Political and Human Rights (African Great Lakes)

Tom Blenkinsop Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Westminster Hall

[Tom Blenkinsop (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing what is a very important debate, given the events that are likely to happen in terms of democratic processes in the area of Africa that we are discussing. I am not well known for my interest in such issues or for speaking out about them in debates, but having often met members of the Congolese community in the Tees Valley, I felt that it was my duty to make some of the points that they have made to me and to talk about related issues that I have been investigating for some time in a personal capacity.

I want to talk about three things to do with the Democratic Republic of Congo: first, the forthcoming elections in 2016; secondly, UK, EU and US investment in the DRC, in terms of conditionality; and thirdly, DRC returnees from the UK.

There have already been attempts, as there were in 2011, to revise article 220 of the constitution, which limits President Joseph Kabila’s mandate to no more than two terms of office. He has been in power since 2001, following the death of his predecessor, President Laurent Kabila. Joseph Kabila, however, was not elected to office until 2006 and he retained power in very dubious circumstances in 2011. Some—indeed, most—would argue that a tenure that has lasted since 2001 has already exhausted a two-term period of power. Be that as it may, article 220 of the DRC constitution restricts any incumbent to a maximum two terms. However, it is Kabila’s intention to overcome that obstacle in order to present his candidature again in the forthcoming election. Kabila also plans to initiate another change by proposing a government of coalition, indicating his desire to remain in place for the foreseeable future until there is the establishment of a democratically elected President.

Post the 2011 elections, there are obvious questions to ask—for example, about the house arrest, since 2011, of the opposing presidential candidate, Mr Tshisekedi. That situation needs to be taken far more seriously and questioned far more profoundly in the run-up to the 2016 elections, in terms of candidates’ freedom to campaign. It is well documented in the EU report and by others that Joseph Kabila named his supporters to the Supreme Court before the 2006 election and again before the 2011 election. The Supreme Court, or rather, the judiciary, does not work independently of the Executive—namely, Joseph Kabila.

It is also clear from the EU final report and the report by the UN human rights department, Kinshasa, that the police stand accused of human rights violations when violently repressing attempts by the civilian population to greet Etienne Tshisekedi on 26 November and before, during and after the elections. The final report by the EU mission in 2006 recommended measures that should have been put in place before the 2011 election.

Electoral fraud began long before observers arrived in the DRC. For there to be “huge irregularities”, the grounds to allow irregularities had to be in place during the registration process and during the naming of members of the Supreme Court, entailing a changing of the constitution six months prior to the election to allow one round of voting. It is clear from the EU final report that observers were not allowed to observe properly.

Recently, and more worryingly, an Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights spokesperson said in Geneva on 6 May this year, about the judgment that 14 officers of the FARDC, the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, were acquitted of charges of mass rape and murder in 2012, that

“the judiciary has not met the expectations of the numerous victims of rape who had fully participated in the trial…The outcome of the trial confirms shortcomings in the administration of justice in the DRC.”

He also said:

“The crimes perpetrated in Minova …were extremely serious and widespread”,

and that they were

“perpetrated in a systematic manner and with extreme violence”.

Yet on 22 March 2013 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated and promised:

“We are also working with DRC government to help consolidate peace in country through the Security sector accountability and police programme (SSAPR) managed by DFID…The UK will also use its G8 Presidency in 2013 to seek to address impunity for sexual violence in conflict and improve the response to these crimes”.

It continued:

“This includes support to security sector reform, demobilisation of armed groups and a more effective military justice sector.”

It is clear that the judiciary under Kabila is hardly reformed in any way, shape or form, and the omens appear very poor regarding any form of democratic progression.

Secondly, on UK, EU and US investment in the DRC, the Department for International Development funded the electoral registration in the DRC prior to the 2011 election, to the tune of £40 million. However, as the Secretary of State for International Development said on 5 February:

“There was mismanagement and poor planning of voting operations, which strongly affected the credibility of the national electoral commission and the results of the 2011 elections.”—[Official Report, European Committee B, 5 February 2014; c. 7-8.]

That widely held and critical assessment needs thorough examination for 2016.

The United States is prepared to give the Democratic Republic of Congo $30 million in aid for stability and democracy building, but only if President Joseph Kabila agrees to step down at the end of his current term of office in 2016. Secretary of State, Senator John Kerry, on touring Africa, said that the DRC Government also need to schedule elections soon. The vote is tentatively set for 2016, although a firm date has still not been set.

