Intelligence and Security Services

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman makes some interesting comparisons between what we do in this country and what is done in Germany, the United States and so forth. Obviously, we can scrutinise only what happens here. Does he agree that it is difficult to find a country where the clandestine community performs so well, but under such scrutiny within the confines of the democratic process?

Part of this debate must be about the use of technology and the internet. I express a concern that, as we rightly debate this matter, we should be careful that we do not place limitations on operations that will expose us to more danger, because of those people who choose to do us harm.

[Dr Huppert]

It is absolutely right that we should have that debate. We have to agree it—we cannot just give carte blanche to people. I think that view is shared by everybody here. The hon. Gentleman is right. We must be balanced. None of us wants the details of exact techniques to be publicised. None the less, we do need to have the discussion about what is okay, what is not okay and where the line is drawn.

We know that the National Security Council was not even told of the scale and scope of the surveillance on our own citizens. We have heard that there were concerns about what would happen if the public knew what was happening. It was feared that it could lead to public debate and legal challenge—well, so be it. Public debate and legal challenge are an important part of the rule of law, and to avoid accountability through secrecy is simply not the solution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Brady, and to follow my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. He is right to make important points about the Committee’s increased powers and remit. I add that the Committee now has a remit to examine not only operational issues relating to the three intelligence agencies but it can examine the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism within the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence’s intelligence arm and the Cabinet Office. Its ambit has been radically and importantly widened.

In a nutshell, the ability to oversee operational activities for the first time is helping strike an important balance that we as legislators and politicians need. It is up to us to set strategy, and it is up to the professionals—the people whom we trust in places such as GCHQ and our other agencies—to get on with the job, but oversight is vital.

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend mentioned GCHQ, which has been mentioned numerous times in this debate. Does he share my concern that university syllabuses overlap by only 15% on cyber-technology? We need greater agreement on what is required if we are to create the experts needed now and in future.

[Mr Buckland]

My hon. Friend is right. The challenge will get ever more complex, so the skills needed will be the sort that we may not even have thought of yet. It is that type of environment. In a nutshell, the status quo will never be an option when it comes to intelligence and security, which is why I welcome warmly the Committee’s intention to consider the operation of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, or RIPA, as we have been calling it all afternoon.

As I said earlier in an intervention, RIPA was a response to what was seen as a deficiency in United Kingdom law in a number of cases that the Strasbourg Court considered relating to the interception of communications. RIPA was seen as an important consolidation of powers that had already been given to the police that, as we have heard, were extended to other agencies in a way that caused controversy and proper concern. The Government have done much work to roll that back, but RIPA itself is now in need of an update.

On both sides of the argument that we have heard in this debate, there is agreement that, for whatever motive, RIPA needs careful consideration. The intention behind the Government’s proposals on data retention and collection involved the need to update RIPA. Using that consensus gives us the potential to ensure that the Act is as up-to-date as possible. The challenge will be how to future-proof it. I do not have an easy answer. As we know, in the world of information technology, to use a well-worn phrase, change is the only constant.

We all know that we have moved from an era when privacy in our own homes and of our personal chattels was important into an era when our personal data are the most valuable thing that we possess. When it comes to the retention of our personal data, the right to privacy is under challenge as never before. Article 8 has been mentioned, quite properly, by several Members including, among others, the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) in an eloquent speech, as we have come to expect from him.

However, it has also been rightly pointed out that that right is qualified on grounds not only of national security but of crime prevention, health protection and, lastly and importantly, protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Herein lies the passion with which my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) addressed the House earlier. He believes firmly and rightly that the activities of the security services are meant to guarantee the freedoms of all of us. Therefore, the qualification in article 8 is emblematic of the balance that must be struck when we come to such issues.

I will focus on one aspect of the debate on which we have not touched today. It concerns schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which is particularly relevant in the David Miranda case. I will not dwell on that matter specifically, but I will discuss the important work of David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who makes important and helpful recommendations to the Government about how we can get the balance right on significant issues such as terrorism prevention and investigation measures, control orders and the use of schedule 7.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We have considered carefully the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, which recommends, among other things, that schedule 7 be changed to get the balance right. We broadly welcome the Government’s intention to reduce the scope of that provision, but there is an important point to note when it comes to use of the more intrusive powers in schedule 7. Whereas reasonable suspicion must be the threshold for the police and other authorities to stop, question and search travellers, there is concern that the same threshold is necessary for the use of more intrusive powers, such as detention for up to six hours, search and seizure of personal electronic devices or the taking and retention of DNA samples or fingerprints without consent.

