Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Tom Rutland and Jeevun Sandher

Friday 16th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tom Rutland]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because it allows me to continue making an argument that will address those points. First, substantial motivation is vague, undefined and legally imprecise. This new clause is a blunt instrument and an attempt to shut the door on entire groups of people accessing an assisted death. How would one establish what a substantially motivating factor in any individual case is? No motivation exists in a vacuum, and feeling a burden can co-exist with physical deterioration and untreatable pain. Secondly, if suicidal ideation is to think about dying by taking one’s own life, would that not encompass everyone considering assisted dying?

[Dr Sandher]

I think today of Norman Ward, who in 2020 shot himself while terminally ill because of the terrible pain that he faced. Does my hon. Friend agree that under subsection (f) of new clause 16, Norman Ward would have been unable to access the choice that would have ended his suffering?

[Tom Rutland]

I agree with my hon. Friend.

Similarly, I cannot support amendment 102, which would require doctors to ensure that there were no “remediable suicide risk factors” before conducting a preliminary discussion with the patient. There is no clear legal or clinical definition of the term “remediable suicide risk factor”, and the Bill already includes multiple checks on mental capacity and mental illness, including by independent doctors and a specialist panel. The vagueness of this amendment risks wrecking this much-needed Bill.

I emailed Karen again yesterday to ask if I could refer to her in this speech. Her father-in-law had sadly died in the time that had passed between her initial email and our exchange yesterday. The Bill was not passed in time for him and he could not benefit from it. However, Karen hoped that his story could make some small contribution to changing the law. There do not need to be more people in Karen’s father-in-law’s position, or in Aimee’s grandmother’s position—they can have choice at the end of life, and our brilliant palliative care workforce, like Karen, can have choice on the kind of care they provide too.