European Union Bill

Stephen Gilbert Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention; she makes a good point. However, the matter might not be quite as she has said. I will address that point later in my contribution, if I may.

Amendment 85 seeks to reaffirm the role of Parliament by giving it the power to consider and decide whether a proposed European change is significant enough to hold a referendum on. A special committee of both Houses—we call it the referendum committee—would be established, and it would consider the fine detail of the Government’s proposal. A recommendation would then go to both Houses, and if both Houses agreed that the change was important enough to warrant a referendum, a referendum would be held.

[Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay) (LD)]

Will the hon. Gentleman tell the Committee what would happen if one of the Houses of Parliament took the view that a referendum should take place, and the other took the view that it should not? Is that not an inherent contradiction in the Opposition amendments?

[Mr David]

It is important that Parliament speaks with one voice, so both Houses would, under our proposal, have to give a positive vote in favour.

[Stephen Gilbert]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s purpose, but it is conceivable that the House of Commons would reach one view on whether a referendum is required, and the House of Lords would reach another view. How do the Opposition intend to settle that discrepancy?

[Mr David]

Before too long, we hope, both Chambers would be elected. Therefore, we believe that it is important for Parliament to speak with one voice. Under our amendment, Parliament would be centre-stage in the whole process. Parliament, and Parliament alone, would decide whether a referendum ought to be held, which is far preferable to referendums being decided according to abstract criteria under this ill-conceived Bill. It is also far better than allowing the Government to make the decision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nia Griffith]

Absolutely. That is the important point and that is why we are calling for a committee to be set up. That would provide the opportunity for the issues to be discussed. If the subject were important and interesting, there would be media interest and lots of lobbying and, as with any work that is done in Committee, the issue would become one that people considered. The whole point of having any committee is that it can make that difference. Committees can do the work on the detail. An innocuous little detail can turn out to have a major impact and that point can be uncovered in Committee. Likewise, something that seems quite big to start with will, when it is considered in detail, be shown to do not much more than maintain the status quo.

[Stephen Gilbert]

As I understand the Opposition’s proposals, there will be one committee comprising Members from both Houses, who will then separate and go back to their relevant Chambers to carry the argument in favour of or against a referendum. Perhaps the hon. Lady can enlighten me given that her Front-Bench spokesman was unable to do so. What will happen in the event of a clash between the Houses?

[Nia Griffith]

It is very clear. The idea is that if one Chamber does not think there is a need for a referendum, there will be no referendum. If both Chambers think there is such a need, there will be a referendum. Clearly, the committee’s recommendations will be considered and we will ask whether the matter is of major significance. One would expect any matter of major significance to create excitement in both Houses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Gilbert]

So whereas the coalition proposes to legislate to ensure that the people have a referendum, the Opposition are proposing a committee of Members of the two Houses, both of which have a veto, which will mean that we might not have a referendum at all. Is that the position?

[Nia Griffith]

The hon. Gentleman has to understand that the committee will make recommendations and it is not about what the committee will say. When the committee comes back, we will not all automatically do what it says; it will make recommendations. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) talked about collective memory, what it is and how important it is. The people on the committee might well have an enormous amount of experience and the people who are likely to want to be involved or to consider the detail will have done so previously. As she pointed out, ministerial teams often change and have to pick up a brief very quickly, so they will not necessarily have that knowledge.

The idea is that the committee should consider the detail, sift out what really matters and make a recommendation, but the Houses will not have to take that recommendation at face value. If the issue is of major significance, surely by that time some interest will have arisen, people will be doing their own research and people will be coming to the Chamber with plenty to say.

My constituents are saying to me, “You do the nitty-gritty and sort out the bits and pieces. When you have done that, you can tell us whether you think that this is a matter of major significance.” That is the idea—the committee would bring that information to the House, and this House and the other place would make the decision.

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[Charlie Elphicke]

Shortly after my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, the hon. Gentleman is a true expert, and whenever he rises to speak I listen with interest and learn.