Our Committee’s view was that the threshold of reasonable suspicion should come into play at the point when a person is formally detained, which under the new provisions in the Bill will be one hour after questioning. That is a small but important example of the need to ensure that when powers are exercised, as they properly should be—the Committee welcomed the use in principle of those powers—we as a state use identifiable and understandable thresholds before going down the line of intrusive use of power. We urge the Government to consider that point carefully in their response to the Committee.

Much has been made of the revelations concerning Edward Snowden. The right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) put it well. The issue of whether The Guardian has broken the law is a moot point; the Official Secrets Act 1989 requires several thresholds. It requires the leave of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General before prosecutions can commence, and it requires that any disclosures be damaging.

I do not think that we can comment properly about the rights and wrongs and the weight of the evidence in this particular case, but the right hon. Gentleman was right to ask whether, in the general circumstances, the actions of The Guardian were wise. I do not think so. Newspapers, like any other part of our mosaic of a society, must balance and weigh carefully the need to be irritating and robust in their journalism with the wider responsibility to bear in mind the qualifications to the right to privacy in article 8.

I have said in the past in this place that I believe privacy should be enshrined in the law of this land, if only to show that we as legislators have the courage to take steps in an area notoriously pockmarked with legal pitfalls. That is the job of politicians, and it should be the job of parliamentarians: to be brave, to strike the right balance and to ensure that we as a society protect the innocent, properly monitor those responsible for acts of terrorism and threats to our country and prevent them from causing chaos, death and mayhem on our streets.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I welcome this open-source debate, which is possibly being listened to live more than the average Westminster Hall debate. I am certainly grateful that we are debating these matters, and it is a real pleasure to follow some of the contributions that we have had today.

The debate is about the balance of individual privacy versus the collective right to security. Spying is nothing new. During Henry VIII’s time, Thomas Cromwell had a league of spies across Europe, as did Sir Francis Walsingham. Anyone visiting the Special Forces Club today can only be moved by some of the stories under the pictures there showing heroic acts that have taken place. And we must not forget the masters of intelligence gathering: the Whips. They are not present here today but no doubt are listening.

The world of the clandestine services has changed. Scrutiny of that world has also changed and we now have the Intelligence and Security Committee, formed in 1994. I am grateful for the scrutiny undertaken by the Committee. In 2002, I was sadly involved in the Bali bombing. MI5 had information to prove that an attack was going to take place. It held on to that information and did not share it. Sadly, my brother’s conference was not cancelled and he was killed. The Intelligence and Security Committee uncovered that information and exposed it. Changes have subsequently taken place to ensure that intelligence of that nature is shared with the Foreign Office and the wider public.

We can now name the heads of the clandestine agencies, which we could not do in the past. We can bring them here to Parliament and scrutinise them; I understand they are visiting next week. Our challenge today is the seismic advance in information technology, which, on the whole, is a very good thing. We must all embrace such change, particularly in social media and in its commercial aspects. Indeed, the speed at which the Arab spring took place could be attributed to the form of communications available. But technology is also harnessed by our enemies, who wish to do us harm.

It is important to pay tribute to our clandestine services. Our intelligence officers serve our country without any public recognition. Some have given their lives in the line of duty in their silent service. Their names are not known and their loved ones mourn in secret. We owe them and every intelligence officer in the country an enormous debt of gratitude.

We lost our way briefly, however, and I would say that the starting point was 9/11, which led to Guantanamo Bay, rendition, water-boarding, justification for the Iraq war, I dare say, and dodgy dossiers and so on. Members will recognise the so-called war on terror, in which we took the eye off the ball. I am pleased that the Chilcot inquiry has finally got off the ground and will report soon. It will be a testament to what went wrong. It will report on the justification for that war and how intelligence was used.

As a nation, we need to be an inspiring example of the values that we hold dear, and we must encourage others to stand up for them. Once damaged, our moral authority in the eyes of the world is very difficult to replenish. Our security services have the skills to assimilate information way beyond the reach of everyday diplomacy, filling in the blanks in our understanding of our enemies. So much of their work is unseen and therefore receives little praise. They are our early warning system against those who plot to sabotage us, steal from us, or kill us.

As I have said before, it is difficult to find a country where the clandestine community performs so well under such scrutiny within the confines of the democratic process. By and large, we sleep safe at night, oblivious to the many threats that we face, as they are dealt with by the service that we never see. So let that scrutiny continue and let us make sure that it adapts to a changing world, but let us not hamper the work that keeps us all safe.