese strategic investments in the region.

It may be true that China has, so far, sought to work within the Arctic’s existing governance framework; however, it is clear that China is now intent on challenging the existing world order so that is very likely to change. As the report finds:

“Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region are legitimate”.


It suggests:

“One region where the deepening partnership”


between Russia and China

“may manifest itself is the Arctic”.

This presents a particular problem for India, which continues to sit on the fence. The committee’s witness, Captain Bisen, acknowledged that India has

“an interest in preventing a strong Sino-Russian partnership”.

The report welcomes the FCDO’s decision to resume working group level projects of the Arctic Council, including Russia, whereas it remains committed to excluding Russia from co-operation at a ministerial level. I wonder whether such an ambiguous policy will be viable for long. The report rightly states:

“Russia must not be allowed to take advantage of its participation in working group activities to undermine the steps taken by the UK and others to isolate Russia diplomatically in response to the war in Ukraine”.


I cannot see that there is any possibility of Russia not seeking to take advantage. Does the Minister think that our ambivalent position can be maintained?

The report strikes the right tone in suggesting that

“the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and coalition-building”.

Those with whom we should work in coalition include Japan and South Korea. I am a little puzzled that the report identified a significant difference between the positions of those two countries. I believe that the Japanese general trading companies, to speak only of one sector, are just as interested in the development of Arctic maritime routes as the South Korean private sector. It is essential that Japan and Korea, which face similar security risks in the western Pacific Ocean, should work more closely together in the defence and security sphere and in collaboration with other Arctic observer nations. The United Kingdom, which enjoys closer defence and security relations with both nations, can play a key role here.

The committee’s report identified that the UK, as the nearest neighbour to the Arctic Council states, co-operates actively with them on search and rescue missions in the High North. As noble Lords are aware, the scrapping of the RAF’s Nimrod fleet in 2011 before it was commissioned was a very controversial decision that left the RAF without any maritime reconnaissance capacity for some years, until the commissioning of the Poseidon P8 aircraft based at Lossiemouth. It is no surprise to read that questions are being raised as to whether the current fleet of nine aircraft is enough to meet our commitments, especially given the deteriorating geopolitical situation in the north Atlantic and in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last week, newspaper reports covered recent statements by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, that defence spending should go up to 3% immediately and that the Government’s current strategy of waiting until after the strategic defence review and then doing it in the June financial statement is ludicrous. The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, have both said that we need to spend 3.5% to maintain our existing military capabilities and commitments to NATO. Does the Minister agree with his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord West, that the Government’s approach to defence spending is ludicrous?

As honorary air commodore of 600 (City of London) Squadron in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, I entirely endorse what my noble friend Lord De Mauley said about the contribution of the Reserve Forces to the resilience of the defence of the United Kingdom. Again, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Ashton and other noble Lords on an excellent report and excellent speeches, but regret that the report is already a year old. Debates on recently published work tend to be livelier and receive more media interest.