Consumer Rights Bill

Viscount Eccles Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2014 Grand Committee

[Viscount Eccles (Con)]

My Lords, I too am speaking on this Bill for the first time. However, many years ago I tangled with—is it called Robinson-Patman?—and triple damages and all that. That has given me an abiding interest in consumer protection. It is clear from the back of the Bill, which says,

“to make provision about private actions in competition law”,

that this is a very important part of the Bill, consigned as it is to Schedule 8. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, there are two issues. One is, what about opt-out per se? The second is, what about the safeguards? I would prefer that there were no opt-out arrangements in the Bill. However, I will concentrate on the safeguards.

None of us, I think, wants to see opt-out arrangements leading to excessive litigation—arguably we already have too much—and we do not want collective proceedings turned into a business, as opposed to the recognition and delivery of justice. There are dangers. As my noble friend said, the CBI has highlighted them. Others, too, have highlighted them. In the sixth report of 2013-14 from the House of Commons committee on the draft Consumer Rights Bill, paragraph 282 says:

“The Government has said that collective proceedings should not be brought by law firms, third party funders or special purpose vehicles. Under the draft Bill, any non-class member can be appointed as the representative in the collective proceedings, provided that the Tribunal considers it just and reasonable for that person to act as a representative. We conclude that this safeguard should be strengthened to reflect the Government’s stated intention”.

In paragraph 283 the committee goes a little further:

“We recommend that revised Tribunal Rules should clarify that collective proceedings cannot be brought by law firms, third party funders or special purpose vehicles”.

I ask the Minister: did it become the Government’s position, and is it still the position, that there should be a bar on law firms, third-party funders or special purpose vehicles? There is some reinforcement for thinking that this was, and I hope still is, the Government’s position: in the response to the private actions consultation, paragraph 2, headed “Introduce a limited opt-out collective actions regime, with safeguards”, reads:

“Recognising the concerns raised that this could lead to frivolous or unmeritorious litigation, the Government is introducing a set of strong safeguards, including: strict judicial certification of cases so that only meritorious cases are taken forward; no treble damages; no contingency fees for lawyers; maintaining the ‘loser-pays’ rule”—

which we have already heard about this afternoon—

“so that those who bring unsuccessful cases pay the full price. Claims will only be allowed to be brought by claimants or by genuine representatives of the claimants, such as trade associations or consumer associations, not by law firms, third party funders or special purpose vehicles”.

I may not be very good at interpreting draft Bills, but it does not seem to me—and certainly not to my noble friend Lord Hodgson—that the Bill meets that commitment, which was made by the Government in its response to the consultation.

Does the Bill, as drafted, fulfil that government response? If it does not, should we not have something on the face of the Bill—which is, after all, what my noble friend Lord Hodgson is really asking for in his extensive probing amendments? He is asking for something in the Bill as opposed to relying on the tribunal’s rules. As my noble friend said, the tribunal’s rules are absolutely key to the way that this regime will in fact work when it starts. The Bill is absolutely clear that the tribunal has a very great responsibility to draw up these rules, but of course the rules can only be drawn up in the light of the legislation. If the legislation is not complete, or is missing certain things, that of course makes the discretion granted to the tribunal very wide. I draw attention to one point in particular, which is about how the phrase “just and reasonable”, which appears in new Section 47B(8)(b), will be interpreted. I have two questions to ask my noble friend on the Front Bench. First, what does that actually mean, legally? Secondly, are there precedents for the use of “just and reasonable” and, if so, what are they?

Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the tribunal’s draft rules of March of this year look at the appointment of a representative. It is difficult to see that they go anywhere near meeting the points that were made by the Government’s response or by the House of Commons Select Committee. I do not find draft rules 6 and 7 very helpful, and I would welcome the Minister’s comments on the state of safeguards. I very much support my noble friend’s request for a meeting to discuss these matters, because the opt-out regime still looks very risky to me.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I start by declaring my interest as a partner for some time in the global commercial law firm DAC Beachcroft LLP. I welcome the important amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which were spoken to so eloquently by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I also follow my noble friend Lord Eccles in saying that we have to be very careful indeed about how we proceed with this particular aspect of the legislation.

I welcome in particular Amendment 66, which to my mind has the effect of making sure that it is the consumer’s rights that are being advanced and that we are not simply creating a fresh breeding ground for claims management companies. We have to heed the lessons learnt in the United States, where actions are brought for consumer remedies in the name of consumers who know little or nothing of them. However, as I understand it, not even the United States has rules permitting such actions to be brought by someone who does not have some sort of direct interest. I strongly believe that we should be very cautious indeed with that concept. The current systems of funding litigation are riddled with risks of conflicting interests, between, on the one hand, those seeking compensation and, on the other hand, those promoting litigation. In this latter group I would include claims farmers who want their cut, and litigation funders who essentially see litigation as an investment opportunity—a way of generating a return on their capital. That return comes out of the damages otherwise payable to the claimants.

I cannot see any reason why people in this category of backers should be able to stand as representative claimant. It flies in the face of common sense. Even if we are to be told that these problems will be ironed out in regulations or draft rules, I for one would expect to see such prohibition controlled by Parliament on the face of the statute. Likewise, lawyers who stand to gain from running cases should not be allowed to represent the claimant group and then act for themselves—if nothing else to avoid the maxim that a lawyer who acts for himself often has a fool for a client. I do not want to go too far down that road, except to stress that the risks of allowing lawyers to be the representative claimant are obvious.

