Onshore Wind Subsidies
Debate between Stephen Phillips and Amber Rudd
Amber Rudd
I thank the right hon. Lady for her comments. May I first take the opportunity to remind her that this policy was well set out before she heard me on the “Today” programme? It was in the Queen’s Speech, in the manifesto and the Prime Minister had referred to the fact that a Conservative Government would take this action. I have in no way been forced to come here. I chose to come here to make a statement after a number of colleagues wanted the opportunity to have their voice heard in support of what is happening. I am delighted to give them the opportunity to do so.
The right hon. Lady chose to question the Conservative party’s commitment to addressing our climate change obligations. Fortunately, she gave me the opportunity to talk about that just 10 days or so ago, when one of the first Opposition-day debates of the Parliament was about climate change. I was able to tell her and the House about the Government’s commitment to meeting the targets and the commitment of the Government and the Prime Minister to getting a deal in Paris this year. We are committed to ensuring that we deliver on our decarbonisation targets but, just as importantly, we are committed to getting a global deal. We do not want to do this alone. We need to provide leadership in the EU and internationally to ensure that our effort is truly leveraged so that we can get that result at the end of the year.
It is disappointing that the right hon. Lady chooses to throw confusion where none exists. I think I was very clear in my statement about the gigawatts involved and the range that we were targeting, but I repeat for her that we hoped to have 10% of electricity generation from wind by 2020, and we are reaching that target early. That is a key reason for ending the subsidy for onshore wind now. We wanted to fall in the middle of the range, and in fact it looks likely that we will be slightly towards the upper end. Having achieved that, it is right that we do not put further pressure on people’s bills. Unlike her and the Labour party, we believe that we can do this in a cost-effective way. We are absolutely committed to supporting renewables, but we want to do it by the most low-cost pathway we can.
In answer to the right hon. Lady’s question about regulation, and particularly planning permission for different sources of energy, it is right that different sources have different types of regulation and fall under different planning regimes. Part of what we are trying to do is to encourage new energy sources, in order to meet our targets and lead to cost reductions. That is why we have different set-ups for different sources—to get the best outcome for both our targets and bill payers.
Finally, the right hon. Lady asked me about Scotland. I have no doubt that I will be answering questions from Scottish National party Members, and I look forward to taking them and addressing them. I have had many conversations with the devolved Administrations, and I look forward to taking further questions from them.
Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
May I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement and encourage her to ignore the hot air coming from the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint) and the Opposition on this subject?
I thank my right hon. Friend for all she is doing to prevent Lincolnshire from being carpeted with wind turbines, which nobody in my constituency wants. Will her Department be prepared to publish on its website a list of all the projects that her announcement will affect, so that people in Lincolnshire and across the country who do not want to see the countryside carpeted with turbines know whether individual projects are going ahead?
Amber Rudd
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for his question. I know that he has felt, representing his community, that there has been too much deployment in his area. I recognise the support that he has provided in helping us to develop our policy.
Each developer will need to contact the Department for us to give a complete answer, and we will work with developers to ensure that it is clear which projects are within the provisions and which are not. At some stage —my hon. and learned Friend will have to give me a little time—that will be published on the website.
Defamation Bill
Debate between Stephen Phillips and Amber Rudd(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker and hon. Members on both sides of the House for that very warm welcome.
I rise to speak, having had the enormous privilege of sitting among significantly more distinguished colleagues from this House, including the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), and indeed from the other place, on the Joint Committee that considered this Bill when it was subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny during the last Session. Let me indicate from the outset in a non-controversial way that the Bill enjoys my support as it enjoys the support of the official Opposition and of all parties.
Like other hon. Members, I have little doubt that the Bill is capable of being improved in Committee, where it will no doubt be debated appropriately, properly and, I hope, at length, particularly in respect of certain Joint Committee recommendations that the Government have not adopted. As it stands, the Bill supplies some, if not all, the certainty required regarding the deficiencies in our libel and slander law previously identified by the noble Lord Lester and others. For that reason, if for no other, I welcome the Bill’s support across the House, as I welcome the Opposition’s decision not to divide the House on the Second Reading of a Bill that evidently does and certainly should enjoy cross-party support.
