Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Thursday 2nd May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, in preparing for today’s debate, I looked at the text of a lecture on the subject of the atmosphere and the threat of global warming that I delivered exactly 25 years ago, and which remains on my academic website. It does not seem to be out of date, for the reason that, by 1994, the science of global warming was well established. However, there were uncertainties about the speed of the onset of the process of global warming and its liability to be accelerated through feedback effects. One of those feedback effects is due to the melting of polar ice. It was uncertain how rapidly melting would proceed. Bare seawater is much more absorptive of radiation than are ice and snow, and their melting would serve to accelerate the process of global warming, but to an unknown extent. The melting of the permafrost releases large quantities of methane gas, which has a far greater warming effect than carbon dioxide; this will also serve to accelerate global warming. Photosynthesis, which captures carbon dioxide, and biological decay, which emits it, are both enhanced by warming, but it was uncertain which of these would advance more rapidly. However, the destruction of forests has proceeded at pace, which has reduced the rate of carbon sequestration.

A further reason for the uncertainties was the difficulty in predicting the human response to the crisis of global warming in its various phases. I asserted that the crisis, which was then presently threatened, would become imminent at some stage and then, in a short time, become actual. The nature of the human response would depend to some extent on the duration of these phases. The feedback processes have proved stronger than was widely imagined, and the human response has been much weaker, and the crisis has indeed become actual sooner than one might have imagined.

At the time, there was some optimism that effective action would be taken to staunch carbon dioxide emissions, but these have grown steadily. In 1994, the atmospheric concentration of CO₂ was less than 360 parts per million by volume. The emissions are following an exponential trend and, today, the concentration exceeds 400 parts per million. Ice core data suggest that the pre-industrial concentration was perhaps 275 parts per million. The ultimate effect of the present levels is bound to be disastrous. The eventual levels may be much higher.

The main reason for the increased burden of atmospheric carbon dioxide has been the advance of manufacturing and the increasing adoption of western lifestyles in the developing economies of Asia. American emissions have been largely unchecked, while in some European countries, such as the UK, they have declined slightly. We have passed rapidly from the era of recognition, when warnings were widely broadcast and timely action to avert a climate catastrophe was first called for, to the present era, which could be described as the age of reckoning, when the catastrophe is upon us. We have squandered our early opportunities and must now act with extreme urgency.

This country has achieved much less in reducing its carbon expenditure than many of us might imagine. It is true that, in generating electricity, we have largely replaced our coal-fired power stations with gas-fired plants and wind farms. Also, our total consumption of electricity is slightly less than it was in the 1980s. These developments have been enabled in the UK by an ongoing process of deindustrialisation. However, if we reckon the carbon costs of what we consume, these have not been reduced. Much of what we consume is now manufactured in countries in which carbon emissions have grown rapidly; other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made that point. Moreover, the climate change committee tells us that we are liable to miss the targets for the reduction of our domestic carbon emissions that were cast in legislation.

How should we react to these circumstances? I will describe three plausible reactions. The first is to adopt a counsel of despair. Our own carbon consumption must seem insignificant in relation to the global total. It can be asserted that our efforts at self-restraint in our emissions cannot have much of a global effect, that they cannot be to our advantage and that they will allow others to act with less restraint. I reject this outlook.

A second and more moral stance is to pursue the course of self-restraint with renewed vigour. It has been proposed that we should seek to exploit renewable sources of power—wind and sun—with increased determination, while enhancing the efficiency of our uses of energy. We should curtail our use of personal transport and insulate our houses. I support these nostrums of parsimony and abstemiousness. However, the difficulty with such a program of austerity is that it would be unlikely to afford us sufficient margins of additional power with which to pursue the electrification of heating and transport, which will be the key to further reductions in our emissions.

The third recommendation is that we should pursue, with the utmost vigour, a technological revolution in the generation and use of electrical power to produce a plenitude that would allow us to supplant all other sources of power. To achieve this, we need to build more nuclear power stations. The surplus power from these stations, which would occur at certain times if they are run at a constant level, should be used to generate hydrogen by electrolysis. The hydrogen would be a source of power in times of high demand for electricity. It should also be available for use in the fuel cells that should power our public and private transport. This technological revolution—the pursuit of which will demand courage—is liable to create a thriving economy, which should be capable of exporting to the rest of the world its solutions for confronting the scourge of global warming.

Corporate Governance

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do agree with my noble friend. I think that she will agree that we have done a great deal on corporate governance ever since we published the Green Paper in 2016, and there is the work done by the FRC and others right up to publishing and bringing into operation the new code in January of this year.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, our failure in corporate governance has enabled the City of London to consign many of our utilities and industries to foreign ownership. Are the Government doing anything to staunch this haemorrhage?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I did not say that there has been a failure in corporate governance, rather that it is right that the Government should be doing what they have been doing; hence the work of the FRC on the corporate governance code and the work instituted by the Government when we published our Green Paper back in 2016, for example.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hanworth]

I wonder if the noble Lord could answer my question more directly.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I believe that I have answered his question.