Would the proposed committee include, for example, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), who is highly knowledgeable but does not always take quite the on-message view that her pager instructs? Would it include my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), or his constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell)? I can think of no more expert people to sit on such a committee, but, if the new clause were passed and the Bill changed as advertised, those people—who are so expert and know so much about matters européenne—would not find themselves on it. I have a sense that the Front-Bench teams of whoever was in power, might not include such people. For that reason, new clause 9 is a Trojan horse. Its purpose, in my humble opinion, is to take power away from the people and to stuff it upstairs in a committee; and that, in essence, is the wrong thing to do.

[Stephen Gilbert]

Is there not another problem? Today, we have teased out of the Opposition the fact that the new clause would effectively give the other place a veto. If the House of Lords decided that it did not want a referendum but the House of Commons decided that it did, we would have stalemate and no referendum.

[Charlie Elphicke]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. The House of Lords was once a thoughtful, revising Chamber that would have orderly debates and not detain business excessively, but some of the new arrivals seem to have changed the way in which it operates. I am told that the Standing Orders and courtesies of this House prevent me going any further into all that happened in the House of Lords, but we have all read the news and seen the number of marathon sessions, and it is incumbent on some of its newer Members to think of the health of some of its older Members and to be a little more considerate than they have been of late. My hon. Friend is right about the House of Lords: whether we go further into or come out of Europe is a matter that should start in the House of Commons, because this is the House of the people.

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[Austin Mitchell]

When the hon. Gentleman has been here longer, he will appreciate that my position is not exactly the same as that of my party’s Front Benchers. My position is sensible, austere and Eurosceptic, and I am anxious for the consultation of the people on any matters that involve the sacrifice of power to Europe. We should have had a referendum on the Lisbon treaty—I concede that point. I and other hon. Members argued for it strenuously at the time, but we were overruled. That was a retrograde step that made the treaty and its provisions less acceptable to this country, because the people felt that they were being imposed on them. I am in favour of referendums, and I do not think that the Bill is strong enough in that respect.

[Stephen Gilbert]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, and I do represent a fishing port. Does he agree with David Blackburn of The Spectator that the Bill

“would introduce a watertight referendum lock on future EU treaties”—

perhaps salt-watertight—

“I doubt whether the Lady herself could have done much better in the circumstances”?

[Austin Mitchell]

All I can say is that David Blackburn must be more naive than I thought.

I was giving the example of the CFP, which was sold to us as harmless. We were told that it would lead to effective conservation because everybody would be involved, everybody had access to our waters and everybody would make decisions collectively. However, it led to the decimation of our fish stocks and the looting, frankly, of about £3 billion-worth of fish and jobs. There is nothing that we can do about that, because it happened under Ted Heath, who used to come down to the House in every fishing debate and justify his mistake. It is all in the past, and we discovered the problem only later. That is what happens.

My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) argued that people are not interested in the details, which is certainly true. We in Grimsby are perhaps more interested than people in Wales in all matters European, particularly to do with fishing boats, but people are not interested in details. The consequences of what happens are interesting, however, because they cause the loss of jobs and employment.

There was a provision in the Lisbon treaty—was it article 121?—stating that aid could be invoked by majority vote in the event of threats to the euro from natural disasters. It has now been invoked for aid to Ireland, which will drag us into making huge contributions not only to Ireland—the Chancellor of the Exchequer projected that as a one-off—but to the other states that follow in the domino-like collapse that will happen. The consequences of concessions that are said to be of no damage, of no great moment and unimportant become clear only later. The Bill provided an opportunity to resist that process, but disappointingly, it is not strong enough.

When we consider the amendments, we should view the European situation with a certain amount of scepticism. The committee referred to in new clause 9 would be controlled by the Whips and by Government, whatever we are told about the intentions behind it. I am suspicious of proposals to modify European powers that come from Euro-enthusiasts such as my party’s Front Benchers. What is in it for them? They want Europe to have its way, and the new clause is a way of allowing that while appearing to protect us.

