Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Stephen Phillips and Henry Smith

Tuesday 7th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

It is an enormous pleasure, as always, to follow my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood). It has also been an enormous pleasure to listen to the contributions from other right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House.

At the outset, I want to make it clear that the issues with which the Bill grapples are not, as I suspect many Members have found, necessarily easy. I have not found them easy. For my part, during my consideration of the measures proposed by the Government I have from time to time changed my mind, or at least changed the direction in which I thought I was travelling, before finally alighting on the position that I intend to set forth this evening.

What, then, is the dilemma for all Members? On the one hand, it seems plain from the responses to the Government’s consultation that there is general agreement among the majority of those who offered their views that in the case of a very few individuals there is a continuing need for the Government to have access to the sort of powers proposed in this Bill to protect the public from potential harm. One simple reason for that, as the responses make clear and as I, at least, am persuaded, is that in the case of some of those very few individuals prosecutions are impossible for either security or legal reasons. By the same token, not every threat to national security is or has yet become a criminal offence. Are such threats to be ignored, as some would urge us to do? I venture to suggest not.

On the other hand, the suggestion that the sort of powers that we see in this Bill should exist at all—they effectively permit the Executive to detain individuals without trial—is naturally abhorrent to Members of this House and is regarded as such on both sides, as it is by all right-thinking people. It is said with force that we now have, and that within the memory of this House we have always had, a system of open justice and it is legitimate to ask, as many Members have done, why in those circumstances we should make even one exception, no matter how carefully hedged about with safeguards, to the principles that have long underpinned our democracy and the rule of law in this country.

The question, then, is how that dilemma is to be resolved. That is essentially the question faced by the House in deciding whether to give the Bill a Second Reading. Differing from hon. Members of all parties and some people outside the House who advocate the complete revocation of any system of civil measures that interferes with the rights of the individual, I have come to the view that what the Government propose, subject to the amendments that will no doubt be made in Committee, strikes the right balance for reasons that I shall come on to. That is, I accept, my judgment. It is my opinion, consistent with the position that my conscience dictates, but that is not to say—and I do not say—that it is the only view that it is possible to take. This is very much one of those issues where reasonable people may come to completely contrary conclusions and where Members have come to contrary conclusions. My task, if I have one at all, is to explain in the course of this debate how I have come to my conclusion and my reasons for having done so.

The starting point—I suspect that all Members would agree that this should always be the starting point for any Government, but it is one which might perhaps have been lost sight of from time to time during the course of the debate—is that the primary duty of the state to its citizens is to keep them safe. National security and public safety are and must always remain the first duty of the Government, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made clear in her statement on 23 May 2011 and as the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the shadow Home Secretary, acknowledged in her opening remarks in this debate. If one accepts, as I think one must, that that is the starting point, it must in my judgment follow that if there are circumstances in which those who threaten the United Kingdom from within her own borders cannot, for whatever reasons, adequately be dealt with by a system of open criminal justice, which I accept should remain the norm in the vast majority of cases, their rights cannot override those of the majority to the safety of their existence, which the Government are bound to protect.

In one sense, of course, this is a question of degree. Is the derogation from the ordinary principles of the rule of law and the rights of the subject that this Bill entails justified given the threat that we know we face at the beginning of the 21st century? In my opinion—I stress again that it is my opinion and that others are driven to a different view by their consciences—it is. We have merely to look at some of the events that we have witnessed during the past decade, such as the bombings of 7 July 2005 in London, to know what may happen when the balance is poorly or inappropriately struck. Of course I do not for a moment suggest that the mere existence of the measures in the Bill—of TPIMs—or even of the existing regime of control orders can ensure that such events will never happen. However, if one wonders, as I do, whether future atrocities might be prevented by proportionate derogations from generally accepted minimum standards regarding the rights of the subject—derogations that can and must be kept to a minimum, as I think all Members accept—it is my belief that they might. It follows that the existence of a regime that is necessary to protect the public, such as that contained in the Bill, cannot be avoided given the world in which we live.

The matter can be viewed in this way: many Members on both sides of the House will quite properly oppose the Bill’s Second Reading, or will at least have indicated that they will not give it a Third Reading in its current form. However, let me posit an eventuality that I hope will not occur—circumstances in which someone who might have been subject to a TPIM is instrumental in a future atrocity that results in our fellow citizens being maimed or killed. Would it, in those circumstances, be right that the Bill fell today or in future? I suggest not, for that would be to strike the wrong balance between the rule of law and the first duty of the Government, which I have already outlined.

I accept that none of this is easy. My view, I am perfectly prepared to accept, may be wrong. It may even, as the courts will be able to inquire given that there will now be no possibility of derogation from the law relating to the rights of the subject, be unlawful, although I think not as the Bill has been carefully drawn. However, it is the view to which I am driven by a consideration of the issues I have outlined and by the horrendous possibility of being wrong and, in being wrong, of failing to prevent a potential terrorist outrage.

