Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for introducing this Second Reading debate today with his usual clear and methodical approach. While declaring my interests as stated in the register, I am delighted to be able to speak from these Benches and believe it is important that we should revert as soon as possible to something nearer our normal ways of working, as the House of Commons has done. It may well be that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and her noble friend have ample opportunities to hold the Government to account under this system, but I feel myself persuaded by my noble friend Lord Dobbs, who, employing his natural eloquence, made the case for our proper return very well.

The Bill seeks to address the perceived failings in our current arrangements. I was surprised to note that the UK languishes at 14th place in the World Bank corporate insolvency rankings, below, inter alia, Slovenia and Iceland. Japan, Finland and the US occupy the top three positions. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government intend to negotiate free trade agreements with Japan and the US this year, and it would be good if the UK’s ranking in the World Bank’s table in future approximated more closely to theirs.

I believe that the permanent measures included in the Bill should assist in achieving that. They enjoy the broad support of the legal profession, and the reforms on moratoriums, restructuring plans and termination clauses have been worked on for some time. I hope that the Minister will commit that the Government will review the new insolvency and restructuring arrangements within, say, three years, and make sure that they are working as well as intended. The justification for the fast-tracking of this Bill, however, is driven by the temporary provisions on wrongful trading and winding-up petitions. They are also retrospective in effect, which we rightly normally avoid in this country. I believe that noble Lords will applaud the Government’s intention, which is to support businesses which were viable immediately prior to the realisation of the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, but whose future is now seriously threatened, especially companies operating in the entertainment and leisure sectors.

The Government have introduced several schemes to provide immediate financial relief to companies suffering from the effects of the pandemic, and those eligible to receive loans will be much less likely to need to avail themselves of the protections provided by this Bill. What progress are the Government making in persuading the European Commission to change its definition of “undertaking in difficulty” to permit companies financed through their growth period by shareholder loans to borrow, or to resolve to apply a better definition of viable companies? My understanding is that not all member states are as diligent as we are in applying the Commission’s definition, even though we are supposed to have left the EU. Creditors’ rights to make winding-up petitions are curtailed by the need to satisfy the coronavirus test. It is not clear whether this will lead to a view that “it just isn’t worth bringing a winding-up petition, so don’t bother because you will fail” or whether people will seek to use and satisfy the coronavirus test to bring petitions that might not otherwise have been brought. It is interesting that judges have already started to grant injunctions to restrain creditors from proceeding with winding-up petitions in cases where the Bill, once enacted, would mean that the petition was dismissed when heard because it would fail the test.

With this Bill, the Government add some useful tools to the toolbox without interfering too much with well-established principles. I welcome the Bill and trust that your Lordships’ House will support my noble friend in securing its enactment without undue delay.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, made two very powerful remarks earlier in the debate when he said that this Bill seeks to do two separate things. The first is to introduce the emergency provisions in respect of the crisis we are in, and the second is making permanent changes to insolvency law. He also drew attention to the absolutely devastating report on the Bill by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which highlights a wider set of Henry VIII clauses than I have ever seen in a Bill of this kind, including the whole definition of which companies are affected by it under new Schedule ZA1, which can be changed by the Government by order, without any primary legislation. I am sure that we will want to return to that.

Even more extraordinary is the Government’s justification for why they have included all these Henry VIII powers, which is

“the undesirability of taking up Parliament’s time unnecessarily.”

Surely it is the job of Parliament to decide whether its time is being taken up unnecessarily, not that of the Government. I draw the particular attention of the Committee to paragraph 8 of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, which states:

“In our view, the presumption should be that where something needs changing which Parliament has enacted, Parliament should enact the changes by primary legislation rather than ministers make the changes by secondary legislation.”


That points the way to a number of key amendments that need to be made on Report.