This Bill is perhaps not the most eye-catching piece of legislation in this Session and perhaps not even the most eye-catching piece of reform in the arena of the ongoing debate on the balance that needs to be struck between free speech on the one hand and other fundamental rights on the other. For reasons that I will attempt to explain in the course of my remarks, it is none the less important.
Let me begin with the problems—not merely those inherent in the existing law, but those of a more fundamental nature concerning any law that seeks to address defamation, whether in this jurisdiction or elsewhere. The first of those problems is naturally the fact that the mere existence of a law of defamation is an intrusion into the area of free speech. Not one Member of this House can possibly begin to doubt the importance of free speech both as a principle of general application in any mature society and, more important, for the health of our democracy and our democratic institutions.
The powerful need to be held to account. They need to be answerable to those in whose name they seek to exercise power. They need to be exposed to hypocrisy or inconsistency, where necessary. Most certainly, as we all know they need to have the balloon of pomposity associated with their position punctured from time to time, perhaps even frequently, and without remorse. That is the nature of free speech. As I say, surely no one can doubt its importance.
But there are other important rights that need to be addressed in a civilised society—even if, on this point at least, I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) that there is no hierarchy of rights and that there ought not to be. The right to a true reputation is particularly important to well-being, given the importance attributed to character in human affairs. The right of those who have not opened up their private lives to scrutiny to keep their affairs private is equally important. That is a right that used more ordinarily to be respected without the need for intervention of the law, but recent events and recent experiences point to those in the media no longer being able to respect that without appropriate restraints. Finally, there is a right not much talked about thus far in our debate—the right to redress, speedily and efficiently, when either of the rights I have already mentioned is dealt a blow from which in an age of immediate global communication neither may recover unless effective solutions to set the record straight are also available.
What the Bill is designed to achieve, as the preamble tells us, is to amend the law of defamation. In so doing, I understand it to be the Government’s aim—it was certainly the aim of the Joint Committee on which I sat—not only to balance the competing rights to which I have drawn attention, but to bring the law more into line with the world in which we now live. In that regard, the potent mechanism of the common law, able as it is to develop and deal with new situations, is not always enough. Occasionally, as in this area, development can run behind the times because of the lengthy processes associated with litigation and as a result of the disincentive afforded by cost to litigants who find themselves in novel situations. When that happens, it is for Parliament to act, triggered where appropriate by a Government’s legislative programme. That is necessary because it is not always the case that we can outsource the change that the common law might deliver, which would require litigants to dip into their own pockets to seek the intervention of the courts to adapt the law to their needs.
That, as I perceive it, is the position in which we find ourselves in relation to the law of defamation. The genuine and general support that Lord Lester’s Bill enjoyed both within and without Parliament demonstrated precisely that. Lord Lester and those who assisted him are to be commended for their initial efforts in this area in the last Parliament, even if they did not bear fruit. This Government, I have to say, are to be commended for having taken forward that work, having established a distinguished Committee—personal exceptions apart—to consider the matter, and having now brought forward appropriate legislation to address the issues in an area that is, as I have already indicated, unlikely perhaps to attract either headlines or even much credit.
Amber Rudd
We have heard much about this Committee and its various members, including my hon. and learned Friend. Is it correct that the Committee was unified on most of these points? It appears that the House is unified on the Bill, but did the Committee find itself unified on its key points?
Stephen Phillips
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for her intervention. My recollection—it is only that—is that the Committee was unanimous on almost all points. I think there was one division—and one only—on the final report; I see my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) nodding. Unlike with the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon sat, there is considerably more cross-party agreement in this area.
The Bill of course comes at an interesting and even opportune time, as, indeed, we are all aware. A mile or so down the road—a little less far than the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) suggested—Lord Justice Leveson is sitting in a far more high-profile environment, examining the culture, practices and ethics of the media. The legitimacy and desirability of what an untrammelled free press has recently been up to, for which we as politicians bear some measure of the blame, has rightly been called into question by recent events, which few can have viewed with anything other than horror and disgust.
As we have heard in this debate, another Joint Select Committee of this Parliament in the previous Session, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon sat, has now reported to both Houses on the subject of privacy and the use of injunctions. New technologies have thrown up new challenges in a number of areas. That they are being addressed piecemeal, although not entirely desirable, as hon. Members have indicated in their contributions, is understandable. That they are being addressed at all is a matter for congratulation, I venture to suggest, for all concerned. Where precisely we will find ourselves at the end of the process is no doubt a matter of debate, but the overall aim is clear: to preserve free speech while respecting other competing rights and the responsibilities that each of those rights entails. For my part, I merely add that this is unlikely to be the end of the process. As the report of the Joint Select Committee on which I sat indicated, there is still work to be done on the issue of parliamentary privilege, just as there remain loose ends to be tied up in relation to those parts of the common law of blasphemy and sedition which remain part of our law.
