Buckland Review of Autism Employment

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Thursday 25th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Stephen Timms]

That sounds like a wonderful model. The more of that kind of initiative around the country, the better.

The report makes the point that a line manager in a mainstream business may well not know that somebody they are managing is autistic. Whether the employer can agree reasonable adjustments for the employee, as is their right under the Equality Act, will depend on them self-disclosing their diagnosis to their line manager. As the review notes, whatever the level of understanding among company directors or senior staff, if the line manager is unable or unwilling to provide support, the employee will struggle to stay in their job.

The review is right to point out that at the moment there is no easily accessible guidance for employers and line managers on how to support autistic staff. Evidence to our inquiry so far suggests that, as the hon. Member for Worcester rightly said, employers want to do the right thing but often simply do not know how. When they are pointed in the right direction and try it, it turns out to be a positive experience. What can the Government do to give employers confidence in this area?

The review calls on the Department to

“Continue to develop Disability Confident, increasing the rigour of developmental work needed to achieve the higher Disability Confident levels”.

I think that is a very kind way of expressing the point. The noble Lord Shinkwin, who sits on the Government Benches in the other place and chaired the disability commission for the Centre for Social Justice, spoke for many of our witnesses when he said that Disability Confident

“is not making a measurable impact”

at the moment. Employers can, as things stand, achieve the highest level of Disability Confident accreditation without employing a single disabled person.

In response to our predecessor Select Committee six years ago, the Department said that it was developing proposals for an evaluation of Disability Confident. That commitment, first expressed six years ago, was announced again in response to our report almost three years ago in November 2021. However, I have still seen no sign of anything happening. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Is that evaluation of Disability Confident now complete, and when can we expect Disability Confident finally to be reformed?

The review is absolutely right to highlight the importance of Access to Work and to call for improvements there. It makes the point—I think the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon referred to this in his speech—that almost two thirds of disabled people stated that it took over three months for their application to be processed, and 20% said that it took over six months. He is absolutely right that that is far too slow. I agree that, as the review suggests, if the adjustment passport produces positive results, it should be rolled out nationally as soon as possible. However, in response to our Committee’s report three years ago in November 2021, we were promised that the adjustment passport would be piloted from November 2021 and, if successful, would be expanded to support all Access to Work customers. As far as I can tell, we seem to be no further forward in 2024 than we were in November 2021. When are these long-promised improvements actually going to materialise?

One other policy lever the Government could pull is mandatory disability workforce reporting, which was recommended unanimously, on a cross-party basis, in our 2021 report. There is a voluntary framework through which employers can choose to report, but in late 2021 the Government launched a consultation on whether to require large employers to report the number of disabled people they were employing. That work was then paused, but I understand that it has now been resumed, and that the Government plan to publish their findings and next steps in the course of this year. I wonder whether the Minister can update us on when we can expect to see that work. Does she agree that requiring employers to report on the number of disabled people they employ and, within that, perhaps the number of autistic people, could be effective in encouraging the employment of people with autism and other health impairments?

I very much welcome the report, which has highlighted important issues, and the opportunity to debate it today. I also welcome the positive approach that the right hon. and learned Gentleman took, when introducing the report earlier, in seeing the scale of opportunity if we get this right. However, laudable aspirations in this area are just not enough if delivery is delayed for years. We need an ambitious target to increase the rate of employment among people with autism and other disabled people. We need worked-up plans and timescales to deliver them. I very much hope that—perhaps as a result of the work of the task group that he mentioned—we will finally see some of that when the Government respond formally to this very welcome report.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the SNP spokesperson.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Report stage
Wednesday 29th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I have now to announce the result of today’s deferred Division on the Draft Strikes (Minimum Service Levels: NHS Ambulance Services and the NHS Patient Transport Service) Regulations 2023. The Ayes were 297 and the Noes were 166, so the Ayes have it.

[The Division list is published at the end of today’s debates.]

[Sir Stephen Timms]

I rise to speak specifically to Government new clause 34 and connected Government amendments which, as we have been reminded, give Ministers power to inspect the bank accounts of anyone claiming a social security benefit. I think it has been confirmed that that includes child benefit and the state pension, as well as universal credit and all the others. Extremely wide powers are being given to Ministers.

