Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

Viscount Stansgate Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The FIRS we announced yesterday includes the leadership of Russia, political parties that support the leadership of Russia and a number of other state apparatuses, including the security services in Russia. We have and we will, in due course, present to this House and the House of Commons a statutory instrument that sets out in detail the applicability of the FIRS. I hope that my noble friend can wait for that to see the detail of the specific organisations and individuals named under it.

In informing him of that, I also pay tribute to him and his work with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is done behind the scenes and appears only when reports such as the Russia report are published. I know, from spending four and a half years on that committee, that there is a tremendous amount of work going on under the surface all the time to both challenge the security services, Government Ministers and agencies on their performance on security and to make the sorts of recommendations that appeared in the Russia report to date.

I am pleased that my noble friend supports the Government’s position not to seek the publication of the unredacted report. For the reasons he has mentioned, this is about national security, and it is also about themes: The themes of the Russia report were that the Russian state was seeking to undermine UK democracy and be a malevolent actor and, as we have seen in Salisbury and in Ukraine since the Russia report, it is not a player on the international stage that abides by the rules. In producing that report, we have to withhold some aspects. It is welcome that my noble friend supports the Government’s approach to that issue.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the Statement. I broadly welcome it, and I think there is a broad, cross-party consensus on the national security requirements.

When I hear my noble friend talk about threats from Iran and Russia, as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy I can tell him that we looked in great detail at the nature of some of these threats—for example, in regard to ransomware—and produced a report on it.

The question I wanted to ask my noble friend relates to the political tier. I quote from the Statement:

“For the first time, Members of this House will now be able to check whether anyone who seeks to influence them is doing so at the direction of a foreign power”.


I wanted to raise the issue of all-party parliamentary groups, because one of the concerns that has been expressed over the years is that they could be a vehicle for unwanted influences—certainly financially—buying their way in and influencing the way all-party groups operate.

I am the president of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, which is the Parliament’s oldest all-parliamentary party group. I hope the Minister can reassure the House that this scheme will enable it to be absolutely clear that no all-party parliamentary group that operates in this House—or in Parliament generally—is in any way open to the type of foreign influence that this Statement is designed to prevent and that as a result Parliament can have confidence that all-party parliamentary groups will be protected under this scheme to some extent by the work being undertaken, and that when FIRS goes live, we will have this confidence open to view.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his work in this field and for his question. Where the scheme will be of best benefit is that it will allow greater transparency around individuals who may be influenced, in this case by Russia or, as in the previous announcement, by Iran. That gives confidence to parliamentarians particularly. Any individual who is engaged with or supporting an all-party group, in whatever shape and form they do that, will have had to make a declaration about foreign influence before they participate in any activity as a whole. After 1 July, that will be a public matter of record. If they do not declare it and are subsequently found to have such influence, they will be subject to severe penalty, tested by the police, the CPS and the court, and ultimately subject to penalties of potential long terms of imprisonment of up to five years. I hope that will bring a transparency and confidence to all-party groups in the event of individuals believing that such groups are somehow influenced or fronted by organisations which are seeking to do malevolent damage to the UK. It gives transparency and flushes that out. If anybody tries to do that in a secretive way and is found to be doing so, they will face a severe penalty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I apologise if I slightly overlooked part of the noble Lord’s question. The Government have not made a judgment on any ISC comment or recommendations. However, we are continually keeping under review every nation in relation to a potential FIRS. We have announced Iran. Yesterday, we announced Russia. All other potential designations are kept under constant review. On China, as I have said in the House before, we co-operate where we can, we challenge where we need to and we ensure that we maintain our national security interests. We will keep that under review, but I cannot give the noble Lord a running commentary on potential FIRS designations. They are not a matter for today, which is about Russia and recommitting to the FIRS declaration on Iran.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, if the House will forgive me for a quick follow-up question, the Minister referred to sector guidance. Will he issue sector guidance relating to Parliament itself?