Nuclear Energy

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Viscount Hanworth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have for the future of nuclear power in the United Kingdom following the collapse of the NuGen consortium, and given the continuing uncertainty regarding the project for a small modular reactor.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and declare that I have recently been in China on a trip organised jointly by the Nuclear Industry Association and the China General Nuclear Power Corporation to inspect the HPR1000 nuclear reactor at Shenzhen.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government believe that nuclear power has an important role to play in our future low-carbon energy mix. This is clear from our commitment to Hinkley Point C, the first new nuclear power station in a generation, as well as from the launch of the nuclear sector deal in June, which outlines a new framework designed to encourage industry to bring viable small-reactor propositions to the marketplace.

[Viscount Hanworth]

I must thank the Minister for that Answer but, notwithstanding his assertion, the Government’s support for the nuclear industry has been half-hearted at best. They have missed the opportunity to establish a joint Anglo-French nationalised nuclear industry in conjunction with EDF, which would have had a global reach in the area of decarbonisation. Moreover, the Government have failed to give sufficient support to Rolls-Royce in its project to create a small modular nuclear reactor that might have had excellent export opportunities. The project has been held in abeyance for far too long. Are the Government content to allow our nuclear facilities to be constructed and owned preponderantly by overseas suppliers?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I think that is a bit rich from the noble Viscount who speaks, I presume, for a party that was in office for 13 years and did absolutely nothing to produce new nuclear power stations. We have produced a new nuclear power station and we have produced a nuclear sector deal that looks to enhance the sector and aims to support the 87,000 jobs in the sector and increase that number to some 100,000 jobs, and aims to see a 30% reduction in the cost of new-build projects and so on—I could go on. We are committed to the nuclear sector and will continue to be so.

Artificial Intelligence (Select Committee Report)

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, artificial intelligence is a concept that is not amenable to a precise definition, albeit many have been attempted. In a narrow sense, AI denotes the ability of machines to mimic the cognitive skills of human beings, including learning and problem-solving. In a broad sense, it denotes any decision-making that is mediated by the computer. The popular concept of AI has been greatly influenced by the test proposed by Alan Turing in 1950. Turing asserted that if an individual working for an extended period at a keyboard could not reliably determine whether their respondent was a human or a machine when it was in fact a machine, then that machine could be said to exhibit artificial intelligence.

This notion of artificial intelligence places a high requirement on the machine. It also engenders the fear and the anxiety that, with the advent of AI, people will be manipulated, increasingly, by impersonal and malign forces, devoid of human empathy and understanding. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, among others, alluded to such anxieties. A different and a carefree definition of artificial intelligence has been advanced by Larry Tesler. He has observed that AI connotes anything that has yet to be achieved by computers. What has already been achieved, such as speech recognition or optical character recognition, is liable to be regarded merely as computer technology.

Doubts about the definition are reflected in the introduction to the excellent report from the Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence by a word cloud illustrating definitions of artificial intelligence. The report also contains a brief history of the progress of AI, in which mention is made of the aspersion against James Lighthill that he was responsible for arresting its development in the UK via an adverse report delivered to the Science Research Council in 1973. Lighthill merely asserted that AI was not a coherent academic discipline and that, as such, it did not warrant specific funding. It should also be said that some of the concepts that appear to be at the forefront of modern endeavours, such as artificial neural networks and Bayesian learning, have been around for a very long time.

Notwithstanding these doubts about a definition, the committee has produced a well-focused report. Faced with the rapidly increasing application of computers in diverse spheres of decision-making, it highlights the hazards of their misapplication and advocates a wide range of measures that should be taken to counteract the dangers. To a lesser extent, it identifies steps that can be taken to maximise the benefits arising from the application of computers in decision-making.

Some of the hazards that the report has identified are well known. Among these is the criminal use of computers, commonly involving fraud and impersonation. These are too well known for me to dwell upon them at length: indeed, Members of Parliament are regularly alerted to such hazards. The threats to our democratic process from fake news and from personalised campaign messages conveyed by digital media have also achieved prominence recently. The novelty in these threats is in the power and the prevalence that they have achieved in consequence of the hugely increased processing powers of computers. The hazards that I wish to highlight are of a different kind. They stem to a large extent from the lack of numeracy on the part of many of our decision-makers, who may not have had any scientific education.

The first of these hazards is a tendency to spurious quantification, which might be described as an attempt to measure the unmeasurable. To many, it must seem that a hallmark of modern management is decision-making based on aggregate statistics and on the models of human and social interaction that can be derived from them. The educational sector at all levels has suffered from the ills of spurious quantification, which is most crudely represented by educational league tables. It is proposed that the multifarious activities of an educational establishment can be summarised in a single index purporting to represent the quality of its provision, and that this index can be used to determine its ranking in a long list of similar establishments. Aggregate measures of quality or performance are compounded by applying differential weights to incommensurable quantities and by adding them together. Chalk is mixed with cheese in arbitrary proportions to produce an indigestible amalgam.

For civil servants and administrators, the advantage of such summary measures lies in their ability to simplify the decision-making process, which often concerns financial and other kinds of support that must be given to the institutions. The statistics allow individual institutions to be removed from view and allow remote and uninformed decisions to be taken without any attendant qualms. I sometimes wonder whether the decision-makers would satisfy what I describe as the inverse Turing test—can they be clearly distinguished from robots? The onus of gathering the information that gives rise to the spurious quantification, or of producing accompanying self-justifications, falls upon the institutions in question. The demands can become so great as to impede their proper functioning.