Turning to this group of amendments, it suffers from exactly the same problem that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said the Bill suffers from, which is that it puts together a whole lot of separate things that do not actually go together. Over the past hour and a half, we have debated three completely separate matters: the issue of the independence of the monitor, which is hugely important—my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s amendments in that regard are utterly compelling—along with the issue of wider conflicts of interest in the whole handling of the moratorium arrangements and the people who play a part in them, which again is a wider and separate issue. The third issue, which has been covered comprehensively by my noble friends Lord Hendy and Lord Hain, is the hugely important matter of consultation with the workforce and the priority to be given to employees and workers in these moratorium arrangements and anything that might follow from them. I hope that in his reply, the Minister will be able to pay substantial attention to all three of these areas.

I do not want to go over ground that has already been covered by my noble friends, but I would like to ask the Minister one specific question. In the early stages of the coronavirus crisis, the Government made great virtue of the fact that they were consulting employee organisations, trade unions and the TUC in order to create a consensus on the kinds of measures which would be needed to deal with it. Indeed, in the construction of the furlough scheme, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made great play of the fact that he had been talking to the general secretary of the TUC, Frances O’Grady. It is quite clear that there are concerns among trade unions about the whole way that these provisions will cut across established insolvency provisions and redundancy provisions. Therefore, I want to ask the Minister a specific question—or rather, two related questions.

First, what representations have been made to the Government about the role of employees and their interests in this Bill? Secondly, can he tell us whether he personally or any of his ministerial colleagues have met the TUC general secretary or officials from the TUC to discuss these provisions? I ask that because if we are seeking to proceed by consensus, by the time we get to Report, we will want to know what actual discussions have taken place with representatives of employees and whether we can satisfy ourselves that there has been adequate consultation. If not, the arguments made by my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Hendy are compelling when it comes to amendments that we will need to make on Report.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, as other noble Lords have mentioned, this Bill is an unusual combination of Covid-related measures that clearly need to be fast-tracked, along with measures to implement the long-held belief that we need an equivalent to the Chapter 11 procedures of the United States.

I do not think that a hybrid House is particularly well suited to scrutinising legislation, especially in Committee. I do not think we will be able to say that this is working well. We are making the best of a difficult situation but it only goes to show that in order to scrutinise the Government’s legislation properly, we need to get back to the proper House as soon as we can.

The only good point I might mention is that, for the first time since we went to Virtual Proceedings, in this Committee we have no time limits. It is so nice and such a relief that we do not have my noble friend the Minister turning round to scowl at us as soon as we have gone 10 seconds over the prescribed one minute or two minutes.

Amendment 1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to narrow the definition of persons entitled to be appointed as monitors from “a qualified person” to qualified accountants. I would not support this narrow definition because it may be too restrictive, especially for small enterprises. A monitor should be someone with a professional qualification, issued by a body whose members are carrying on a relevant regulated activity.

I agree with Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and my noble friend Lady Altmann. It is important that the monitor should be capable of independence and objectivity. The current IESBA—International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants—code of ethics definition of “independence” explains it as being made up of two elements: independence of mind and independence of appearance. The former is defined to include integrity, objectivity and scepticism. The latter is defined as being free from facts and circumstances that would lead

“a reasonable and informed third party”

to conclude that integrity, objectivity or scepticism was compromised.

I ask the noble Lord, or my noble friend, to confirm which definition of independence they would apply and whether it should be a strict, rules-based one, comprising a list of prohibitions of those related by blood, marriage, shareholding, et cetera, or a looser one, based on principles and objectivity. I hope that a sufficiently robust definition of independence could be included, so as to render unnecessary Amendment 42, in the names of my noble friends Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lady Altmann, which seeks to ensure that a monitor should not be exposed to any possible conflicts of interest.