I support amendment 11 and shall certainly vote for it if there is a vote—I hope there is, because I want to support it. However, we cannot be sure that, if the House were faced with a choice of whether to reverse a Minister’s decision that an issue was not worth a referendum, it would take the decision independently. Debates such as today’s give a clue as to what would happen. We happy band of Eurosceptics, including most of the Members present, have argued consistently, been right all along and warned of the consequences of what has happened. Those disastrous consequences have emerged, but nobody has said, “Oh, my God, we should have listened to the Eurosceptics on this matter.” People have constantly abused us for rocking the boat and as dissenters and just a nuisance, but we are right, and we are right to fight.

However, we cannot be sure that we will win the fight. Should a matter be referred to the House under amendment 11, the House would be whipped as always and Members would see their careers relying on voting with the Government. They would think, “I shall get a powerful position even more quickly, as a Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister for Bathing Pools, or I shall be given a junior ministerial job in charge of seeing that library books are returned promptly”—if any libraries are left open under the Government’s proposals. Ambition, love of the party and support for the party will always whip people into line. Amendment 11 would not put a roadblock in Ministers’ way; it would erect another hurdle that they would be forced to jump. That would be salutary for them, because the more hurdles they jump, the more exhausted they will get and the greater the chance that we will eventually prevail.

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[Martin Horwood]

I do not always agree with the hon. Gentleman, particularly on matters European, but I pay due credit to his Committee and its work. The level of scrutiny that Parliament now gives European matters is certainly on the increase, which is a healthy trend. I give due respect to him for that.

Amendments 67 and 68 would remove the requirement to hold a referendum on any treaty change under the simplified revision procedure that would pool or transfer power or competence from the UK level to the European level. They would not remove the new requirement for Parliament to ratify every treaty change through an Act of Parliament, so Parliament would have the opportunity to put back the requirement for a referendum if that was felt to be absolutely necessary.

The new procedure that the amendments would create for the UK to support and ratify a treaty change made under the SRP that had already been voted for in unanimity at European Council level would simply be for the Minister to lay a statement setting out what the treaty change was and for the Government then to bring forward primary legislation, which would have to be passed by Parliament. That would not touch the requirement for a referendum to ratify any major new treaty under the ordinary revision procedure.

As I have said, even the Act of Parliament under the SRP could ultimately include a referendum in a particular case. In tabling the amendments, the issue we are raising is whether it is advisable to use referendums on any—I stress “any”—transfer or sharing of power or competence with the EU. The provisions for a referendum lock set out in clauses 3 and 4 seem to cover more or less any future change by the SRP, regardless of its size, content, purpose, necessity, or indeed whether it is in the UK’s national interest.

I appreciate that the obvious counter to that train of thought is that if there is a good case to be made for a future treaty change, the Government and Parliament of the day should be able to make that to the British public, and I accept that there is a strong case for that on major questions. That case is perhaps made more strongly by Conservative Members than by Liberal Democrats, but I recognise that it is an important one. It might even include some issues such as EU membership for countries such as Turkey. My concern is whether referendums are the best way to approach any future change, even if it is only technical and insignificant.

[Stephen Gilbert]

One area of competence that the EU currently acts in but does not have defined is combating climate change. Does my hon. Friend agree that saying that we need a referendum when that activity becomes defined is a stretch too far?

[Martin Horwood]

That is a good example of how a completely uncontroversial and essentially technical change might nevertheless, if we are not careful, trigger a referendum. Like the hon. Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), I am an enthusiast for referendums in general and voted for one on the Lisbon treaty and for an in/out referendum at the same time, but those are undoubtedly significant changes.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee has noted more recently that there are some risks and costs associated with referendums. We have held just nine referendums since 1973, although only one has been UK-wide. The Committee conducted an in-depth inquiry on referendums in the UK last year, concluding:

“The balance of the evidence that we have heard leads us to the conclusion that there are significant drawbacks to the use of referendums”.

I do not sense any implied rejection of referendums per se, but there are arguments for using them with restraint and ensuring that they are limited to major issues.

Some of the drawbacks cited in the Committee’s report include, first, that referendums can undermine representative democracy—not a point that I necessarily agree with, but one that some Opposition Members have made; secondly, that referendums are costly—unarguably an important point in the current austere environment; thirdly, that voters show little desire to participate in them; fourthly, that referendums tend not to be about the issue in question—very likely with some of the technical issues in this case; fifthly, that referendums fail to deal with complex issues; sixthly, that referendums never “settle” the issue—despite expectations; and seventhly, that referendums are a “conservative device” or a block on progress. As a result, the Lords Committee concludes that referendums should be used on questions only of “fundamental constitutional change”. Some examples given are, rather alarmingly, referendums to abolish the monarchy, to change the electoral system for the House of Commons and to change the UK’s system of currency.