For a long time, the primary and secondary tiers of our educational system have been subject to decisions arising out of their rankings. More recently, our universities have been subject to the same methodology. I have a clear view of the consequences, which I consider to be disastrous. The emphasis on statistical analyses has, of course, been fostered by the availability of computers. The lack of quantitative skills on the part of those who handle the information and their inability properly to interrogate it is a major hazard. The problem has been highlighted by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll.

Had I time to describe them fully I would dwell at length on some of the fiascos that have arisen from the Government’s attempt to adopt computerised information processing. One of the most prominent examples concerns the initial attempt by the NHS, some years ago, to create an integrated system of patient record-keeping. A large and unrecoverable sum of money was given to an American software company, which created nothing of any use. The episode illustrated one of the hazards of outsourcing. It was proposed that it would be far more efficient for the organisation to use the services of experts in matters of computing than to rely upon its own expertise. However, if there are no resident experts within an organisation, then it is usually incapable of assessing its own needs, or of envisaging a means of satisfying them. In that case, it is liable to be vulnerable to confusion and exploitation. The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, talked eloquently on that issue.

To those with whom I am serving on a Lords Finance Bill Sub-Committee, it seems clear that HM Revenue and Customs is in the act of creating a similar fiasco in its programme for making tax digital. It seems to me that, far from being new and unprecedented, the principal hazards of artificial intelligence are both familiar and mundane. They will be overcome only when we face up to the need to devote far more resources to enhancing the mathematical, the quantitative and the computer skills of our nation. The issue is a perennial one: are we to be the masters of our technology or its slaves?

Life Sciences Industrial Strategy (Science and Technology Committee Report)

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

In 2014, we witnessed an heroic corporate battle when the American drug company Pfizer mounted a hostile takeover bid for the Anglo-Swedish company AstraZeneca. The bid was successfully resisted. Many politicians were aghast at the prospect of such a large component of the British pharmaceutical industry disappearing into the maw of an American competitor. Some of the leaders of the Conservative Party were conflicted in their reaction to this prospect. The City of London derives much of its income by mediating such takeover bids, and the Conservatives favour the interests of the City. On the other hand, our pharmaceutical industry is one of the few British industries that can be said to be world leading; and the loss of one of its principal players would have severely diminished its status.

What was at fault in this episode was the failure of our weak laws of corporate governance to protect British companies from the depredations of foreign competitors. Other European countries, including France and Germany, have created strong barriers to protect their companies against such depredations and activities. It is appropriate, however, to take a closer look at AstraZeneca, which is representative of the large multinational pharmaceutical companies. Zeneca, which is the British component of the company, originated in 1993 from the demerger of the pharmaceutical operations of Imperial Chemical Industries. Zeneca combined with the Swedish Astra company in 1999. Since the merger, AstraZeneca has become one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies and has made numerous corporate acquisitions. In 2009, GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca were respectively the world’s fifth-largest and sixth-largest pharmaceutical companies, measured by market share. However, since then they have been sliding down the scale, and today they are seventh and 15th respectively.

AstraZeneca proudly boasts that its focus is on developing new medicines that would make a meaningful difference to patients’ lives; and says that the UK is right at the heart of efforts to achieve this. However, a very different impression is gained by looking at the list of its acquisitions, which have been the basis for its product lines. In this respect, it is probably no different from the majority of large pharmaceutical companies.

For an explanation of the structure of the international pharmaceutical industry, one must consider some of the fundamental economic determinants. Research to find new drugs and remedies is risky and expensive; and there are no guarantees of immediate success. The clinical trials that must precede the release of a new drug are bound to be protracted and expensive. The marketing of a new product requires considerable resources and an extensive sales force. For a while, a proprietary drug can reap huge benefits, but, eventually, the profits will disappear when the patent of the original drug expires. Then the product becomes a generic drug that can be cheaply manufactured and sold by other companies.

The consequence of these circumstances is that large pharmaceutical companies must maintain a steady stream of new drugs passing down the pipeline that runs from their clinical trials to their certification and marketing. To maintain the supply of new products, the companies are involved in an incessant process of wheeling and dealing and of mergers and acquisitions that absorb smaller start-up companies. The failure to maintain a sufficient product pipeline can cause a large company quickly to crash. Thus, at the time of the attempted acquisition by the American drug giant Pfizer, AstraZeneca was in a vulnerable state and Pfizer was also heading in that direction.

Had Pfizer succeeded in its takeover bid, it would have captured the product lines of AstraZeneca; and the likelihood is that it would have suspended the research activities of the company and divested it of its British employees. It seems clear therefore that our large pharmaceutical companies require much stronger protection against hostile takeovers. However, on looking further down the food chain, it seems clear that the smaller UK companies also require protection. They are the mainspring of pharmaceutical innovation; and to lose them to foreign takeovers would be to lose our international competitiveness.

