North Africa and the Middle East

Debate between Tobias Ellwood and Denis MacShane

Thursday 17th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), who always brings an interesting angle to these debates.

I begin by congratulating the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and my Front-Bench team on recognising the scale of the unprecedented change that is taking place in the middle east and the role that the international community must play in promoting democratic reform. That is in stark contrast to some of our allies, who have been either slow or deliberately hesitant to speak out and join us in calling for change. It poses the question: how good are the international alliances and organisations of which we are part if they fracture at the first contact with an international crisis? For the UN, the EU and the G8, these are questions worth addressing so that we can act more propitiously when these events take place in future. I pose a question to Germany. It is a staunch ally and close colleague in Europe but why does it remain silent and fail to support a no-fly zone over Libya?

I called some friends in America, two Senators in particular, to ask why we had not heard more from the other side of the Atlantic. A lot of noise came back: concerns about spreading forces and interests too widely across the world, still undecided issues about Afghanistan, but also questions about who we are dealing with and the consequences of removing this particular dictator. After all, he is a much-improved dictator than he was 10 years ago.

[Mr MacShane]

If it is any consolation to the hon. Gentleman, he gets an extra minute by giving way to me. In some respects, the hon. Gentleman and other speakers are slightly behind the curve, as the United States is now working at the UN with Britain and France on a composite motion with good things in it. On Germany, I agree with him, but is the response surprising when some Members make speech after speech in this House attacking Germany and the EU and then, when they need Germany’s help, turn round and say, “Will you be our friends after all?”?

[Mr Ellwood]

First, I am aware of where the US now stands and, secondly, I am not attacking anyone, but simply asking for some form of clarification of why Germany has taken the stance it has. I have inquired about it, but got no reply.

On the issue of why countries might be reticent, the particular dictator we are dealing with is a relevant issue. Gaddafi had, after all, turned his back on terrorism; he had stopped funding the IRA; he had paid compensation to victims of the Lockerbie bombers; he had suspended his nuclear programme; and he was no longer seeking weapons of mass destruction. He was co-operating with the EU on the movement of refugees. Yes, he might well be bad, but what will his successor be like? If we want to avoid another Somalia, perhaps we should keep this guy.

We also need to bear in mind the reputation we gain for wandering into countries, particularly in Arab countries such as Iraq. I happened to disagree with our invasion in 2003, but the long-term consequences of it on Britain’s reputation in the Arab world as a whole are huge—and stay with us to this day. This reticence to go into Libya is strengthened by reports circulating in America that suggest that twice as many foreign fighters against the US in the Iraq invasion came from Libya than from any other part of the Arab world. I can understand those arguments, but I do not agree with them.

The first problem is that such arguments fail to recognise the changing mood across the Arab nations. The mother of all Parliaments here should, after all, encourage democracy. The world is a much smaller interrelated global community. Oil prices, stock exchanges, trade movements and deals, business interests and so forth: for all these, we are so much more interrelated in comparison with the independence we used to have—perhaps enjoyed—in the decades and centuries before. Politicians move; ideas are set; and there are consequences when an event happens in one part of the world—whether it be a natural disaster as in Japan, or a human catastrophe such as we are seeing in Libya, with the movement of refugees and so forth. We cannot dissociate ourselves from what is going on in north Africa.

There are also more moral questions. One issue not much talked about is the level of genocide. How many people need to die before we wake up and say, “We must step in”? I am reminded of the spokeswoman who, in May 1994, said of Rwanda—Members might recall it from the films about the country—that the word “genocide” should not be used, and that “acts of genocide” should be used instead. She could not bring herself to use that term.

Apparently, 5,000 people have already died in Libya. We must ask ourselves at what point we should make a judgment from a moral perspective, let alone a legal one.

The Prime Minister has made clear three requirements for the establishment of a no-fly zone: a need for it, legal grounds for it, and of course regional support. Unfortunately, the dithering that has taken place over the last couple of weeks has allowed Gaddafi to regroup his forces. It has allowed to him to recruit mercenaries—because he cannot trust many of his own troops—and to steal the initiatives.

We should also ask ourselves why the “good” dictators, if I may call them that, have stepped down in this Arab spring, while the bad dictators—the ones who stay in there and fight—are being rewarded by being allowed to keep their jobs. Our failure to support the people in that regard sends a message to the other dictators, who say, “Let us hold our ground. Let us stick it out.” That is what will happen if the international community is not organised enough, and has not the necessary gravitas and determination, to mount a challenge.

The Arab League has been mentioned, and I referred to it in an intervention. The Arab League has no power. It is a group of Foreign Ministers who have no influence over the dictators to whom they report back. Moreover, Arab forces have never been organised. If we look back at the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars, we see that they have never been united. If a no-fly zone is imposed or intervention takes place, it will not be through those Arab nations. Their armed forces are nowhere near as strong as they seem to be on paper.

It is also necessary for us to understand the terrain. As I said when I intervened on the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), a no-fly zone in Libya would be very different from a no-fly zone in Bosnia or Iraq. We need to understand the structure of communities in Libya. There is one long road leading from east to west which contains two main cities, two main groups of communities in Tripoli and Benghazi. We should control Libya with not just a no-fly zone but a no-drive zone. Such a measure would be far easier to implement than any that we have seen before.

Allowing Gaddafi to stay will have a number of consequences. There will be repercussions for his own people, and questionable alliances will develop. Gazprom will eye the region with envy, and will resolve to take over all the operations in north Africa and Libya in particular if Gaddafi stays. That may be one reason why it is not willing to support a no-fly zone.

We have also touched on military tactics. What is the purpose of a no-fly zone? Is it humanitarian or military? Those of us who have served in the military know that it is a force multiplier—a way of creating an advantage for one side or another. It would probably be necessary only to create a no-fly zone over Benghazi initially, and then to move forward from that. A no-fly zone is intended to prevent aircraft from moving, but that can be done in another way. A Storm Shadow missile could be fired right now, landing on the runways and preventing the aircraft from taking off in the first place. The aircraft that are available are not good, and many of them are already in rebel hands. There are other questions we should ask about tactics. We tend to grab at labels and to say, as armchair generals do, “That is what we have done in the past, so that is what we should do now.”