In a private meeting, Senator Kerry said that he urged Kabila to follow Congo’s constitution in the upcoming elections, which would prohibit him from running for a third consecutive term as President. It is not clear whether Kabila agreed to that.

As Senator Kerry stated:

“It is important to the people to be able to know what the process is, to have confidence in that process…The sooner the process is announced, the sooner that the date is set, the sooner people have an ability to be able to participate. And we believe it ought to be done in keeping with the constitutional process of the country.”

The $30 million pledge would more than double the $12 million in assistance given to the Congo last year linked to elections and stability assistance. Some of the money could go to non-governmental organisations. Last year, the total US aid to the Congo was about $210 million.

UK support to the DRC is increasing to the tune of £250 million a year, which vastly outstrips the European development fund framework, which I think is just over €700 million over a six-year period. In short, the UK’s support to the DRC is rising massively in comparison with the EU’s and the USA’s, and with hardly any of the concerns uttered by the US State Department. The lack of conditionality in the aid programme to the DRC has been pointed out by a European Court of Auditors report released in October last year on efficiency of EU aid to the DRC.

The watchdog noted that

“the effectiveness of EU assistance for governance in the DRC is limited”,

and that

“Risks have not been adequately addressed, programme objectives tend to be overly ambitious…and policy dialogue has not been exploited to its full potential and adequately coordinated with EU Member States”

in all areas.

The report stated that the EU needs to be

“more demanding of the Congolese authorities when monitoring compliance with the conditions agreed and the commitments made”,

and that the Commission should

“(a) strengthen its use of conditionality and policy dialogue. This will involve (i) setting clear, relevant, realistic and time-bound conditions, (ii) periodically assessing compliance with the agreed conditions, and (iii) responding firmly, proportionately and in a timely manner if the DRC government shows insufficient commitment to compliance, where appropriate by suspending or terminating the programme;

(b) urge the DRC government to adopt the necessary measures for improving the functioning of the thematic working groups, and monitor the implementation of those measures;

(c) take a more active leadership role towards EU Member States to encourage coordinated policy dialogue and increase EU leverage over the DRC government.”

Those conclusions not only should be heeded by the UK Government, but must be implemented in conjunction with other EU member states and the USA.

Thirdly and finally, I want to deal with the monitoring of Congolese asylum seekers returned to the DRC and contradictions in the “Country Policy Bulletin”. The report, entitled “Unsafe Return”, documents the post-return experience of 17 Congolese men and women who were forcibly removed to the DRC from the UK between 2006 and 2011. Eleven of those were clients of Justice First, a charity that operates in the Tees Valley. The report was written to provide evidence to the Government that the DRC is not a safe country to which to return asylum seekers and to request the Government to review their decision, in the “Country of Origin Information Report” for the DRC of 2009, that it was safe for them to return. No monitoring mechanism is in place to test the UK Border Agency hypothesis that it is safe for rejected asylum seekers to be returned to the DRC. Every effort has been made, as is documented in the report, to show that all the evidence is credible.

The report’s author visited the DRC in 2011 to verify the situation of the returnees still living there. At least six returnees had fled the country, and others were found to be still living in hiding, fearful of re-arrest and unable to live with their families because of threats. Those returned consistently reported being punished in the DRC, as they had spoken out in this country about having been ill treated and the lack of human rights in the DRC, thereby betraying their country and the President.

A Congolese immigration official was interviewed in 2011. He explained that when UK immigration passed on the names of those to be removed, the files in the possession of the immigration authorities were studied. If the asylum seeker was deemed to be a problem to the state, the secret services would be alerted and the asylum seeker imprisoned or worse.

Of the number who were traced, 15 were arrested at the airport, two were arrested after leaving the airport building and transferred to Kin Mazière prison, one was arrested after leaving the British embassy in Kinshasa, three were arrested at home, one was threatened with death in Tolérance Zéro by officers and four were threatened at the airport. Congolese human rights activists and a lawyer confirmed that detainees were not given access to lawyers during their imprisonment. Returnees reported the following ill treatment in prison. One was handcuffed, blindfolded and severely beaten. Six were severely beaten. Two were given electric shock treatment. Two of the men were sexually abused. Two of the women were raped. Two of the women received slaps and blows with hands and fists.

There is much more information in the report, which I am sure the Minister is aware of; I am happy to give him a copy if he requests one. It makes me very, very angry that people who sought asylum in our country from that regime were returned. I hope that the Minister takes on board the points that I have made and that he will get back to me as soon as possible with any response.