European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

The truth is that this Government lack the mandate and integrity properly to confront and debate the issues of principle raised by this Bill. The powers they wish to grant themselves will function only to occlude and conceal their weaknesses and divisions. A minority Government, internally divided, shaken by scandal and high-profile resignations, cannot be trusted with this powerful set of new powers. This withdrawal process will touch on every aspect of British public and private life. It is therefore necessary—as far as is practically possible—that this Chamber confers its full legitimating force to this process. The breadth and scope of delegated authority in this Bill must be curtailed and safeguards introduced to protect existing rights. The power of ministers to create wide definitions when addressing so-called deficiencies must be constrained. New committees ought to be created to scrutinise and challenge delegated powers. This House must have the final say on any ratification of the future legal and political relationship with Europe. When will the Government allow Parliament to take back control, rather than deny us the ability properly to scrutinise legislation?

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Thank you, Mr Hanson, for the opportunity to join hon. Members in their criticism of the extraordinary breadth of the Henry VIII powers contained in this Bill and the inadequacy of existing scrutiny procedures for dealing with them. I welcome the host of amendments that have been tabled by hon. Members to help remedy these concerns.

The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) helpfully identified that there are two different types of amendments that seek to improve the situation. One group seeks to limit the scope of the powers so that they are used only in appropriate circumstances and only for the specific purpose of correcting tightly defined deficiencies. A second group of amendments seeks to enhance our ability to scrutinise the statutory instruments that Ministers will make using these powers. All those ideas are welcome. If several of them were passed this evening, they could make this part of the Bill a little bit more palatable.

I will focus on a third type of amendment that throws up a different issue in relation to clause 7—an issue for which I am not sure we have found the perfect remedy. Rather than limiting the use of Henry VIII powers or strengthening oversight of them, this group of amendments would require that the Government take action to ensure that certain important provisions of EU law can operate effectively after withdrawal. After all, clause 7 expressly anticipates—in fact, the whole thing is premised on the fact—that there will be chunks of retained EU law that will not operate effectively if deficiencies are not prevented, remedied or mitigated.

The express purpose of this Bill is saving and incorporating EU law as it stands on withdrawal day, but this purpose would be undermined considerably if parts of that EU law were allowed, whether by accident or design, simply to fester away uncorrected and therefore unable to operate effectively. It is for those reasons that a number of amendments have been tabled positively requiring action to be taken, including new clauses 62 and 63 on environmental law, amendment 131 on the rights of EU citizens and amendment 385 on European protection orders. I will focus on a similar example—new clause 53.

New clause 53 would require changes to the immigration rules to retain the effectiveness of the Dublin regulation. Dublin III is far from a perfect set of rules, but it has the welcome goal of ensuring that an asylum claim is determined in the most appropriate EU member state. Its most positive feature is the ability for a person who has made a claim in one member state to seek to have that claim transferred and determined by another member state—for example, where a young asylum seeker has a sibling, aunt or uncle in that country. For all the flaws of the Dublin regulation, those provisions are surely worth saving, regardless of how negotiations proceed.

Even though the rules are retained by the Bill in theory, Dublin III would clearly struggle to operate effectively unless corrected under clause 7. To prevent that, new clause 53 is designed to ensure that those powers are used so that “take charge” requests can continue to be made in the UK. Going further, for one limited and vulnerable group, the new clause seeks to bring the definition of family contained in UK family reunion rules in line with the definition of family in the Dublin regulations. It would mean that an unaccompanied child could seek family reunion with a broader group of family members without needing to make dangerous journeys to Europe in order to claim asylum and make a Dublin request. Currently—with the exception of when joining parents—alternative options for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children under the immigration rules are too restrictive and costly. As a result, they are rarely used. As UNICEF makes clear, a failure to take action risks adding to the number of unaccompanied children forced to take dangerous journeys with smugglers and traffickers in order to reach close family in the UK. That is why new clause 53 is so important.

I turn finally to a more general question. For every amendment or new clause that we are debating today requiring that retained and incorporated EU law in a particular area must be corrected using these powers, there will be large swathes of other EU laws where there is no such requirement. The question that occurs to me is: what happens if, by oversight or choice, the Government do not fix those provisions, rendering key measures useless? What are our courts going to do if confronted, for example, by a citizen seeking to establish rights under retained EU law when that retained law is riddled with deficiencies? Is the court supposed to try to make that work? Does the person lose their ability to exercise that right? I do not think that this issue has been touched on in the debate. In short, I wonder whether we still have work to do to find the appropriate and comprehensive solution in this Bill.

Should there be a mechanism, for example, to put Ministers under an obligation or duty to ensure that retained EU laws operate effectively? Should our courts be required to interpret retained EU laws in such a way as to make them operate effectively wherever possible? Should there be a procedure to allow courts to flag up rules they have found cannot operate effectively? More modestly perhaps, do we simply need to require the Government to publish a list of all the deficiencies they have found in retained EU law and to detail what, if any, action they are taking to remedy them? That is, do we require the Government to list not only the statutory instruments they intend to table under clause 7, but what deficiencies they have identified that they are not going to rectify in that way? I am concerned that, without such changes, Parliament’s intention of retaining EU law and an efficient and effective statute book after exit day may not prove as effective as we would wish.

[Caroline Lucas]

I rise to speak to the provisions in my name, and particularly to new clause 27, which I hope to press to a vote later this evening. I apologise to Members for being absent from the debate for a couple of hours while I was in a Committee.

New clause 27 aims to preserve the high level of environmental protection that comes with membership of the EU. As we have discussed tonight, there is a very real risk that Brexit will create a big gap when it comes to the enforcement, in particular, of environmental law and standards in this country. The European Commission’s monitoring of member states’ action to implement and comply with EU law, backed up by the European Court of Justice’s ability to impose effective financial sanctions, have been an absolutely vital driver in pressing for and delivering environmental improvements in the UK. The example of clean air in London is just one case study that makes that point. In the absence of an effective domestic enforcement regime replicating the vital roles and functions currently performed by the Commission and the ECJ, it is difficult to see how the Government can deliver on their manifesto pledge to leave the environment in a better state than they found it.

On day 2 of the Committee, on 15 November, we had a good debate on the case for fully transposing the EU environmental principles into UK law. The debate was ultimately fruitless in terms of amending the Bill, but we heard a great deal from both sides of the Chamber about the importance of the EU environmental principles to the future protection of the environment in this country.

Perhaps most significantly, environmentalists such as myself were encouraged by a rather remarkable double act, with nods and comedic timing, of the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. From that, we learned a little more about the Secretary of State’s plan, first announced on 12 November, to consult on a new independent statutory body to

“advise and challenge government and potentially other public bodies on environmental legislation…stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and enforce standards.”

More to the point, we were led to believe that the Secretary of State now intends to introduce an environmental protection Bill to establish an environmental protection body with prosecutorial powers and independence from Government that is charged with policing and enforcing a national policy statement incorporating the EU environmental principles.

That amounts to a welcome recognition on the part of the Secretary of State of the risk of an ever-widening governance gap on environmental protection after the UK leaves the EU if there is not a domestic enforcement regime. Taken at face value, it also seems to be an acknowledgment that the new environmental protection body must be absolutely independent of Government; must be prosecutorial and investigatory so that it can hold the Government and other public bodies to account, including through the courts if necessary; and must be robust and durable so that it cannot easily be abolished or have its functions eroded by stealth.

However, what we still do not know is whether this is a concrete plan that will soon be put into practice so as to ensure the protection of environmental standards in the UK from March 2019, or something that the Secretary of State alone ruminates about while in the bath.