Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal)

Thomas Docherty Excerpts

Tuesday 4th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I am most grateful for the opportunity to respond to the motion. The Human Rights Act is a statute that rarely receives a good word and is subject to more than its fair share of the bad, yet it is one of the most important pieces of legislation passed by the previous Labour Government. Here I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), who was instrumental in the formulation and implementation of the policy and remains one of the most coherent voices on the role and, crucially, limitations of the Act. I am also incredibly grateful to him for his advice in preparing for this speech; he has been generous with his time and counsel.

Despite what some newspapers and, it appears, some Government Members claim, the Human Rights Act is not some badly drafted and rushed piece of legislation, a Dangerous Dogs Act for civil liberties. Rather, the opposite is true. The legislation benefited from three years of development in the mid-’90s while Labour was in opposition, on a cross-party basis and with the assistance of the Liberal Democrats. It was further improved by careful consideration in this Chamber and the other place.

The Act is noticeable as a piece of legislation by the very fact that, although my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn and Lord Irvine are rightly known as its midwives, its DNA draws from a far wider and deeper genetic pool. That is an incredible strength of the Act and undoubtedly one of the reasons why it has not been seriously challenged in the 14 years since it received Royal Assent.

It is interesting that in the eight years since Michael Howard first declared that the Tories wanted to repeal the Act and replace it with a British Bill of Rights, not one significant step of progress has been made by the Conservative party in developing a coherent alternative. That is testament to those parliamentary draftsmen working at the end of the last century.

The Act itself can be seen as a key plank of the constitutional framework built by the Labour Government alongside devolution. It sets out in clear and unambiguous language those human rights that our nation holds to be dear and that we rightly regard as vital in any modern free society: the right to life; the prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labour; the right to liberty, security and a fair trial; no punishment without law; the right to respect for family and private life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of speech; the right to marry; the freedom of assembly and association; and the prohibition of discrimination.

The Act also does something profoundly important for our democratic system—it writes into law the supremacy of Parliament over the courts and the Executive. It places limitations on how far the Executive can interpret their powers without the consent of Parliament. In essence, it requires the Executive to seek and obtain the agreement of Parliament before they may implement new policies. It is therefore no surprise that many Secretaries of State on both sides of the House have expressed irritation at the Act or bridled at the limitations imposed on their authority. Equally, though, the Act is clear that it does not prevent a Secretary of State from ultimately achieving their goal, provided that the Government are prepared to seek parliamentary approval through legislation; it merely prevents a Government from unilaterally setting a new policy without the endorsement of the people through their elected representatives or without due regard for the law. It is bizarre that in our modern democratic system some politicians, particularly one as well regarded as the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon), would seriously propose to repeal this safeguard.

Moreover, the Act places limitations on the power of the courts. My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn was careful in his drafting so that it merely requires that the legislature should be “mindful of”, not “bound by”, court decisions. The Act has provision for Parliament to set aside court rulings if it sees fit. For example, in 2005 British courts, through the Law Lords, ruled that it was inhumane and degrading to deny some asylum seekers the right to earn a wage to support themselves and simultaneously deny them the right to receive any benefits from the state—in effect, to place them in destitution without any support apart from charities and churches. As my right hon. Friend has said, this was one of those decisions of our courts which could be classed as inconvenient to the Executive, and I recall that it caused quite a stir at the time. However, if we, as the then Executive, had decided to ask Parliament to pass primary legislation that said in plain, unambiguous terms that certain categories of asylum seeker were indeed to be rendered destitute, and Parliament had agreed, that would have been it—the end of the matter—as far as the British courts were concerned.

Some argue, legitimately, that Parliament should not seek to overturn court decisions. Others argue, erroneously, that in the United States the Supreme Court is indeed supreme and the defender of its constitution. However, the US Congress, with the support of states and the White House, may overturn the Supreme Court through constitutional amendments, as has already happened 27 times in that nation’s history.

On prisoner voting, which the hon. Member for South Norfolk mentioned, the Human Rights Act is perfectly compatible with the principled decision taken by this House. The House voted—and voted overwhelmingly—to remove from convicted prisoners the right to vote in elections, and thus they have no recourse under the Act. Our membership of the European convention on human rights has forced this issue to the European courts. Indeed, another strength of the Act is that it has provided a mechanism whereby British courts may seek to influence the working of the European courts.

As we have seen again today, one of the greatest challenges that the Act must constantly overcome is urban myths and misconceptions. No one could forget the powerful speech delivered by the current Home Secretary to last year’s Conservative party conference when she said:

“We all know the stories about the Human Rights Act...about the illegal immigrant who cannot be deported because, and I am not making this up, he had a pet cat.”

Unfortunately for the Home Secretary, whoever wrote her speech had in fact made it up. In the case of the cat, it appears that the Home Office lost a reconsideration case after the initial verdict was successfully appealed because it failed to meet the requirements set out in the UK Border Agency guidelines, not because of the Human Rights Act. So the hon. Gentleman might have been better served by introducing a human rights education Bill which would involve mandatory attendance by the Cabinet.

In the final analysis, the single strongest argument against repeal is that this is the decade in which we hope to welcome more countries, particularly our neighbours to the east of Europe and Asia, and to the south of Europe, into the family of democratic, civilised nations. To turn our back on, tear up and cast aside the Act that enshrines in law the fundamental human rights that we ask others to respect would remove the legitimacy of our position. How can we ask developing countries—the new democracies—to respect human rights when we seek to remove them from our statute book? I urge the House to reject this Bill.

Question put (Standing Order No. 23).