We should also question whether past experience is the best guide to the future. Modern advances in biochemistry, genetics and cytology imply that, in future, the development of drugs and remedies might proceed in a very different direction. This might utterly alter the structure of the international pharmaceutical industry. The Government continue to adhere to the view that industry should lead the way in stimulating the practical application of biomedical research. The activities of the drug companies are determined largely by their commercial priorities, which are poorly aligned with public health requirements, but the Government appear to be largely unconcerned by this. The one exception to this aspersion is the concern that the Government have shown over the declining efficacy of antibiotics and the failure of the industry to undertake research to find replacements.

The activities of the drug companies could become more closely aligned with the interests of public health if our National Health Service were to exercise a greater leverage over them. This is one of the principal observations of the excellent report of the Science and Technology Committee that we are debating today. The Bell report, which was the precursor to the committee’s report, asserted that the NHS is potentially an enormous asset for those attempting to discover and develop new, innovative products and to test their utility in a healthcare system. Given the decentralised structure of the NHS, which is a product of the reforms of the Conservative Government, the organisation lacks a coherent purchasing policy that could redress the power of the large pharmaceutical companies. The result is that many new products that are too costly to afford are denied to NHS patients. A better integration of NHS IT and data services could greatly facilitate clinical trials as well as epidemiological research, and the NHS could thereby become a driving force in medical innovation.

However, these prospects are being severely stymied by Brexit. We have learned that already the EU certification of pharmaceuticals, which has been taking place largely in the UK where the European Medicines Agency has been based, is now taking place elsewhere. The agency will transfer to Amsterdam when the UK leaves the EU. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, our clinical trials will lose their validity as far as the EU is concerned and will have to be conducted elsewhere, or at least in conjunction with an EU partner. This is not the worst of it. Last night we heard from the BBC of the likelihood that the research staff of the Francis Crick Institute would leave in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Some 40% of them are from the European Union and, of those, 78% have declared that they are unlikely to stay. In fact, 51% of all the research staff have said the same. The reasons given are the hostile environment, which will inhibit free movement, and the lack of research funds, of which there will be no guarantee beyond 2020. The carelessness of the protagonists of Brexit who dismiss all such concerns is incomprehensible to many of us.

Brexit: Energy Security (European Union Committee Report)

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Wednesday 6th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I will deal with only one or two aspects of energy security. The present state of the electricity supply industry in the UK has been determined by two major and virtually contemporaneous events: the discovery and exploitation of North Sea gas, and the privatisation of the industry. These events have determined both the predominant technology of the electricity supply industry and the means by which it markets its output.

Prior to privatisation, generating capacity was provided predominantly by large coal-fired power stations. The last of these to be constructed was the massive Drax power station, which was commissioned in 1987. This was shortly before the passage of the Electricity Act 1989, which prepared for the privatisation of the electricity industry in Great Britain. The privatised industry was no longer capable of large capital investments on the scale of the Drax power station, nor was there any possibility of the industry pursuing nuclear power generation; instead, the new generating capacity was provided, almost exclusively, by combined-cycle gas turbine plants fuelled by North Sea gas.

The fact that private enterprise was able to provide the new infrastructure of our electricity generating industry seemed to confirm the opinion of Conservative Governments that the private sector could be relied upon to provide much of the social and industrial infrastructure that had hitherto been the responsibility of central government. Latterly, that opinion seems to have been confirmed by the manner in which private industry has financed and constructed most of the renewable generating capacity in this country. However, by relying on private enterprise to provide the infrastructure, we have allowed both a dearth and an imbalance to affect our generating capacity.

Soon we shall be facing a severe shortfall in our capacity for baseload generation, which is a necessary adjunct to our increasing reliance on intermittent renewable generation. To provide for our electricity in the future while pursuing a policy of decarbonisation, we need to build new nuclear power plants. So far, the only nuclear power station under construction in the UK is at Hinkley Point in Somerset. The Government have been unwilling to provide the necessary funding. It has therefore incurred the exorbitant costs of private finance, at a time when the interest rates associated with government borrowing have been at an all-time low.

In consequence of the privatisation of the industry, the UK has led the way in devising flexible and innovative ways of marketing electricity via a system of futures markets. This is relied upon to equate the supply with a demand that varies in annual, weekly and daily cycles. Our system of energy markets has been adopted by the European Union. It is ironic that, in pursuing the Brexit agenda, we will be divorcing ourselves from a European internal energy market—IEM—that has been largely a product of our own endeavours. Our committee’s report makes it clear that there will be significant disadvantages if we cannot remain part of the IEM. It instances the circumstances of Norway and Switzerland, which are constrained to abide by the rules of the IEM without having any influence over its policies.

I turn to some issues that have arisen out of what has been described as one of the most outstanding of the self-inflicted injuries of Brexit: the decision to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community —Euratom, as it is commonly called. The decision to withdraw has given rise to the Nuclear Safeguards Bill. Euratom has provided much more for us than an inspection regime for ensuring that radioactive material does not fall into the wrong hands. It governs the supply of fuel and all the nuclear engineering materials and equipment that come to us from abroad. It facilitates international exchanges of personnel trained in nuclear technology. It governs the acquisition and supply of medical radioactive isotopes. It funds an extensive nuclear research and development programme, including the programme for nuclear fusion.