The second argument that drives me to support the Government’s proposals and therefore to lend my support to the Bill’s Second Reading is the very fact that there are certain rights that I and the vast majority of people consider to be inalienable, the most important of which is the right to life. That this right is inalienable seems to me naturally to entail the proposition that it should, by the nature of the law as it should be framed, be protected—if necessary at the expense of other lesser rights, which are not necessarily inalienable. Schedule 1 identifies a series of measures that the Secretary of State may take, should the Bill become law, which would undoubtedly interfere with the second of those groups of rights. It enables the state to obstruct the liberty of the citizen, to oblige him or her to comply with the directions of those who exercise its authority and to disturb the free enjoyment of property rights. However, not one of those rights is, or at least should be, regarded as absolute and inalienable. The right to life and to security, in the sense of freedom from hurt or injury, is in a different category altogether. As the Bill makes clear throughout, particularly from the safeguards with which it is hedged, it is that right that is being protected and the other, lesser rights that are being obstructed. That cannot but indicate, as many Members on both sides have noted, that a balance is being struck. Whether it is the right balance will be a question that future historians will no doubt assess.

[Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)]

My hon. and learned Friend is making a powerful argument about the balancing of rights. Does he feel that this consideration should be reviewed regularly to ensure that the balance remains correct in future?

[Stephen Phillips]

I can see that there is a powerful case for amending the Bill in Committee to introduce some annual review by Parliament, but there are countervailing arguments, some of which have been alluded to during the debate. The first of those arguments, which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker), is that with the whipping system being what it is, such an annual review may prove pointless. The second is that if the House forms a view in relation to TPIMs, which are not control orders, it will have reached a settled view, and that will not fade from parliamentary memory. I think that everyone on both sides of the House accepts that once the reasons why TPIMs or control orders need to exist have disappeared, this legislation should also disappear. In those circumstances, while I can see the case for an annual review, it is not something on which I have a conclusive view, and I look forward to debating it again in due course.

Returning to whether it is right in principle for the Bill to strike the balance that it seeks to strike, what finally has driven me to the view that the Bill must continue its passage through the House is the fact that the arguments against the balance being struck at all either misinterpret or only interpret semantically and without regard to its content what the rule of law actually means. We have created for ourselves, as have most other nations, a system of justice that involves the open trial of individuals for those things that we characterise as wrongs that deserve punishment. That system, however, is a fabrication of the society in which we live—no more, no less. It is not the only system that man could devise, but it has been found over the years to be the best system, even though we must occasionally alter or change it so that it meets the needs of the times in which we live. This is such a time, so the Bill seeks to fashion a different system from the ordinary criminal justice system, and it does so because, in my judgment, it must, for reasons that I have given.

Is the system contrary to the rule of law because it is different? No. It is contrary to the rule of law, if in any sense, because we say it is, yet the rule of law as created must be protected, as it answers so well to the circumstances of existence that we must not seek to undermine it any more than is necessary. Again, there is a balance to be struck—what is necessary is what is proportionate to the circumstances, and in my view that is the regime that the Bill seeks to create. The same cannot be said universally of the regime that will be repealed if and when clause 1 comes into force. While the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 sought to strike a necessary balance, in my judgment it struck the wrong balance, which is tacitly accepted by the Opposition Front-Bench team, given their acceptance that the control order regime was not necessarily the best way of dealing with the threat that the legislation that they introduced sought to deal.

I know, as I have said before in the House, new as I am, that it is the Opposition’s duty to oppose, but for those of us who have sat through this debate in its entirety it has been odd to note the opposition from their Front-Bench team, but the consensus among Back Benchers on both sides of the House that the Bill should at least complete its Second Reading.

The previous regime of control orders permitted the Government to derogate from the Human Rights Act 1998. The Bill does not do so, which is progress. While I am no fan of the Human Rights Act, I accept that it includes welcome protections that have existed in our law for generations, even if consistently misinterpreted or over-interpreted by the Court in Strasbourg. The previous regime of control orders likewise provided a non-exhaustive list of the way in which the rights of the subject could be hindered. The Bill, by contrast, tells the Home Secretary precisely what she may do, circumscribed by Parliament. I know which I prefer and which meets the need to tackle the mischief at which the Bill is directed.

The previous regime of control orders likewise allowed the Home Secretary powers overly and unnecessarily in effect to extinguish individual rights, the best example being the 16-hour curfew. The Bill, by contrast, limits the Home Secretary’s powers—again, always subject to review—to something which, to my mind, is more capable of justification, even though overnight detention orders require more definition. Most importantly, unlike the present regime, mere suspicion on the part of the state will no longer be enough to trigger the powers in the Bill—and rightly so. The Bill makes it clear that there must be reasonable belief that individuals can no longer be deprived of their rights merely on the basis of suspicion. Lawyers other than I have suggested this afternoon that there is little difference, but I disagree. Even if I am wrong, I am more content with a regime that requires some form of objective proof and justification than one that can be triggered merely on the basis of vague, subjective assertion on the part of the state.

For these reasons, and many others which there is now insufficient time to develop further but which will undoubtedly be explored in Committee if the Bill goes forward tonight, it is my belief that this is the right Bill to address the dilemma that I posed at the outset and which the Government face in striking a balance between the rights of the individual and the obligation to protect all the citizens of this country. If the House divides tonight, the Government will therefore receive my support to give the Bill a Second Reading, as I believe they should receive the support of the remainder of the House.