Proscription of Hezbollah

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts
Thursday 25th January 2018

(6 years, 10 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Stuart C McDonald Portrait Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
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This has been a passionate but thoughtful debate, and I congratulate the right hon. Member for Enfield North (Joan Ryan) and her colleagues on bringing it to the House.

Members have repeatedly made it clear that Hezbollah in its broadest sense has engaged in atrocious terrorist activity. They have highlighted attacks in the middle east and beyond. In 2012 in Bulgaria, a bus of Israeli tourists was blown up. In Buenos Aires in the 1994, the bombing of the Israeli embassy was followed by the detonation of explosives outside the Argentinian-Israeli Mutual Association. Plots and activities have extended to Thailand, Nigeria, Cyprus and many other countries. Those arguing in favour of the motion have made a powerful case for full proscription. The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers) and others have highlighted the knock-on consequences of sticking only with partial proscription for law enforcement here, including the seizing of financial assets.

Is there any possible counter-argument? In supporting partial proscription, the Home Office under the previous Labour Government pointed to the

“legitimate political, social and humanitarian role Hizballah plays in Lebanon”,

while in a debate just before Christmas, when this issue was raised, the Security Minister pointed out that Hezbollah formed part of the Government of Lebanon. That has meant that much of this debate has focused on whether Hezbollah is just one organisation and whether it is realistic to divide it into political, military and terrorist parts, as some countries do, including the UK—but not just the UK—for the purposes of proscription. In the December debate, the Minister himself said:

“If…the non-military wing is viewed as not separate…we will review the situation, use the law and take the required steps.”—[Official Report, 19 December 2017; Vol. 633, c. 1018.]

Members have argued today that these are false and unreal distinctions, pointing even to the rhetoric of Hezbollah itself and arguing that there is a unified decision-making power in the Consultative Council.

The next question is: does it matter that there is a degree of unity at the top, if there are clearly distinct branches that can be separated? It is only fair to record that different countries have taken different approaches to that question. For the Netherlands, as we have heard, it did matter and was conclusive. In its annual report in 2004, its general intelligence and security services stated:

“It can also be concluded that Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one co-ordinating council. This means that there is indeed a link between these parts of the organisation. The Netherlands has changed its policy and no longer makes a distinction between the political and terrorist Hezbollah branches”.

In fairness, not all countries take that approach. It is not, for example, the approach taken in Australia, where what it refers to as the External Security Organisation of Hezbollah is listed as a terrorist organisation but not Hezbollah as a whole. In the statement explaining their decision, the Australian Government do not seek to argue that they are very distinct organisations. They describe on one hand a

“pragmatic political organisation with deep roots in Lebanese society”

that

“maintain a social welfare network that encompasses education and health services”,

but at the same time include what they describe as “a branch”—the ESO—responsible for

“the planning, coordination and execution of terrorist attacks against Hizballah’s enemies outside of Lebanon”.

Despite the fact that the Australian Government take the view that the ESO is a branch of a bigger organisation, they simply chose to proscribe the branch rather than the whole organisation. So different Governments can come to different views.

As some hon. Members have pointed out, it is relevant to note that under the 2000 Act, the Home Secretary has powers but not a duty to proscribe organisations—it is a “may”, not a “must”. As some have alluded to, one wonders whether there are other considerations at play here, including a desire to keep certain diplomatic channels open and concerns about maintaining stability in Lebanon. In the past, the President of Lebanon has asked the EU and its member countries not to proscribe Hezbollah, describing it as an essential component of Lebanese society. However, in response, the right hon. Member for Enfield North fairly points out that countries that do proscribe the whole group continue to play a diplomatic role in the countrythings do not have to end there. So I do not envy the Minister the task he has or the decisions he has to make.

One problem I have raised before in debates on the proscription of terrorist organisations is that the information hon. Members have at their disposal is, I suspect, but a drop in the ocean compared with what is available to the Minister making the decision, and I think that was essentially the point the hon. and gallant Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) alluded to in his intervention. I wonder whether there may be a role for the Intelligence and Security Committee in scrutinising such decisions and in advising Members more generally.

In conclusion, I congratulate hon. Members on bringing about this debate and on posing serious and difficult questions to the Government. I am sympathetic to the case they make, and I await the Minister’s response with interest, because it is fair to say that, so far, there has not been a coherent counter-argument.