The Minister told us that the measure is expected to save some half a billion pounds over the next five years. I was pleased that the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work was present at the start of the debate, although he is not now in his place and the Department for Work and Pensions is not hearing the concerns expressed about this measure. The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure told us that the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work will not be not speaking in the debate, so we will not hear what the DWP thinks about these concerns.

We have also been told—I had not seen this assurance—that these powers will not be used for a few years. If that is correct, I am completely mystified by why this is being done in such a way. If we had a few years to get these powers in place, why did the Government not wait until there was some appropriate draft legislation that could be properly scrutinised, rather than bringing such measures forward now with zero Commons scrutiny and no opportunity for that to occur? There will no doubt be scrutiny in the other place, but surely a measure of this kind ought to undergo scrutiny in this House.

I chair the Work and Pensions Committee and we have received substantial concerns about this measure, including from Citizens Advice. The Child Poverty Action Group said that

“it shouldn’t be that people have fewer rights, including to privacy, than everyone else in the UK simply because they are on benefits.”

I think that sums up what a lot of people feel, although it appears to be the position that the Government are now taking. It is surprising that the Conservative party is bringing forward such a major expansion of state powers to pry into the affairs of private citizens, and particularly doing so in such a way that we are not able to scrutinise what it is planning. As we have been reminded, the state has long had powers where there were grounds for suspecting that benefit fraud had been committed. The proposal in the Bill is for surveillance where there is absolutely no suspicion at all, which is a substantial expansion of the state’s powers to intrude.

Annabel Denham, deputy comment editor at The Daily Telegraph warned in The Spectator of such a measure handing

“authorities the power to snoop on people’s bank accounts.”

I suspect that the views expressed there are more likely to find support on the Conservative Benches than on the Labour Benches, so I am increasingly puzzled by why the Government think this is an appropriate way to act. I wonder whether the fact that there have been such warnings prompted Ministers into rushing through the measure in this deeply unsatisfactory way, without an opportunity for proper scrutiny, because they thought that if there had been parliamentary scrutiny there would be substantial opposition from the Conservative Benches as well as from the Labour Benches. It is difficult to understand otherwise why it is being done in this way.

As we have been reminded, new clause 34 will give the Government the right to inspect the bank account of anyone who claims a state pension, which is all of us. It will give the Government the right to look into the bank account of every single one of us at some point during our lives, without suspecting that we have ever done anything wrong, and without telling us that they are doing it. The Minister said earlier that the powers of the state should be limited to those absolutely necessary, and I have always understood that to be a principle of the Conservative party. Yet on the power in the new clause to look into the bank account of everybody claiming a state pension, he was unable to give us any reason why the Government should do such a thing, or why they would ever need to look into the bank accounts of people—everybody—claiming a state pension. What on earth would the Government need to do that for? The entitlement to the state pension is not based on income, savings or anything like that, so why would the Government ever wish to do that?

If we cannot think of a reason why the Government would want to do that, why are they now taking the power to enable them to do so? I think that all of us would agree, whatever party we are in, that the powers of the state should be limited to those absolutely necessary. The power in the new clause is definitely not absolutely necessary. Indeed, no one has been able to come up with any reason for why it would ever be used.

Financial Services Reforms

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Tuesday 11th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee.

[Sir Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

Defined-benefit pension funds have long been under pressure to invest in Government gilts rather than the productive economy, so I welcome the change of direction that the Minister has announced. He has indicated how much extra pension fund investment will go into high-growth companies in future. Will he indicate what share of that he expects to go into UK high-growth firms rather than overseas? He has indicated, I think, a replacement for the current charge caps on pension funds, with a wider value-for-money assessment, but can he indicate when we are likely to see the detail on what exactly he and the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott), have in mind for that?

Cost of Living Support

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Tuesday 20th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee.

[Sir Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

The cost of living payments have made a vital contribution to millions of families in supporting people through the current crisis and I welcome the contribution they have made. However, the need for them does reflect, particularly following the removal of the £20 a week uplift from universal credit, the historically low headline level of benefits—at the moment, in real terms, the lowest for 40 years. What consideration are the Minister and his colleagues in the Department giving to consolidating those occasional one-off payments into the mainstream benefits— universal credit and the rest—so that people can budget with confidence, week by week?