Euratom, which predates the Common Market, was established in 1957, and exists largely independently of the European Union. However, in a speech of 17 January 2017, Theresa May declared that she would not countenance,

“anything that leaves us half-in, half-out”,

of the European Union. Since the European Court of Justice plays a marginal role in its affairs, Euratom was judged to be half-in, half-out of the European Union and, therefore, an organisation that the UK was bound to leave.

On leaving Euratom, the functions of nuclear safeguarding will have to be assumed by the Office for Nuclear Regulation—ONR—which is the UK’s nuclear regulatory agency. To have all the necessary facilities in place by March 2019 will be impossible, and it is doubtful whether other nuclear nations would be convinced of the adequacy of our provisions, as they must be if we are to continue to co-operate with them. There have been fears on the part of the nuclear industry that unless the status of the ONR as a viable safeguarding authority can be ratified by the date of our formal departure from the EU, and unless all the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements with overseas suppliers of nuclear fuel and materials are in place, we shall have to close down our nuclear power plants. However, today we have passed an amendment to the Nuclear Safeguards Bill that will enable the Government to approach the European Council with a plea to be allowed to remain under the auspices of Euratom if the necessary arrangements are not in place in good time. The Government have simply reworded a Lords amendment that was passed on Report on that Bill in the face of their opposition.

I turn to the matter of our access to the skilled labour that will be required for the various nuclear infrastructure projects that are either mooted or already under way. It is vital that these projects should proceed in a timely manner if we are to have an electricity supply industry that meets our needs while fulfilling the objectives of decarbonisation. I am told that the Government are carefully considering a range of options for the future immigration system and will set out initial plans in the coming months. This is where the difficulty lies. We have no idea as yet of the sorts of allowances that will be offered to the industry in respect of the EU and non-EU nationals whom they might wish to recruit.

I am aware that the Government have received strong representations from some of the companies involved in projects for new nuclear power stations. The most prominent of these is EDF, which has repeatedly reminded the Government of the skills shortages that it will face in connection with the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station. The limitation in the supply of civil engineering workers, including welders, steel fixers and concrete pourers, is a particular concern of EDF. These are the kinds of workers who are liable to be excluded by an immigration policy that gives priority to so-called tier 1 immigrants of “exceptional talent” who possess high-level professional or academic qualifications.

I should also mention the concerns of Rolls-Royce, which is engaged in a project for the construction of small modular nuclear reactors. It continues to await a long-delayed decision from the Government regarding the outcome of a competition to identify the reactor of best value for the UK. There may come a point soon when the company can no longer sustain its project in the face of the continuing uncertainties. Rolls-Royce is committed to training a native nuclear workforce but should it walk away from this project, which is quite likely, Britain will lose much of its nuclear engineering competence.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 20th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I very much respect the expert opinion of the noble Lords who have tabled this amendment. I share their concern about whether the ONR is going to be sufficiently staffed in time, with enough appropriately qualified experts who can quickly take up all the safeguarding duties. It is also essential that the ONR should have the necessary budgets and organisation and enough duly authorised persons in order to carry out its duties. I should like to hear from the Minister that he is satisfied that this will be the case.

I should also like to ask the Minister exactly what our status is going to be during the interim or implementation period, assuming that we have managed, before March 2019, to put in place an IAEA-approved safeguards regime. This is unlikely because I think we will need most of the implementation period till the end of 2020 to establish and enter into the new NCAs, at least with our principal nuclear trading partners. Many of them have to go through their own legislatures and we have no means of guaranteeing how smoothly this will be done. I think we can be confident that it is equally in their interests to make sure that they continue the appropriate arrangements with the United Kingdom as a major player in the nuclear sector.

I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Broers, and the other noble Lords who have tabled this amendment, fail to recognise that there is an upside from our leaving Euratom. It has been suggested that it is a mistake, and that we could have remained within Euratom but left the EU. Even if this were so—and I do not know whether I believe it or not—I think there are good reasons why we would do better to have our own safeguards regime approved by the IAEA and to escape from the rather cumbersome and onerous Euratom process.

Other noble Lords were present at the briefing given by Mr Colin Parker of EDF. I have also been told by Dr Pat Upson, former director of BNFL and Urenco and former chief executive of ETC—the joint venture between Urenco and EDF—that there could certainly be advantages to the UK in having an independent safeguards regime and not seeking to replicate Euratom safeguards which concentrate too much on complicated verification processes and are less robust than IAEA requirements on process, procedures and controls.

There are those who believe that our security in this very sensitive sector will also be enhanced if we are not obliged to share all the details of our research and development programme with the 27 members of Euratom. There is, therefore, a considerable upside. Euratom is also too expensive. To replicate Euratom’s safeguards regime does not provide extra safety or security over what is required by the IAEA. I therefore have some reservations about proposed new subsection (3)(c) of the noble Lord’s amendment regarding the necessity to continue to share research and development entirely with the Euratom community.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I am inclined to clap a hand on my head and express my utter amazement at the absurdity of this aspect of the Brexit agenda.