Thus far, I have dealt in generalities, but the greater raft of problems—at least in terms of number, if not seriousness—relates to the specific difficulties encountered with the mechanistic aspects of the law of defamation. The second issue with which it is necessary to grapple in any reform in this area is, therefore, the cost that is associated with defamation litigation and, when necessary, court proceedings. The evidence taken by the Committee demonstrated that those costs were prohibitive to the defence of reputation by the majority; but, even more important, they are inimical to free speech itself.
Few individuals, save perhaps the very brave such as Dr Ben Goldacre, have been prepared to put their lives and fortunes at stake and raise their right to express the truth above their own financial security and that of their families. As anyone who does not enjoy the luxury of parliamentary privilege is all too well aware, the powerful have deep pockets and frightening lawyers with heavy notepaper and even heavier language. The costs associated with defamation not only prevent ordinary people from defending reputations that are so easily damaged in an age in which anonymous posting online can wrongly create a rapist or a paedophile at the click of a mouse, but prevent public figures who lie, cheat and steal from being revealed for what they are.
How, one is driven to ask perhaps all too often—even if rhetorically—have the individuals who have been involved in many of the scandals that we have seen in the past got away with it for so long? The truth, frequently, is that they had, and continue to have, good lawyers who are adroit at putting those who might otherwise hold them to account through the preventive mills of cost and stress. Any reform of the law of defamation needs not only to take account of that, but to address cost at each and every turn. Yes, legitimate reputation is important in a civilised society, as is the prevention of false accusations which damage it; but such protections ought not to be purchased through prevention of the exposure of that which ought to be in the public domain, something which is perhaps all too often a result of the chilling effects associated with any defamation litigation. Indeed, as the Committee concluded in its report,
“the reduction in the extremely high costs of defamation proceedings is essential to limiting the chilling effect and making access to legal redress a possibility for the ordinary citizen.”
This is, none the less, an appropriate moment at which to pause and recognise a fact that—given the evidence taken by the Committee and the views of many commentators—may be obvious, at least to practitioners: the fact that the true problem with the costs associated with defamation proceedings is driven not by substantive rules but by procedure. Any significant reform to reduce cost is therefore not something that can be exclusively, or even primarily, driven by Parliament. As has been pointed out by Members on both sides of the House today, what we need are reforms of procedure to provide new and effective procedural mechanisms that will level the playing field as between those with deep pockets and those without them.
Much, in general terms, was achieved in that respect by the reforms of civil procedure for which we are eternally in the debt of Lord Woolf, but I should like the Minister to state categorically that the Government, in the person of the Lord Chancellor, will instruct the Civil Procedure Rule Committee—if, indeed, they have not already done so—to review the civil procedure rules relating to defamation proceedings, as well as the pre-action protocol, in an attempt specifically to strengthen the parts of the overriding objective that are directed to addressing the cost associated with litigation and the necessity of ensuring equality of arms between litigants.
The third difficulty, which both the Committee and the Government have sought to address, is one that I have already mentioned: the difficulty posed by technological and other advances. The last statutory intervention in that regard was made in 1996, under the Administration of Sir John Major, mention of whom is, perhaps, opportune today. Even I can remember vaguely what the world was like then, and it was different. For a start, there was no Human Rights Act—legislation on which, as many know, I have my own strong views, but which, in terms of general principle, has had a significant effect on the law of defamation by recognising privacy rights that have been used as a back door to circumvent free speech protections developed in the arena of defamation over centuries. That affords yet another reason why the 1996 Act is, at the very least—I put it neutrally in deference to my hon. Friends—problematic. We had human rights in this country before the Act was passed, but we did not recognise them in the way that we have now, which has enabled judge-made law in one area to trespass on the will of successive Parliaments and higher courts in others.
What is even more important in the present context, however, is the fact that when Parliament last considered this issue in 1996, the internet was in its infancy. Nothing was known of how matters would develop.