State Pension Age: Review

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Thursday 30th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee.

[Sir Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

I am grateful for early sight of the statement. I understand why the Secretary of State has chosen to defer the key decision. Like John Cridland’s independent review six years ago, Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s report should have been published soon after the Department received it six months ago, rather than kept needlessly under wraps until today. John Cridland proposed early access to pension credit. Will the Secretary of State consider leaving access to pension credit at age 66 when the state pension age rises to 67 in three years’ time?

Skills and Post-16 Education Bill [Lords]

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Report stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

To be of assistance, I am going to put in place a six-minute time limit. If we cannot stick to my helpful guidance, not everybody will get in.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

We are having an interesting debate. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins) on the case that he set out from the Front Bench by rightly highlighting that, every couple of years, the Government say they will solve the skills problem by putting employers at the centre, and it never works, so they come back and do the same thing again. He was also right to highlight the failure of the apprenticeship levy, about which the Government were warned.

I rise to speak to new clause 13 in my name. Nine years ago, the Government pledged to introduce alternative student finance, but it still has not been delivered, barring large numbers of Muslims from higher education. The problem became a serious one in 2012, when tuition fees were drastically raised and student loans became essential for pretty much everybody. For some British Muslims, having to take an interest-bearing student loan simply meant that they could not go to university at all. Riba—interest—is prohibited in Islam as it was in Christianity until the middle ages. Some Muslim young people defer university until they have saved to pay the fees outright. Some, with a heavy heart, take out a loan and feel bad about it ever after. Others do not attend at all. That is the reality facing young British Muslims today.

Last October, Muslim Census published the findings of a survey on the scale of the problem. It concluded that, every year, 4,000 Muslim students opt out of university altogether because alternative student finance is not available, 6,000 choose to self-fund, severely limiting their course choice and student experience, and four in five who took loans felt conflicted as a result, sometimes leading to mental health consequences requiring clinical intervention. It is in nobody’s interests to fail such a large group of bright young people who we need to contribute their full potential in the years ahead. As Prime Minister, David Cameron promised to change that. At the World Islamic Economic Forum in London in 2013, he said:

“Never again should a Muslim in Britain feel unable to go to university because they cannot get a student loan - simply because of their religion.”

The promise he made was very clear. Nine years later, there is still not even a timetable for keeping it. It looks to young Muslims as if Ministers simply cannot be bothered.

A year after David Cameron’s speech, a Government consultation attracted 20,000 responses—a record at the time—on a proposed takaful system, in which students pay into the system to guarantee each other against loss. This co-operative structure is generally recognised as sharia-compliant. Repayments, debt levels and cost to the Government would be the same as for conventional student loans. But progress since then over eight years has been glacial. In November 2015, a Green Paper said:

“we are looking to develop the ‘Takaful’ product more fully.”

A White Paper the following year said there was a “a real need” to support students who felt unable to use interest-bearing loans and that:

“we will introduce an alternative student finance product for the first time”—

which—

“will avoid the payment of interest”.

That was seven years ago. In 2017, campaigners hoped the new Higher Education and Research Act 2017 would enable a takaful loan model. Ministers then said that the May 2019 Augar review would cover it. It did not, but ever since Ministers have used the forthcoming response to that report as a justification for still not doing anything. The response to the Augar review was supposed to be published at the time of the spending review, but six months later there is still no word.

British Muslims make up nearly 5% of the UK population and almost 10% of students. In the borough I represent, Muslims are about a third of our population. It is extremely hurtful that the Government simply cannot be bothered to keep the promise they made nine years ago to so many people. Thousands of young Muslims miss out on university. Others struggle over the conflict between what they believe and their hopes for higher education. Our system should not be doing that to people, as the Government recognised nine years ago. New clause 13 requires the Secretary of State to at last make the long-awaited regulations. I hope the House and the Minister will support it.