As precise amounts can be difficult to assess, I support Amendment 4, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, rather than Amendment 3, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn. However, I agree that some kind of document showing the number of a company’s creditors would be useful to the court in making a decision on granting a moratorium. As explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that would assist the monitor in his or her duty to notify every creditor.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, makes a case in Amendment 10 for the extension of the initial period in relation to a moratorium from 20 to 30 business days; this means six weeks, rather than four. I think that 20 days should be enough, even for small companies. Obviously, it will not be enough time for a complex restructuring, but that is not the purpose of a moratorium as introduced in this Bill.

I support Amendments 12, 13, 17, 18, 30 and 31, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley. Like my noble friend, I also have spent more than 30 years as an investment banker, much of it doing mergers and acquisition business. Like him, I know just a little bit about this. In the case of companies which have both viable businesses and non-viable businesses, it may be that to rescue one or more of a company’s businesses is sensible in cases where a rescue of a whole company may not be realistic. Does my noble friend not therefore agree that his amendments would be improved further if, after “company”, they sought to insert, “or the whole, or some part, of the company’s business”? I understand that this issue was much discussed at the time of the Enterprise Act 2002. There are of course very many companies which contain only one, or one substantive, business. But surely, in other cases, it is the rescue of a business, as opposed to the rescue of a company as a legal entity, that is important.

I also support Amendment 27 in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann. Where an asset has been pledged to a company’s defined benefit pension scheme, it should not be within the powers of the court to release it for sale without the consent of the pension protection fund, as well as, surely, the trustees of the pension fund itself.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I am also minded to support Amendment 1, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, because it should not be too difficult a task for the directors to undertake and would be likely to save time afterwards, once the monitor starts his work. However, given that the noble and learned Lord has expressed satisfaction with what the Minister wrote to him, far be it from me to doubt his learned judgment on that matter.

I speak in support of Amendment 2 and the other amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh, to which I have added my name. I declare my interests as listed in the register. I know a little about corporate restructurings, having worked in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions for some 40 years. I thought that the amendments proposed in Committee by my noble friend made obviously good sense, and I have heard nothing from the Minister that causes me to change my mind—at least, so far.

As I mentioned in Committee last week, this question was discussed during the debates on the Enterprise Act 2002. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said in the debate in Committee that

“the greatest asset of a company is the people whom it employs … I believe that rescuing the company on its own is a pointless objective … the objective of preserving all or part of the company’s business would be beneficial to the employees of the business, creditors of the company who may be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the business or from future profits, and of course it would be beneficial to the economy as a whole”.—[Official Report, 29/7/02; cols. 764-65.]

My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts said on Report that

“by inserting … ‘and the whole or part of its business’… an administrative receiver or administrator”

would be empowered

“to deal even-handedly with the whole or part of the company’s business.”—[Official Report, 21/10/02; col. 1102.]

Of course, the views of my noble friends in 2002 related to a different Bill from the one before your Lordships’ House today, but I nevertheless believe that their comments are equally relevant to the points we are considering now. New Section A6(1)(e) requires a monitor to say that in his view it is likely that a moratorium would result in the rescue of the company as a going concern. Even if the monitor thinks that the company’s business, or some part of it, would be rescued if the company could obtain a moratorium, this would not provide sufficient grounds for the court to grant a moratorium.

Under the Enterprise Act 2002, obtaining a moratorium through administration is not as restrictive as proposed under the provisions of the Bill. It is necessary for an administrator to show that there is a reasonable likelihood of achieving one of three statutory objectives: rescuing the company as a going concern; achieving a better result for the creditors as a whole than would be likely on a winding up; and realising property in order to make a distribution to secured or preferential creditors. The second of those objectives is the one most often relied on as it includes the rescue of a business or one or more of several businesses when, as is often the case, it is impossible to show that the company as a whole can be rescued.

Prior to 2002, the position was the same, although the purposes of administration were not precisely the same. They were: the survival of the company and the whole or part of its undertaking as a going concern; the entering into of a creditors’ voluntary arrangement; the sanctioning of a scheme under Part 26 of the Companies Act; and a more advantageous realisation of the company’s assets than would be effected on a winding-up. Again, the last of those four options was the one relied on where, even though a company was doomed because of the burden of debt, its business or a part of its business could be rescued.

