Veterans Update

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Wednesday 19th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I cannot answer the question of why it took 22 years. All I can say is that, from the authority I have in my office for now, having been able to commission this report and start this process is something that I am proud and pleased to have done, ably supported by the Veterans Minister and the Office for Veterans’ Affairs, and by my colleague the Minister for Defence People, Veterans and Service Families, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison). I can only speak for that. As for the enthusiasm and support for getting this implemented, I will be sitting alongside my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) and I can hold whoever comes to this Dispatch Box to account to do it. I absolutely think we should do it with enthusiasm. At one stage we thought about just having a full debate on this today, but that would have involved coming here with no solutions. That would be the worst thing to do to the House. The best thing is to come here with this statement today and come back after the summer and hold the Government to account. I will be there, beside my hon. Friend, holding them to account on whether they uphold these recommendations.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I draw the House’s attention to my own interest in this, including my past service as an openly gay Army reservist after the ban. I strongly welcome the apology today, but I am acutely aware that I was able to serve openly only because of the repeal of the ban, and that I had a very different experience in service than that of so many here today, including the hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt). I cannot praise enough the work of the veterans who have campaigned so tenaciously, and also their service and the courage that they have exhibited so many times during and after their service careers.

I wrote to the Ministry of Defence a few years ago on behalf of a lesbian constituent who had been discharged for her sexuality. It was the first time she had told anyone about this when she came to see me in my surgery, and she told me that it was recorded in her record of service and her discharge that her services were no longer required, although of course she was discharged for being a lesbian. She told me of the horrific experiences she had gone through, including the invasion of her privacy, and the impact that had had on her for decades. The MOD told me that her service record could not be amended because it had been administered correctly and that it would be inappropriate to do so. Given the recommendations in the report, particularly recommendations 26 and 27, can the Secretary of State tell me whether records will now be able to be changed to truly reflect the service and bravery of so many of our veterans?

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his question and for his service. When I think of my own experience, I know that being friends with and getting to know men and women from the gay community—which I did not really do in my childhood or in my service because it was never talked about—is what has brought me to a position where I regret voting against gay marriage, for example. My relationships and friendships with people such as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) and the former Member for Arundel and South Downs, and meeting friends and colleagues from throughout the House, is part of the experience for all of us.

On the hon. Gentleman’s question of making sure that those veterans who want their service record to say what they want it to and being open about it, we absolutely should see a way of how we can accommodate that. It is not going to be easy, but that does not mean we cannot do it. There was clearly a policy running through the armed forces where the real reasons that people left were not put on their records. I think that applies to thousands, or even tens of thousands, of people. Of course that is going to be a challenge, but it is not insurmountable. We must find a way to do this, and I am clear that we should do so.

However, I also remember a debate about pardons when I was a Parliamentary Private Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. At that stage, there was a longing for people’s records to be removed because people did not want a record of a criminal offence that they felt should never have happened. That was the driving force behind the police chiefs’ discussions that led to the destruction of those records. As I have said, it was not a cover-up. There were some people who said, “This is wrong and it should not be on my record. Why should I be known for that?” So we just have to find a way through. If there is anything we can do to find a way of doing this, I will do my very best to do it and I know that the Defence team will as well.

Defence Command Paper Refresh

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Tuesday 18th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Our men and women are motivated by lots of things. The state often shows its appreciation, not only when they are serving, by the x-factor—the wraparound—but also by medallic recognition. One of the things that has taken quite a long time in my tenure is the creation of the wider campaign medal. I am still waiting for the final approval by those medal committees, but it will recognise people’s contribution to a campaign that keeps us safe. A good example of that could be the continuous at-sea deterrent, which is an enduring campaign. Campaigns that reflect modern war mean that not everyone is on the frontline. People hundreds of miles away are contributing to keeping us safe, and they sometimes need to be recognised, not just the person pulling the trigger or storming the bunker; it goes all the way back. In today’s military, the pyramid is very big and very deep, and hopefully a wider campaign medal will recognise that.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I pay my own tribute to the Secretary of State for his service and thank him for the personal courtesies that he and his officials have shown me on a number of occasions. He has rightly been focused on the major geopolitical threats and risks to our own security and that of our allies, but he will also know the importance of watching the flanks and rears. Whether it is the western Balkans, the Sahel, which he mentioned, space, the polar regions or the non-geographical domains—in cyber, artificial intelligence and those issues—he knows that the range and diversity of threats is increasing. Given that, is he convinced that we have the number of personnel right? I have no doubt about the commitment of our troops in all those areas and capacities, but the numbers are simply not there to deliver on that diversity and range of threats.

[Mr Wallace]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that, as the threat rises, we should respond and design our forces to meet whatever is the threat of the day. Do I think 73,000 is enough to meet today’s threats? I do. Do I think defence needs a greater share of public spending? Yes, and that is what the Chancellor said in the autumn statement. Do I think we need 2.5% of GDP? Yes, that is what I have campaigned for and what I have achieved. I do not have a timeline, but I know that is the direction. Should we get the extra money, what is important about it is that it will prepare us to have a range of choices, depending on the threat of the moment.

The Army will still be over 100,000 people. My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) raised the challenge. I have instructed that the Army’s modernisation requires us to protect its budget until it is modernised. It is behind the other two services and we will continue to modernise it. I think the Army has currently configured a size, but do I never say never about making it bigger? We should always be prepared to change our courses if the threat changes.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel And Veterans) Bill

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 23rd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

We are not going to publish his opinion or anybody else’s.