Pensions Update

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Tuesday 7th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

Is it still the Secretary of State’s view that it is important that the level of the basic state pension keeps track with earnings over time, as the coalition pension reforms assumed? If so, will it not require some further adjustment after these two exceptional years? Given that pensioner poverty was starting to increase before the pandemic, after a long period in which, as she said, that did not happen, what will her Department do to increase the currently very low take-up of pension credit?

Pension Schemes Bill [Lords]

Debate between Stephen Timms and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 16th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Pensions Advisory Commission—

“(1) The Pensions Regulator shall establish a committee to be known as the Pensions Advisory Commission.

(2) The Commission shall consist of—

(a) members of the Regulator as provided under section 2(1) of the Pensions Act 2004, and

(b) five other persons appointed by Her Majesty on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.

(3) A person appointed under subsection (2)(b) shall exercise only functions in pursuance of the duties in subsections (5) and (6).

(4) The Commission shall be chaired by a person appointed under subsection (2)(b).

(5) It shall be the duty of the Pensions Advisory Commission to submit to the Secretary of State each calendar year, beginning with the year 2022, a report setting out the Commission’s views on—

(a) the impact of provisions in Parts 1, 2 and 4 of this Act on—

(i) persons in different parts and regions of the United Kingdom,

(ii) equal treatment of men and women in access to pension provision, and

(iii) persons with a protected characteristic under section 4 of the Equality Act 2010; and

(b) the effectiveness of the powers in Parts 1 to 3 of this Act in enabling the Pensions Regulator to achieve its objectives under section 5 of the Pensions Act 2004.

(6) It shall also be the duty of the Commission to report to the Secretary of State by 31 October 2021 its views on when commercial operators should be able to enter the market for provision of a pensions dashboard service.

(7) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a copy of every report received from the Commission under this section.”

New clause 3—Pension accounts—

“(1) A jobholder to whom section 3 of the Pensions Act 2008 applies may by notice require an employer to arrange for the jobholder to receive into a pension account any contribution which would otherwise be made by the employer into an automatic enrolment scheme.

(2) A contribution by a jobholder or by their employer into the jobholder’s pension account shall be invested in a pension scheme offered by an approved pension provider.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—

(a) about the form and content of a notice given under subsection (1), or

(b) about the arrangements that the employer is required to make.

(4) The Secretary of State may make regulations to set criteria by which a pension provider may be approved for the purposes of subsection (2).

(5) Regulations under this section shall be made by statutory instrument and may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

New clause 4—Employer debt: trustees’ discretion—

“(1) The following changes are made to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Employer Debt) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/678).

(2) In regulation 2, in the definition of “scheme apportionment arrangement”—

(a) in sub-paragraph (f)(ii), after “apply”, insert “but not if the circumstances in paragraph (h) apply”;

(b) at end insert—

“(h) the consent of the remaining employer or employers shall not be required under (f)(ii) above where all of the following conditions apply—

(i) the departing employer’s debt was treated as becoming due prior to the coming into force of this provision; and

(ii) the departing employer’s debt was less than 0.5% of the scheme’s overall liabilities, as estimated by the trustees or managers on advice of the scheme actuary, as if the whole scheme had been winding-up at the time the debt was treated as becoming due; and

(iii) the employer in question was operating as an unincorporated business during his participation in the scheme; and

(iv) the trustees or managers consider that, in the context of the scheme overall, taking into account factors such as the scheme’s assets, liabilities and the trustees’ or managers’ most recent assessment of the overall employer covenant, there would be no material benefit to the scheme and its members in seeking recovery of the employer’s liability share from the departing employer.”

(3) In regulation 9, after paragraph (14B), insert the following new paragraph—

“(14C) Condition L is that a debt was treated as becoming due from him under section 75 of the 1995 Act but is excluded under this Condition because—

(a) the employer’s debt was treated as becoming due prior to this Condition coming into force; and

(b) the employer’s debt was less than 0.5% of the scheme’s overall liabilities, as estimated by the trustees or managers on advice of the scheme actuary, as if the whole scheme had been winding-up at the time the debt was treated as becoming due; and

(c) the employer in question was operating as an unincorporated business during his participation in the scheme; and

(d) at or before the applicable time, the trustees or managers have made a determination not to pursue the debt on the grounds that, in the context of the scheme overall, taking into account factors such as the scheme’s assets, liabilities and the trustees’ or managers’ most recent assessment of the overall employer covenant, seeking recovery represented a disproportionate cost to the scheme and would be of no material benefit to the scheme overall.””