We are at present attempting to mitigate the deleterious consequences of a wholly unnecessary programme of the Government for leaving the Euratom consortium. The present amendment, which is supported by all other parties, foreshadows an inevitable outcome. The programme to leave Euratom will not be fulfilled by March 2019, when we shall formally leave the European Union, and the Government will have to bid for extra time. A similar amendment ought to have been brought forward by the Government. Their need to demonstrate their faith in Brexit may have prevented their doing so. Indeed, they have fostered some dangerous delusions. At the outset, the Government evinced an unreasonable optimism in the ability of the ONR to have the necessary security arrangements in place by March 2019. They have since become convinced that they will be able to negotiate a meaningful transition period thereafter from which our nuclear industry could profit. I believe that, notwithstanding recent events, it is far from certain that a workable agreement on a transition period will be reached. Certainly, a secure agreement has not yet been reached.

The Government also have an unjustified optimism regarding the likelihood that the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements, or NCAs, will be in place in time to avert a crisis in the supply of nuclear fuels and engineering materials. Without these NCAs in place, the generation of our electricity by nuclear power and the construction of the new nuclear power stations are likely to grind to a halt. Let me elaborate on these three points in the order that I have raised them, albeit that, in doing so I am conscious that I will repeat some familiar arguments. It is necessary to do so in the face of the obtuseness of the Government.

First is the question regarding the readiness of the ONR to assume the burden of nuclear safeguarding by March next year. Doubtless the Minister will attest that the ONR has declared that it is willing and able to undertake the task, and that it is working hard to meet the deadline. One is bound to retort, “It would say that, wouldn’t it?” But it has also said much else besides, which makes it abundantly clear that the best that it could achieve by that date is a threadbare organisation that would be severely understaffed. These honest admissions on the part of the ONR of its incapacity do not seem to have registered fully with the Government. However, they may have registered with other agencies that participate in the international nuclear regime. I am thinking of the foreign organisations that will require that we should have a proficient nuclear safeguarding regime in place if they are to continue to be our suppliers.

Next, there is the Government’s optimism regarding the likelihood of our being granted a lengthy transition period to ease the demands of Brexit. We have heard a statement recently from Michel Barnier to the effect that he sees a prospect for a rapid advancement of the negotiations, but he has insisted that all this depends on the precondition of an arrangement regarding the Irish border. I wonder how this sounds in the ears of the responsible government Ministers. Have they been listening more to the upbeat tone of the delivery of the message than to the preconditions that it asserts? To many listeners the message serves only to increase the anxiety that there will be no viable transitional arrangements.

The final point to make concerns the nuclear co-operation agreements or NCAs. The importance of enacting these in good time has been stressed repeatedly by EDF, which is the owner of Britain’s existing fleet of nuclear power stations and the constructor of the first of what is planned to be a new fleet. These are surely the people to whom we should be listening. The NCAs can be established only when there is a viable UK nuclear safeguarding regime in place. There is likely to be a considerable hiatus between the time when a new UK nuclear safeguarding regime is up and running and the enactment of the necessary NCAs. The Government have said nothing about how they would accommodate the inevitable delays. As many have mentioned, one is mindful of the fact that a new NCA with the United States will require to be ratified by the Senate. This could be a hazardous and lengthy process. The US has a nuclear industry of its own. Someone in the US legislature might be minded to promote the commercial interests of the American industry at the expense of ours and at the expense of the French, who own our nuclear power stations. I believe that this amendment foreshadows an inevitable outcome. The Government will be bound to take the steps proposed in the amendment.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I agree about the importance of consultation, as noble Lords will know, and also about the proper resourcing of the ONR. However, I am nervous about the precedent set by proposed subsection (9)(b) in the amendment. It would be very difficult if this was established as a new approach to SIs. As the Minister knows, resources are sometimes constrained when you bring in new legislation, but that is not a reason not to proceed with regulations. I recall milk quotas, where a vast amount of administrative work was involved—but that did not mean to say that it was not right to proceed with that part of EU policy at that time.

It is also not clear how many people will need to be involved in resourcing work. I accept that this is a problem in the nuclear area, but I would guard against putting that sort of provision into legislation—although it might be that the amendment is purely exploratory. I very much agree that we need comfort on resourcing for the ONR, and I thought that the Minister gave us some comfort when he last spoke.

I have another question for the Minister about transition. The draft withdrawal agreement published yesterday covers Euratom—slightly to my surprise, because I believed and hoped it would be in a separate instrument. But that is as it is; it is in the draft document. I am interested to know, since the document also covers transition, whether that means that Euratom will be part of any transition agreement likely to be agreed in the coming weeks and months. Confirmation of that would be helpful because it bears on some of the other concerns we have had about the process of bringing nuclear safeguards into UK law—and of course the resourcing and the time for the ONR to do a proper job are critical.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I discern from the letter sent on 20 February by the Minister to the Lords who have participated in the various stages of the Bill so far that the Government intend to impose most of the costs of a nuclear safeguarding regime on the civil nuclear industry. It is clear that the regime will deal mainly with matters that are remote from the everyday concerns of the civil industry. Therefore, it seems inappropriate that it should be asked to bear most of the costs. Be that as it may, it is appropriate that it should be consulted regarding provisions of statutory regulations. This is not what is being called for directly in the amendments. However, unless the Government signal clearly that they intend to consult the industry, this is something they should be enjoined to do by an amendment to be brought forward on Report.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I support what my noble friend, Lady Neville-Rolfe, just said. I would also be cautious about including in the Bill a requirement to ensure that there should be sufficient staffing, because it is not a good reason to decide whether to put in a certain control. Obviously everything the Government undertake to do must be properly staffed.