Under the new moratorium procedure, the only type of restructuring proposal that can be advanced is one that involves a company rescue. This means that the options available in a moratorium are significantly more limited than they would be in an administration. Perhaps the Minister can tell the House whether the Government are deliberately trying to restrict the use of moratoriums and do not want to give the directors that degree of freedom if they are trying to save the business but not the company.

However, very often when a business is successfully rescued the company may also be rescued, although that category of company would not be able to use this new procedure. I understand that the Government believe that if rescuing a company’s business were sufficient grounds for a moratorium to be granted, the company would be tempted to use the moratorium to prepare for a pre-pack administration. If this is the case, perhaps my noble friend the Minister could explain to the House why the Government think so.

As my noble friend Lord Leigh has already explained, companies as legal entities are hardly ever saved in an insolvency situation and the connection between widening the grounds for entering a moratorium and the possible abuse of the pre-pack mechanism is, I believe, tenuous at best. Pre-packs have developed as a mechanism for selling a company’s business immediately after it goes into administration, so that the administrator—not the directors—is responsible for breach of duty if the business or assets are sold for less than fair value. The moratorium is surely intended to prevent creditor action, but creditor action has never been a check on an abusive pre-pack. It would be a pity if the moratorium were to be limited to cases in which a debt restructuring is the only way forward, rather than other forms of business rescue.

In conclusion, I think that the Minister has shown great wisdom in introducing so many amendments to dispense with Henry VIII powers, which the Government had thought they might wish to include—although I share my noble friend Lord Leigh’s reservations about some of them in the event that they may restrict the Minister from providing enough comfort on the points that he and I have raised.

[Baroness Drake (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests and shall speak to Amendment 13 in my name. In this group the Government have brought forward helpful amendments to seek to prevent bank debts and other financial lendings that are accelerated during the moratorium from gaining super-priority status. This is a welcome change. However, serious risks remain of gaming to give current or future lenders access to super-priority, avoid pension liabilities and incentivise insolvency over rescue for certain creditors.

Amendment 13 would remove the exemption which payments in respect of pre-moratorium debts arising under a contract or instrument of financial services have from the payment holiday and from super-priority in the event of an insolvency process. Notwithstanding the Government’s amendments, real concerns remain that lenders may be able to circumvent their intent by the drafting of their lending agreements; the definition of accelerated debt could be sidestepped so that lenders can continue to bring forward debt and benefit from super-priority. It is unclear, for example, whether on-demand debt that is called during the moratorium would be caught by the definition of accelerated debt and debts accelerated prior to the moratorium would continue to be granted super-priority.

Adding to these concerns is the width of the definition of financial institution debt which would qualify for super-priority, covering intra-company loans, for example. In addition, finance debts due prior to or in the moratorium continue to be exempt from the payment holiday. Debts due to the pension scheme are not, would not be payable and would be outranked in subsequent insolvency. That exemption and the super-priority given to that financial debt, which are permanent provisions within the Bill, will inevitably lead to novel forms of moral hazard when it comes to pension liabilities.

This is a fast-track Bill containing permanent, major changes and scrutiny has consequently been fettered, but government Amendment 80 in this group gives a power enabling the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the definition of moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt. This is a welcome concession by the Government, because it implicitly recognises the arguments that many noble Lords have made that it allows the Government to respond to actual experience of gaming and perverse behaviours. Will the Minister confirm that the intention of Amendment 80 is to allow the Government to quickly address the risks other noble Lords and I have identified when they emerge and to change the definition of moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt in response? Will the Government commit to monitor closely the impact of the provisions on moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt, and to consult relevant bodies on the real concerns around super-priority status, the definition of accelerated debt and the implications for pension scheme debt?