Public Order Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office
Viscount Hailsham Portrait Viscount Hailsham (Con)
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My Lords, I rise to speak briefly in support of the Bill—briefly because I want to focus on the main purposes of the Bill and on the principles that underpin it.

I acknowledge that there are major concerns that have been expressed by many of your Lordships, as well as in the House of Commons, about the constraints that the Bill undoubtedly imposes on the right of individuals to protest or to express their views. I hope that Ministers will be sensitive to those criticisms when the Bill is considered in Committee and on Report. That said, I do think that the Bill in its essential respects is a proportionate and necessary response to a growing problem.

The truth is that democratic societies have always accepted that there is a balance to be struck between the rights of an individual to protest and the rights of other members of society not to have their lives unreasonably disrupted by such actions. The rights to free expression, assembly and association are important, but they are not absolute in the sense that they can be exercised whatever the consequences for other people. Thus, in the context of free speech, society has long accepted limitations, such as in the law of defamation in civil law. In criminal law, there are many more illustrations: the most recent are the prohibitions on the use of racist language or language likely to cause distress or put minorities at risk. I suspect that many of those who protest in the way that this Bill has sought to address would support those particular restrictions.

Some constraints have also been placed on the right to demonstrate. My noble friend the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to Clause 9, regarding buffer zones to prevent demonstrations around abortion clinics, which was debated in the House of Commons on 18 October. I agree with the majority in the House of Commons that buffer zones should be created, but I accept that it is undoubtedly a serious restriction on the right to free expression and the right to assembly. My own feeling is that the buffer zones get the balance right and are certainly justified by Articles 10(2) and 11(2) of the convention—but I accept that this is a matter on which there are, reasonably, competing views.

I turn directly to Clauses 1 and 8, which address tactics much favoured by the present generation of protesters, such as locking on, tunnelling, and the obstruction of major transport works and of key national infrastructure. In my view, the restrictions imposed on such activities by the Bill are clearly justified. Locking on, disrupting the highway and interfering with rail travel impede and often prevent fellow citizens going about their daily business—going to work, taking their children to school, shopping, visiting elderly relatives and keeping medical appointments. In such circumstances, the activities of the protesters will frustrate the essential work of the emergency services. These consequences, in my opinion, are a wholly unreasonable interference with the rights of others, and the disruptive consequences are intended. I regard such actions as profoundly selfish and to be roundly condemned.

So too is the promotion of strongly held views by acts designed to impede the normal requirements of an interdependent state, or acts designed to frustrate policy objectives duly approved by properly constituted institutions, often elected. I have in mind, for example, tunnelling to frustrate HS2 or the blocking of fuel supplies to promote specific climate change policies. I regard these actions as an abuse of freedom. In my view, they are wrong in principle. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, they divert police resources from more pressing demands. They often provoke citizens to take the law into their own hands, which undermines the basis of a civil society. They also display a fundamental contempt for democratic and representative government. So I am firmly behind the purpose of the Bill.

Some of the opposition to this Bill relies on historical analogies—on the suffragettes, whom the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, on the actions of the ANC in apartheid South Africa, and on the civil disobedience now going on in Iran. Of course, there are many other cases that can be cited, both historical and contemporary. But we should be very careful not to use such examples as justifying similar action in the United Kingdom.

Our democracy is by no means perfect. Many of its defects were identified by my father when he wrote and spoke about the “elective dictatorship”. Incidentally, he would have been deeply shocked by some of the actions and much of the conduct of Mr Johnson—not something that he would have expected from a Conservative Prime Minister. However, we live in a society in which policies can be changed by elections, by a change of Government, through discussion and by the force of public opinion.

Our task in Parliament is surely to identify the correct balance between the right of individuals to protest and the right of others not to be unreasonably interfered with. Many of the critics of this Bill suggest that the constraints on free speech and the right to protest go too far. Although I think that the under- lying purposes of the Bill are correct and should be supported, I hope, as I have said, that the Government will be sensitive to the detailed criticism of the Bill that has been and will continue to be expressed in this place.

There is always a danger, which I accept, that when seeking to address issues of public order Governments will go too far. Powers once given are hard to withdraw. Such powers will often be abused. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans who made precisely that point.

Also, I have to say I treat with great caution recent policies coming out of the Home Office, especially when they were fashioned at a time when Miss Patel was the Home Secretary, although I have to say I treat with equal caution policies that have the authority of the present Home Secretary. I am amazed that, when Attorney-General, Miss Braverman should have advised that the doctrine of necessity justified a breach of recently made treaty obligations with the European Union. Surely it is a case of providing a legal argument, however bad, in order to provide cover for a previously determined policy outcome.

We will need to look carefully at, for example, a whole variety of the provisions contained in the Bill, such as the power to stop and search without suspicion, the power that enables courts to make a serious disruption prevention order in the absence of a conviction, the management content of such orders and the power of the Secretary of State, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, to seek injunctions. There are serious criticisms to be addressed, and they may require serious amendments. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified a number of issues. However, that said, I believe that the fundamental purpose of the Bill is correct, and I hope that in its essential elements it will receive the consent of this House.