This new clause would enable pension scheme trustees to exercise discretion not to pursue employer debt following an employer’s exit from a pension scheme where such debt is below a de minimis threshold. This aims to support unincorporated employers who are now retired for business and for whom the current regulation allows no easements.

New clause 5—Employer debt: deferred debt arrangement—

“(1) The following changes are made to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Employer Debt) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/678).

(2) In regulation 6F—

(a) in paragraph (1), leave out “A” and insert “Subject to the provisions of paragraph (8) below, a”;

(b) at end insert—

“(8) In relation to a frozen scheme, the trustees or managers of the scheme may agree to a deferred debt arrangement where the employment-cessation event occurred at a time prior to the scheme becoming a frozen scheme, providing the conditions of paragraph (3) are met at the time the deferred debt arrangement is entered into.””

This new clause would permit employers in a pension scheme closed to future accrual to apply for a deferred debt arrangement, providing they meet the other statutory tests. This aims to support employers who are still trading but were not able to use the existing deferred debt easement.

New clause 6—Regulation of pension superfunds—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall publish a statement on proposals for primary legislation in relation to a duty on the Pensions Regulator to regulate pension superfunds.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a pension superfund is a defined benefit pension scheme that allows for the severance of an employer’s liability towards a defined benefit scheme and one of the following conditions applies—

(a) the scheme employer is replaced by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) employer, or

(b) the liability of the employer to fund the scheme’s liabilities is replaced by an employer backed with a capital injection to a capital buffer.

(3) The statement under subsection (1) shall be laid before Parliament before the end of a period of six months from the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish within six months of Royal Assent proposals for primary legislation to place a duty on the Pensions Regulator to regulate pension superfunds.

Amendment 15, in clause 118, page 104, line 19, at end insert—

“(3) Requirements prescribed under subsection (2) must include a requirement that a pensions dashboard service may not include a facility for engaging in financial transaction activities.”

This amendment ensures that a pensions dashboard does not include a provision for financial transaction activities.

Amendment 9, page 105, line 20, at end insert—

“(6A) A requirement under subsection (6)(d) may require the provider of a pensions dashboard service to ensure that the needs of people in vulnerable circumstances, including but not exclusively—

(a) persons who suffer long-term sickness or disability,

(b) carers,

(c) persons on low incomes, and

(d) recipients of benefits,

are met and that resources are allocated in such a way as to allow specially trained advisers and guidance to be made available to them.”

This amendment would require that specially trained advisers and guidance are made available to people in vulnerable circumstances and would provide an indicative list of what vulnerable circumstances should include.

Amendment 10, page 105, line 20, at end insert—

“(6A) A requirement under subsection (6)(d) may require the provider of a pensions dashboard service to communicate to an individual using the dashboard the difference between—

(a) provision of information,

(b) provision of guidance, and

(c) provision of advice.”

This amendment would require the provider of a pensions dashboard service to ensure that users are made aware of the differences between “information”, “guidance” and “advice”.

Amendment 11, in clause 119, page 108, line 18, after “scheme,” insert—

“(iva) the total cost of charges incurred for the administration of the scheme”.

This amendment would add information about the total cost of charges incurred for the administration and management of occupational pension schemes to the list of information displayed on the dashboard.

Amendment 13, in clause 121, page 112, line 42, after “scheme,” insert—

“(iva) the total cost of charges incurred for the administration of the scheme”.

This amendment would add information about the total cost of charges incurred for the administration and management of personal and stakeholder pension schemes to the list of information displayed on the dashboard.

Amendment 8, in clause 122, page 116, line 37, at end insert—

“(2A) Before any other pension dashboard services can qualify under section 238A of the Pensions Act 2004 (qualifying pensions dashboard service)—

(a) the pensions dashboard service under subsection (1) must have been established for at least one year, and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the operation and effectiveness of the pensions dashboard service under subsection (1) in its first year.”