That is graphically illustrated by a current piece of legislation. Thousands of Nigerians are suing Shell over an oil spill in the Niger delta and have found themselves embroiled in a dispute in the High Court as to which firm of solicitors is representing them. Without going into too much detail, I refer my noble friend the Minister to that case. Action is being taken by one law firm, Leigh Day, against CW Law Solicitors, based in London. It warns us about the dangers of going down this road. If I am allowed to add another example: Leigh Day is now facing legal action in the Kenyan courts over claims that a number of the torture victims it represented were fictitious. I do not begin to know on whose side justice lies, but it is a fact that the Law Society of Kenya is taking that firm to court. That demonstrates the dangers of allowing this sort of legislation to take hold.

I hope that my noble friend will be able to give us a lot of reassuring words either now, before we conclude this debate, or in a subsequent meeting. I strongly support the case put forward by my noble friend Lady Noakes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I am delighted to welcome my noble friend Lady Noakes to the Committee and commend the clarity with which she took us through the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. I am sorry that he is not here because he sat patiently through many hours of our proceedings last week. I especially enjoyed my noble friend’s refreshing emphasis on growth and wealth creation. It was also good to hear from the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, who rightly emphasised the importance of this part of the Bill, and from my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, who urged caution and warned us, honestly and graphically, about the role of the lawyers in some climes in this sort of area, which we are seeking to avoid.

An effective competition regime is built on public enforcement and the ability for consumers and businesses to take private actions and claim redress. The current collective actions regime is opt-in, which requires consumers to opt in to a court action. A key feature of the revised regime is the introduction of an opt-out regime, where consumers are automatically part of a court action unless they opt out. This change is being made as there has been only one collective action case in more than 10 years, so we feel that the current law is not working.

My noble friend’s amendments would remove opt-out collective actions. Of course, a collective action is not a new concept; a regime has existed since 2002. Under this regime, consumers have to sign up to an action before it commences in the Competition Appeal Tribunal. As I said, since the regime was created in 2002, there has been only one collective action case, and that had only 130 claimants—less than 0.1% of those eligible. Furthermore, SMEs are not permitted to use the existing regime to bring claims; for example, if a dominant manufacturer were to withhold supplies to drive up prices.

The Government have always been clear that an opt-out collective actions regime would require stringent safeguards to prevent vexatious claims and the US-style class actions that have been described this afternoon. I would also highlight the different legal culture and practice in the US, where significant financial incentives to bring claims, such as treble damages and damages-based agreements, are the order of the day and have led to a large number of claims. We have learnt from that experience and introduced three key safeguards, as the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, explained.

I will summarise the safeguards very briefly. The first is a requirement for the CAT to certify that the representative is suitable to bring the claim. Secondly, the Bill prohibits businesses paying too much redress by prohibiting exemplary damages. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, explained, they would have to pay back only the overcharge to the consumer, not multiple damages. Thirdly, law firms are prohibited from taking a percentage of the damages as a success fee—so-called damages-based agreements. Further requirements that have to be met before a representative can be approved will be set out in the CAT rules. These will include a representative’s ability to pay costs, whether there is a conflict of interest with the underlying claimants, and whether a representative would adequately act in the interests of the underlying claimants.

To assist in understanding, the Government published draft CAT rules on collective actions in March, and they are available in the House Library. I have a copy if anyone would like one. In the draft rules, the CAT would have to scrutinise the nature and function of the representative body. This would include whether or not the body is suitable to be a representative body, including whether the body had a pecuniary interest; for example, whether an underlying claimant wishing to act as a representative had a conflict of interest because they had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.

[Viscount Eccles]

I have read the draft rules; I brought them with me. I do not think it is all that easy, if you have a pecuniary interest, to define whether or not it is a conflict. If it has been entered into freely as an agreement that in certain circumstances the people being represented will pay fees of a certain size and they have signed up to that, that is not a conflict of interest.

I emphasise that I do not think that the draft rules anywhere near meet the undertakings given by the Government in their response to the consultation and in respect of the advice received from the House of Commons Select Committee.

Perhaps I may just say that I made no reference to the United States in what I said; none at all. I think that the situation is completely non-comparable, so I agree entirely with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about that. However, I do not think that the safeguard regime is anything like adequate in the Bill as it is drafted.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I thank my noble friend for his clarification. He is right to say that the draft rules were constructed by a specialist working group. They will be subject to full public consultation in order to ensure that they strike the right balance, and that will obviously be undertaken well before these provisions come into effect on 1 October next year. Perhaps I may also say at this point that I have talked to the CBI and corresponded with the Law Society, with which I am extremely happy to have a meeting, as I think my noble friend suggested, so that we can go through some of the points that I am making in more detail.

A key safeguard in the Bill is that the CAT must certify that a representative is suitable to bring a collective action. This means, as has been said, a law firm, a claims management firm or a special purpose vehicle. These will not automatically be able to bring a claim, and the draft CAT rules provide for even more scrutiny of a proposed representative. It is appropriate for these requirements to be in the CAT rules so that they can be modified more easily or be made even more stringent if that is necessary. This will ensure an effective regime which promotes the interests of consumers. The Government also believe that the CAT, a specialist competition court which I know from my own experience, has a strong track record in dealing with consumer detriment in competition law, and is well placed to scrutinise each and every body that seeks to act as a representative. I do not share my noble friend’s concern, given my knowledge of the court and its specialist nature.