I have to ask the Minister whether including all SRP changes under the referendum lock in the Bill is in keeping with the Lords Committee’s detailed findings on the use of referendums. Given the current “treaty fatigue” throughout the European Union, SRP is highly likely to be the most common form of treaty change for the foreseeable future. It is highly likely also that future treaty changes will be relatively small and targeted affairs designed to tweak existing treaties rather than to rewrite them substantially. Is it not therefore highly likely that the referendum lock in clause 3 will capture highly specific, arguably complex, limited and uncontroversial treaty changes?

Such changes might, nevertheless, be urgent. For example, in 2007 my constituency was badly flooded, as was much of Gloucestershire, and we benefited significantly from European emergency funds. If, during any future emergency in a part of Europe which technically fell outside the fund’s scope, a treaty amendment were technically required, it would surely be uncontroversial and, in fact, very urgent, so would we seriously say to whichever stricken part of Europe was affected, “Fine, we’ll send aid from the European emergency funds, but we’ll just have to hold a referendum on it first”? That would be inconceivable. My example may be hypothetical, but it is not impossible to conceive of equally uncontroversial and desirable things that the referendum proposal might block completely.

Given the conclusions of the Lords Committee’s report on referendums, can the Minister reassure me that the provisions in clauses 3 and 4 will not produce a plethora of complex and costly referendums that exasperate the public, frustrate proper decision making at European level and are highly vulnerable to hijack by questions that are completely different from those on the ballot paper? Does he agree that the most appropriate democratic check on the use of article 48(6) is primary legislation, as it would give Parliament alone, as the representative of the people, the power to ratify those limited, specific and complex treaty changes that are likely to come under the use of that article?

On the complexity of the referendums that the Bill could produce, can the Minister provide the House with some examples of referendum questions that the referendum lock on SRP treaty changes might create? It is quite difficult to conceive of one so significant that it would justify the use of a national referendum. Can the Minister provide the House with an estimate either of the number of referendums that the Bill is likely to produce in the foreseeable future, or, if that means looking too far into the crystal ball, of the number of SRP changes that are currently in discussion at the European Council or expected to be in the near future? Most significantly in these austere times, can he indicate the expected cost of each referendum on current projections?

The Minister will be aware that the purpose of creating the SRP under the Lisbon treaty was to avoid the need for long drawn-out intergovernmental conferences and painful ratification processes in instances where EU member states wished to undertake targeted and limited treaty changes, particularly uncontentious improvements or enhancements to the workings of the EU for the benefit of all member states. I therefore have concerns over the inflexibility of the referendum lock, and what it will mean in practice. Will the Minister reassure me that the threat or fear of losing a referendum on a treaty change will not prevent future Governments from supporting even uncontroversial and popular changes, and changes that are in the UK’s national interest?

I point out to the Committee that on many occasions in the history of the UK’s membership of the European Union, it has been deemed in the UK’s interest to further pool powers and competence in the European Union. The most obvious example, which should be close to Conservative hearts, is the Single European Act, which was a massive shift away from unanimity voting and towards dropping national vetoes. The European Union was able to dramatically accelerate integration across the internal market—the basic economic rationale that I thought was shared across the coalition Benches. The forward-thinking move to pool and share powers and competence has been of huge economic benefit to the UK and the European Union as a whole. Can the Minister not think of potential instances in the future when further pooling of powers and sovereignty would be dramatically to the UK’s benefit?

In the light of the time and the desire for other Members to take part, I will cut short my planned remarks. In asking the Minister to consider amendments 67 and 68, I suggest that there is a risk of the Bill triggering, on a hair trigger, referendums on every conceivable issue. Liberal Democrat Members, who perhaps do not share some of the fears of those on the Conservative Benches, need considerable reassurance on that issue.