Amendment 14, page 116, line 37, at end insert—

“(3) Before any other pension dashboard services can qualify under section238A of the Pensions Act 2004 (qualifying pensions dashboard service) the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the operation and effectiveness of the pensions dashboard service, including the adequacy of consumer protections.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to report on the operation and effectiveness of the public dashboard service (including consumer protections) before allowing commercial dashboards to operate.

Amendment 7, in clause 123, page 117, line 34, at end insert—

“(2) In exercising any powers to make regulations, or otherwise to prescribe any matter or principle, under Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2004 (scheme funding) as amended by Schedule 10, the objectives of the Secretary of State must include ensuring that schemes that are expected to remain open to new members, either indefinitely or for a significant period of time, can adopt funding and investment strategies which are suited to the characteristics of such schemes.”

Amendment 1, page 117, line 34, at end insert—

“(2) In exercising any powers to make regulations, or otherwise to prescribe any matter or principle, under Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2004 (scheme funding) as amended by Schedule 10, the Secretary of State must ensure that—

(a) schemes that are expected to remain open to new members, either indefinitely or for a significant period of time, are treated differently from schemes that are not;

(b) scheme liquidity is balanced with scheme maturity;

(c) there is a correlation between appropriate investment risk and scheme maturity;

(d) affordability of contributions to employers is maintained;

(e) affordability of contributions to members is maintained;

(f) the closure of schemes that are expected to remain open to new members, either indefinitely or for a significant period of time, is not accelerated; and

(g) trustees retain sufficient discretion to be able to comply with their duty to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries.”

This amendment seeks to ensure that open and active schemes which are receiving regular, significant cash contributions and closed schemes are treated differently, in accordance with their differing liquidity profile.

Amendment 6, page 117, line 34, at end insert—

“(2) The Secretary of State must, on or before 30 June 2021, lay before Parliament a comprehensive impact assessment of the effect on the charitable sector of changes to defined benefit schemes made under Schedule 10.”

This amendment would require the Government to produce an economic impact assessment of the changes to defined benefit schemes upon the charitable sector.

Amendment 16, in clause 124, page 118, line 45, leave out subsection (8) and insert—

“(8) In this section and in sections 41AA, 41B and 41C—

(a) “the Paris Agreement goal” means the objectives set out in Articles 2 and 4.1 of the agreement done at Paris on 12 December 2015; and

(b) “other climate change goal” means any climate change goal approved by the Secretary of State, but does not apply to a climate change goal which fails to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement goal.

41AA Alignment with the Paris Agreement goal

(1) Trustees or managers of occupational pension schemes of a prescribed description must develop, set and implement, and from time to time review and if necessary revise, a strategy for ensuring that their investment policy, objectives and practices (including stewardship activities) are aligned with the Paris Agreement goal or other climate change goal.

(2) Such a strategy is to be known as a “Paris-alignment strategy”.

(3) The objective of a Paris-alignment strategy must be to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner, consistent with the Paris Agreement goal or other climate change goal.

(4) Provision may be made by regulations—

(a) requiring the trustees or managers of a scheme, in determining or revising a Paris-alignment strategy, to take into account prescribed matters and follow prescribed principles—

(i) as to the level of detail required in a Paris-alignment strategy; and

(ii) as to the period within which a Paris-alignment strategy must be developed, set and effected;

(b) requiring annual reporting on the implementation of the Paris-alignment strategy and progress against the objective set out in subsection (3); and

(c) requiring a Paris-alignment strategy to be reviewed, and if necessary revised, at such intervals and on such occasions as may be prescribed.”

This amendment enables regulations that would mandate occupational pension schemes to develop a strategy for ensuring that their investments and stewardship activities are aligning with the Paris agreement goals, and include an objective of achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner.

Amendment 17, page 119, line 7, after “scheme” insert

“and alignment with achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement goal or other climate change goal”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 18, page 119, line 8, leave out “section 41A” and insert “sections 41A and 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 19, page 119, line 19, after “41A”, insert “, 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 20, page 119, line 21, after “41A”, insert “, 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 21, page 119, line 22, at end insert—

“(za) provide for the Authority to undertake a review of, and report publicly on, the extent to which the activities under sections 41A and 41AA are achieving effective governance of climate change risk and alignment of pension schemes with the Paris Agreement goal;”.

