Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness

Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Matt Western]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his service on the Committee over so many years, which was hugely valued, and his point is absolutely fair. I have not seen the specific report that was published today, but it echoes the points that we have made in this report. We do not want to be alarmist, but we cannot accept any complacency about what the threats are, because there is a genuine risk.

The truth is that there is the potential to reroute cables. There is a significant amount of traffic across the Atlantic—some of it comes into Ireland, some of it into mainland Europe, and some of it into the UK—so it is always possible for data communications to come through to us in different ways and, in an extreme crisis, for us to turn to satellites, although that capacity is significantly lower. I am sure there are some very valid points in that report, and I will look at it more closely.

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his statement, and commend the hard work of other members of our Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in helping to compile the subsea telecommunications cables report. The number of recommendations agreed to by the Government demonstrates that our detailed analysis in the report ensures the very best for our nation’s security. Does the Chair agree that in this fast-evolving security environment, the UK must ensure that our military deterrent is robust to protect subsea cables from the deliberate damage that we have seen in, for example, the Baltic?

[Matt Western]

I thank my hon. Friend for serving on the Committee and for the work he is doing in chairing the Defence Committee, and he is absolutely right. There are several elements to this. One is, as we have seen in the Baltic and around our shores, the nature of the threats. The attacks on cables are proving provocative, and we have to demonstrate a more muscular approach to how we view them. It is interesting to see that some of our peers in NATO have taken this a bit further, and we should look closely at that, but we are constrained by international law.

I have mentioned the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, which is not fit for purpose. There needs to be some thinking along the lines of what we can do within our territorial waters to address any threat that is presented, such as we saw last year with the Yantar and other ships. Work needs to be done on the legal side, but also on the hardware that we can deploy. As an island nation, this should be something on which we can develop a huge sovereign capability, which would also boost our exports.