International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill

Viscount Eccles Excerpts

Friday 27th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I have no interest to declare save that some of my best friends are in the Treasury. The argument has been made about a signal. I think that it is an important signal to the developing world and to other countries, which are manifestly failing in respect of the moneys that they spend. It would certainly give us a greater lever to use with regard to that, although I am not so convinced by that argument.

However, I notice—and I will be very brief—that the argument used, very powerfully, by those who have spoken in favour of the amendment is rigour and accountability. They speak as if no accountability is likely. There are a number of accountability mechanisms, one of which is of course the Select Committee. The Select Committee is able to throw a searchlight on mistakes that are made by any government department so that any middle-ranking civil servant or higher civil servant who made the decision knows that at any stage they may be hauled before the committee and asked to justify their action or lack of action, which can be extremely embarrassing. Of course, the proposal then is retrospective, but it has relevance for any future decisions. It is also certainly a corrective for anyone particularly in a ministry such as this, which is more than most subject to pressure groups and non-governmental organisations from outside, and it gives them a degree of rigour.

Equally, of course, one has the NAO. That very powerful report—and I have not heard DfID give a very convincing reply to this—showed the extent to which there was a readiness to spend almost for the sake of spending. All of us, and perhaps most of us, have been in such positions. I recall once having an entertainment allowance; as I had only spent 50% of it by the end of the year, I ensured that I used up the rest of the money very quickly in the last few weeks—so there is that temptation.

Those noble Lords who have spoken thus far seem to ignore the relevant clause, Clause 5, where again there is a mechanism for accountability. There is accountability, and the danger is that if we were to accept this amendment, it would be rather like the French “en principe”. Yes, of course we are all in favour of aid and of 0.7% of GNI in principle, but if this amendment were to be accepted it would effectively drive a coach and horses through the Bill.

[Viscount Eccles (Con)]

My Lords, I speak as somebody who was part of the aid programme for a number of years with the Commonwealth Development Corporation and who was subjected to Treasury discipline. At the time, in today’s money we were responsible for about £3 billion of assets. Under the statutory arrangements of the day, we were partly responsible to the Foreign Office and partly to the ODA. The ODA arranged the monitoring meetings at which we would account for how we were getting on with the income and expenditure related to £3 billion of assets. In the run-up to the meeting, the discussions we had within CDC were all about what the Treasury official would ask us in the meeting which followed. From our point of view, in formal terms, the Treasury official had no right to be there, but of course the Treasury has a way of being where it wants to be.

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[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, this amendment, like the last one, is about more than public expenditure control, important though that is. It is, as my noble friend has just emphasised, about flexibility. Why is there an essential need for flexibility? Because the fundamental views about the relationship between ODA, development and the eradication of poverty are changing fundamentally all the time—and certainly will change radically over a five-year period.

The worry of many of us who have worked for years in development and overseas aid issues—almost half a century in my case—is that the promotion and thinking behind this Bill, and behind the reluctance to have more flexibility, is blind to the entirely new thinking that has been developed in the OECD and other areas about the way in which development assistance should be contributed by the richer countries of the world. The concept of what is called “country programmable aid” has now been introduced. This is generally recognised to be a far more effective measure and a real contribution to aid from richer to poorer countries than the old ODA definition. The other very powerful new tool that has come along is impact investment, which would not be included under ODA at all because there is no grant element in it, and it would have to have a grant element to be ODA.

It is sad that we should be ignoring flexibility and insisting on a rigidity that will exclude development of the most effective new instruments for the eradication of poverty and for helping poor people and development processes throughout the world. That is why this amendment, like the last one, would give flexibility and help in our aid efforts and not hinder them.

[Viscount Eccles]

My Lords, Clause 3(2) states:

“Accordingly, the fact that the duty in section 1 has not been, or will or may not be, complied with does not affect the lawfulness of anything done, or omitted to be done, by any person”.

It seems to me that this means that the promoter of the Bill recognises that there has to be some flexibility. If this clause does not provide flexibility, I am not sure what it is for. I would be grateful if I could be told how I am expected to explain this in the bar of the Black Bull, if I am asked, without the other members in the bar of the Black Bull saying, “Oh well, that is typical political behaviour. Now you see it, now you don’t. Now you’re going to do it, now you’re not. All you do is put a provision in a Bill and then in an Act of Parliament which lets you completely off the hook”.

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[Viscount Eccles]

My noble friend mentioned my name. I hope he will accept the clarification that he did not answer my question. The thrust of my question was why the promoter of the Bill thought it necessary to introduce a flexibility that allows the Secretary of State off the legal hook. That is the question that my friends in the public are going to ask me. They are going to say, “Legislation is about passing law, and that law needs to be enforceable. You have included a clause which means it is not”.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I was going to come back and clear up that point. However, I will finish this element first. The Bill provides for the very form of independent evaluation that can take into consideration external factors that may have been at play if the target has not been met. That independent evaluation then reports to Parliament.

I am glad that the noble Viscount intervened because he pre-empted exactly how I was going to conclude. Ultimately, the framework provided by the Bill allows for Parliament to have the powers to do its job and hold the Government to account when they make a promise. I hope that that would be sufficient not only for those people in the Black Bull but for Parliament. There is important evaluation and monitoring of these programmes. I hope that the explanation from the Permanent Secretary of DfID showing the deficiency of moving to the programme that the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has argued for is sufficient for the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment. I am not in a position to accept it.

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[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, the House will be relieved to know that I can move this amendment very briefly because the point is a very simple one. The Bill does not apply to the present Government; its only purpose, as I said earlier, is to bind future Governments. It will be noted that the Bill comes into effect on 1 June, and that date will not be lost on the House. The point of the amendment is that it seems wrong that a future Government should not have the chance to decide whether they wish to implement the Bill. I am not saying that it is constitutionally wrong—any Parliament can of course pass a law that binds the next Government—but I am saying that, so close to the election, to move a Bill that binds the next Government without giving them a chance to say whether they want to accept and implement it is wrong.

I noted that the Minister ducked a question earlier about whether the next Government would continue the 2% pledge by saying that the new Government will take a decision. If the new Government can take a decision on that, surely they ought to have the right to take a decision on this. It may be said, “That’s all right because the Labour Party supports this too so, whichever Government are in power, they support the Bill”. Frankly, the polls tell us that we do not know quite what the nature of the next Government will be or what situation they may face. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the Bill does not come into effect on 1 June but at such time after that date as the new Government should decide and to bring it into effect by regulation. I beg to move.

[Viscount Eccles]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. If we are getting into gesture politics now that we are running up to an election—we have varying views as to what the public will think and indeed possibly varying views as to how many votes some candidate might garner as a result of the Bill—it is completely wrong to set it on a date before the next Government have a chance to consider the outcome of the election, their own position and their attitude towards the Bill.