This amendment enables the regulator to publicly assess the progress and development of schemes’ strategies to achieve alignment with Paris agreement goals.

Amendment 22, page 119, line 25, after “41A”, insert “, 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 23, page 119, line 30, after “41A”, insert “, 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 24, page 119, line 37, after “41A”, insert “, 41AA”.

This amendment is consequent on Amendment 16.

Amendment 2, in clause 125, page 120, line 32, at end insert—

“(e) the results of due diligence undertaken by the trustees or managers regarding the intended transfer or the receiving scheme.”

This amendment enables regulations under inserted subsection (6ZA) of section 95 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 to prescribe conditions about the results of due diligence undertaken in relation to a transfer request such as to determine that the statutory right to a transfer is not established if specific “red flags” are identified in relation to the transfer or intended receiving pension scheme. Amendments 3, 4 and 5 are related.

Amendment 3, page 121, line 27, at end insert—

“(e) the results of due diligence undertaken by the trustees or managers regarding the intended transfer or the receiving scheme.”

This amendment enables regulations under inserted subsection (5A) of section 101F of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 to prescribe conditions about the results of due diligence undertaken in relation to a transfer request such as to determine that the statutory right to a transfer is not established if specific “red flags” are identified in relation to the transfer or intended receiving pension scheme. Amendments 2, 4 and 5 are related.

Amendment 12, in schedule 9, page 178, line 14, after “scheme,” insert—

(iva) the total cost of charges incurred for the administration of the scheme”.

This amendment would add information about the total cost of charges incurred for the administration and management of occupational pension schemes in Northern Ireland to the list of information displayed on the dashboard.

Amendment 4, in schedule 11, page 192, line 20, at end insert—

“(e) the results of due diligence undertaken by the trustees or managers regarding the intended transfer or the receiving scheme.”

This amendment enables regulations under inserted subsection (6ZA) of section 91 of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 to prescribe conditions about the results of due diligence undertaken in relation to a transfer request such as to determine that the statutory right to a transfer is not established if specific “red flags” are identified in relation to the transfer or intended receiving pension scheme. Amendments 2, 3 and 5 are related.

Amendment 5, page 193, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) the results of due diligence undertaken by the trustees or managers regarding the intended transfer or the receiving scheme.”

This amendment enables regulations under inserted subsection (5A) of section 97F of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 to prescribe conditions about the results of due diligence undertaken in relation to a transfer request such as to determine that the statutory right to a transfer is not established if specific “red flags” are identified in relation to the transfer or intended receiving pension scheme. Amendments 2, 3 and 4 are related.

[Stephen Timms]

I rise to speak to new clause 1, together with amendments 2 to 5, and I am grateful to those from my party, the Conservative party and the SNP who have added their names to them.

New clause 1 addresses a serious flaw in the implementation of the pension freedoms that George Osborne announced in his Budget speech in 2014 and that were implemented the following year. This is what George Osborne said in that Budget speech on 19 March 2014:

“Let me be clear: no one will have to buy an annuity. We are going to introduce a new guarantee, enforced by law, that everyone who retires on these defined contribution schemes will be offered free, impartial, face-to-face advice on how to get the most from the choices they will now have.”—[Official Report, 19 March 2014; Vol. 577, c. 793.]

That was a recognition that there could be pitfalls in allowing people to do whatever they wanted with their pension savings—for many people, the largest sum of money they would ever have access to—and that the Government would have to ensure that everybody had access to guidance to help them make the best decisions.

The outcome of George Osborne’s promise is the Pension Wise service operated by Citizens Advice, and it is an excellent service. It is free and it is impartial, as George Osborne promised, and it gets very high satisfaction ratings from those who use it. The problem is that hardly anyone does use it, and new clause 1 is intended to fix that. The latest figures show that about one in 33 of those eligible for Pension Wise actually use it. Last month, the Department for Work and Pensions published a document entitled “Stronger Nudge to Pensions Guidance: Statement of Policy Intent”. That proposed the adoption of new nudges, which, according to the trials, would increase the take-up from one in 33 to one in nine. Well, that is not enough.