I ask the Minister to confirm whether the Government consider that a transition period will be necessary for Euratom as well as for the EU generally. I had understood that the Government expected to put in place a satisfactory accredited nuclear safeguards regime before March next year, although I understand that certain doubts have been expressed about whether that is feasible in the time available, given the necessity to obtain the consent of various other countries’ legislatures, with which we would have to establish new nuclear co-operation agreements. Could the Minister tell the Committee whether a transition period for Euratom is envisaged?

I question what the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, said about Euratom standards being better than IAEA standards. I understand that the Government’s intention and commitment is ultimately to reach Euratom standards, but I am not sure there is any evidence that Euratom’s standards are better than IAEA standards. Two weeks ago at a briefing by a representative of EDF, together with the NIA, we heard that, in his opinion, the safety standards set by the IAEA are more robust on process, procedures and controls than those set by Euratom and that Euratom concentrates heavily on verification processes that may or may not add anything to achieving a satisfactory level of safeguards. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on that.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy for the questions raised in this debate and I start by associating myself with support for the nuclear industry and for nuclear R&D. As the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, said, the nuclear industry was founded in this country.

I support the Bill, as I think that we need to plan for the withdrawal from Euratom in a responsible way. The Bill is relatively clear, and we have seen the draft implementing regulations, which are very helpful—I thank the Minister for that. As in other Brexit areas, the Government need to put EU provisions into UK law because many people in this country have told us that that is what they want. I believe that, as a scrutinising Chamber, we need to progress matters technically and that we should provide the powers that the Energy Ministers need to negotiate the necessary nuclear agreements and to strengthen the ONR.

However, I want to make one point which perhaps builds a little on what has been said by my noble friend Lord Trenchard. If we crash out of the EU in March 2019 or, alternatively, at the end of an agreed implementation period, will the Minister consider informing the EU at that point that we would like to reverse the bespoke Article 50 for Euratom and put up with a little bit of potential ECJ involvement—at least until an association agreement with Euratom is arranged or a relevant trade agreement with the EU is finalised? Once the air clears, the two sides will be bound to return to the negotiating table and will no doubt start to agree things on important areas such as nuclear.

I am not sure that my concern calls for an amendment to the Bill but we must avoid any risk of enhanced nuclear non-proliferation and the industry disruption and damage that would go with it. Therefore, if we could find a way of retaining some flexibility in the event of a bad outcome, that could be helpful, and I shall be grateful if the Minister has anything to say by way of reassurance. I had thought that perhaps we should not go ahead with this Bill but, by looking at it carefully, I have been persuaded that we need to get on with it.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments propose an associate membership of Euratom. In effect, they propose a deferment of our severance from Euratom and possibly even an indefinite deferment.

There is a marked contrast between the bland assurances we have received from the Government that everything regarding nuclear safeguards will be in place by March 2019 and the anxieties expressed by other parties, including, in a professionally restrained manner, the ONR, which is due to assume the duties of nuclear safeguarding. It has indicated that it is struggling to meet the deadline. The regime that it might have in place by March will be decidedly understaffed, and surely the danger that the deadline will be missed fully justifies the provisions of these amendments.

There are also anxieties regarding the ability to establish the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements with third parties in a timely manner. Such agreements depend on the existence of a nuclear safeguarding regime that is compliant with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it will take some time to achieve this. We are fearful that the requirement that a nuclear co-operation agreement with the USA be ratified by the Senate will give rise to a lengthy hiatus during which our nuclear industry may be deprived of some essential supplies.

There is also the matter of medical isotopes, which it is appropriate to raise at this juncture. The Minister has told us that the Government take their continued availability most seriously and assures us that this issue is quite distinct from nuclear safeguarding. Well, it is not a matter that is separate from our membership of Euratom. Euratom appears to have played a significant role in ensuring their continued and timely availability when they have been extremely scarce. By leaving Euratom prematurely we shall be prejudicing the security of our supplies, and this is a good reason for deferring our departure.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I have some sympathy with the intent behind these amendments. I will not go over the very interesting responses last night to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath; I would just like to make a few brief comments.

A report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee in other place states:

“We conclude the Government should seek to retain as close as possible a relationship with Euratom, and that this should include accepting its delivery of existing safeguards requirements in the UK”.


The MPs on the committee warned that the impacts of leaving Euratom would be “profound”, putting the UK in,

“a much weaker position to drive regulatory standards”,

at an EU level.

Last week, the EDF corporate policy and regulation director said:

“The UK still lacks the replacement rules needed to fuel its nuclear reactors after”,


the country quits the EU. EDF also told the House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee:

“The Euratom Treaty is currently vital to the functioning of nuclear energy generation in the UK. Failure to replace its provisions by the point of withdrawal could result in the UK being unable to import nuclear materials, and have severe consequences for the UK’s energy security”.


The UK’s Nuclear Industry Association, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, said that,

“the Bill does not provide enough certainty for the industry and the government should be pushing for a transitional agreement”.

Finally, according to City A.M., Vote Leave campaign director Dominic Cummings, in rather colourful language, lambasted government plans to leave the European nuclear agency as “near-retarded”.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill is slim by the standards of Brexit Bills, but this belies the importance of the issues it addresses. The Bill makes provisions for the eventuality that the UK will leave the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom, to give its common name. In its place, we should have to establish a new safeguards regime to oversee the security of our nuclear materials. Euratom has provided much more for us than an inspection regime for ensuring that radioactive material does not fall into the wrong hands. It governs the supply of fuel and all the nuclear engineering materials and equipment that come to us from abroad. It facilitates international exchanges of personnel trained in nuclear technology. It governs the acquisition and supply of medical radioactive isotopes and it funds an extensive nuclear research and development programme.

Euratom is governed by the International Atomic Energy Agency—the IAEA—which is an organisation affiliated to the United Nations. It mediates our relationships with third-party countries. On leaving Euratom, we should have to establish individual nuclear treaties with each of those nations. Even now, there remains doubt as to whether it is necessary, in any case, for the UK to sever its connection with Euratom. The legal opinions on the matter have been divided. It is clear that the Ministers most closely involved are far from enthusiastic about the prospect of this divorce.

The die was cast at the beginning of 2017 when, in a flurry of Written and Oral Statements, the Government asserted that there would be no room for compromise in exiting the European Union. Thus, in a speech on 17 January, the Prime Minister asserted that there is to be no,

“partial membership of the European Union, associate membership … or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out …We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave”.

Euratom is an international organisation founded in 1957, as we have heard, and is legally distinct from the European Union. However, since the European Court of Justice plays a marginal role in its affairs, Euratom was judged to be half in the European Union and, therefore, an organisation that the UK is bound to leave.

During Second Reading of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill in the Commons on 16 October 2017, the Minister Greg Clark emphasised:

“Triggering article 50 of the treaty on European Union also requires triggering article 50 on membership of Euratom”.


He also asserted:

“That is not just the Government’s view; it is the European Commission’s view, too”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/17; col. 618.]


He proceeded to quote a declaration to this effect that had been made in the European Parliament. It appears that the European Commission and the European Parliament have been happy to go along with the view of the UK Government. The Government’s insistence on a clean break from European institutions has led to a perverse outcome that we are now coming to regret. It is arguable that, had we taken a different approach at the outset, we would not now be faced with the need to enact the present Bill. The trouble that is entailed in leaving Euratom might be mitigated by the proposed two-year transition period after our formal departure from the European Union in March 2019.

Leaving Euratom imposes tasks that would be impossible to accomplish by that date of departure. There have been numerous testimonies regarding the expense and the damage that will result from leaving Euratom, and they bear some repeating. In the UK, more than 100 facilities and locations are currently subject to Euratom safeguards and inspections. The Office for Nuclear Regulation—the ONR—which is the UK’s nuclear regulatory agency, has repeatedly asserted that it will be unable to implement equivalent safeguarding standards by March 2019. To deliver the new domestic regime, the ONR will need to double the number of its inspectors by 2019 and triple the number by 2021. The costs of purchasing and installing replacement equipment would, in its testimony,

“likely be well in excess of £150m”.

Once established, the regime is expected to involve an ongoing cost of £10 million per annum. Without safeguards and nuclear co-operation agreements, critical areas of nuclear trade and research collaboration would cease. The United States, on which we depend for nuclear equipment, will not trade with us unless a regime is in place. Moreover, a new safeguards regime will need to be implemented before any nuclear co-operation agreements can be concluded and ratified. That is to say, none of the necessary third-party nuclear co-operation agreements, or NCAs, can be negotiated in advance of a settled regime.

At present, in excess of 20% of our power is provided by nuclear energy. The flow of nuclear goods and services that are required to sustain this output cannot continue without a safeguards regime. The construction of new nuclear power stations requires the importation of specialised equipment and personnel that is regulated by the codes of the IAEA. EDF, which is overseeing the construction of a nuclear power station at Hinkley Point, has expressed grave anxieties in this connection. In a very telling memorandum, it has revealed the extent of the international co-operation that was required to overcome a seemingly minor operational problem affecting the Sizewell B reactor, which arose when a seal on one of the heating elements failed. The supply chain involved France and the USA as well as the UK. Its point is that an impaired access to the international supply chain is bound to prejudice the safe and reliable operation of our nuclear power stations.

The UK hosts important nuclear research facilities, including the Joint European Torus at Culham, which is currently funded largely by Euratom. The Government have undertaken to meet the costs of JET until 2020. Thereafter, the future of the Culham enterprise is in doubt.

The next phase of the international fusion programme entails the construction of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, which is being constructed in Provence, France. ITER, which will exploit the developments at Culham, is one step away from an operational power plant. If we cease to be fully involved in this enterprise, we will squander our intellectual capital and forgo some significant business opportunities for British enterprises.

These troubles, and more besides, are the consequence of an ill-considered and intransigent attitude on the part of the Government in pursuit of their Brexit agenda. These difficulties could be mitigated to some extent if we were prepared to contract the delivery of our safeguards regime to Euratom, while maintaining our overall responsibility. In fact, this has been proposed in a recent report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee of the House of Commons. There is no other reasonable course of action.