We do not publish the opinion of our Attorney General. It is a long-held policy of most Governments not to publish the legal advice they receive, except in exceptional circumstances.

Part 2 of the Bill makes changes to the time limits for bringing claims in tort for personal injury or death and claims for Human Rights Act 1998 violations that occur in the context of overseas military operations. Clauses 8 to 10 introduce schedules 2, 3 and 4. Taken together, these provisions introduce new factors that the courts in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland must consider when deciding whether a claim for personal injury or death can be allowed beyond the normal limit of three years. The provisions also introduce an absolute maximum time limit of six years for such claims. These new factors ensure that operational context is properly taken into account, and they weigh up the likely impact of giving evidence on the mental health of the service personnel or veterans involved.

Clause 11 amends the Human Rights Act. This provision largely mirrors the changes that are being made for tort-based claims. It will change the rules governing the court’s discretion to extend the one-year time limit for bringing claims under the 1998 Act and will introduce an absolute maximum time limit of six years for human rights claims in relation to overseas operations. Again, critics of the Bill are trying to mislead veterans with tales that this somehow discriminates against our armed forces.

Let us put this six-year backstop into perspective. Currently, for claims in tort, where personnel may sue for personal injury in England, there is already a time limit. Mostly, that limit is three years from the date of the incident or knowledge of it. In other words, if a former soldier is diagnosed with PTSD 20 years after his service, the time limit starts then, not when the operation took place. The existence of time limits is commonplace and was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stubbings v. the UK. The UK Human Rights Act itself has a 12-month time limit for claims from the event happening but does allow for further judicial discretion, and the armed forces compensation scheme has a seven-year time limit.

Finally, clause 12 will further amend the Human Rights Act to impose a duty to consider derogating from—that is, suspending our obligations under—the European convention on human rights in relation to significant military overseas operations. This measure does not require derogation to take place, but it does require future Governments to make a conscious decision on whether derogation should be sought in the light of the circumstances at the time. We want in future the ability, if necessary, to allow soldiers to focus on the danger and job in hand when on operations, not on whether they will have a lawsuit slapped on them when they get home.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving way. He knows that my views on these matters are sincere. I abhor vexatious claims against former service personnel. I have witnessed the training of armed forces on the laws of war at first hand and seen how seriously they and their commanders take it. He will be aware that derogation from that section of the ECHR is used in very rare circumstances, and it would be helpful to have more clarification on that. Many people have spoken out on the Bill, including a former Chief of the Defence Staff, a former Commander Land Forces, former Conservative Defence Secretaries and Attorney Generals and learned and gallant Members on both sides of the House. Does he accept that they are expressing those concerns sincerely? I urge him to listen to them as the Bill goes into Committee.

[Mr Wallace]

I certainly recognise that people have concerns. Some of those people were doing the job that I am doing when these things were going on, so I would venture to ask them why they did not do anything about it at the time. It is a fact that there has been abuse of this system; we all know that on both sides of the House. It is a fact that we need to do more, rather than just talk about it, for our veterans. It is really important to include measures to recognise the very unique experiences of and pressures put on the men and women of our armed forces when they go on operations hundreds of miles away.

Middle East: Security

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend will know that this House proscribed the full element of Hezbollah a few months ago. It is key that we work with our allies to strengthen Lebanon so that it has some resistance to Hezbollah within its state. That is important because Hezbollah has a habit of assassinating people in Lebanon who disagree with it. At the same time, it is important that we work with our ally, Israel, ensuring that we share any knowledge that either we have or Israel has to protect it from terrorists.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Secretary of State is right to call for de-escalation because the consequences of a wider conflict with Iran would be severe, and the situation diverts attention from the many other crises in the region, including in Idlib and Yemen. I want to ask him about the prisons in northern Syria that were housing many of the Daesh fighters who pose a risk—both to us and to civilians in northern Syria. The prisons have effectively been left abandoned because of the consequences of US actions with regard to our Kurdish allies and Turkey’s intervention. What is the Secretary of State’s assessment of the security of the prisons and of the risk posed by the escape of prisoners from them?

[Mr Wallace]

At present, we, the French and even the United States consistently talk with the likes of the Syrian Democratic Forces to ensure that the prisons are still guarded and that we provide whatever support we can to help them with that. Like the hon. Gentleman, we recognise the importance of those prisons, which contain lots of foreign fighters as well as more localised fighters. We do not want Daesh to be reborn in those prisons, and it is incredibly important that we are able to stay in Iraq because we are partly going to deal with that situation in partnership with the Iraqis—there are Iraqi foreign fighters and others. We urge the Iraqi Government to reconsider their vote, because we think it would be useful to stay to secure that situation.

Far-right Violence and Online Extremism

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Monday 18th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend is right. As I said in my statement, as the threat moves, we will tack with it. The Home Secretary’s first point of call is within the Department and then it is the Treasury. We are determined to make all our places of worship safe, and we will do what is necessary.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I too visited mosques and had contact with local Muslim leaders on Friday, and there was a palpable sense of fear. I praise South Wales police and our police and crime commissioner for responding so quickly. I was particularly disturbed to speak to young people who told me that they were watching the video of the horrific attacks in New Zealand. We have to do everything we can to prevent young people from having to see such horrific content. On that note, I have to push the Minister and the Home Secretary further. I do not doubt their sincerity in wanting to deal with these issues, but they say that we need to wait for the online harms White Paper. I have previously raised with both of them the issue of an organisation called Radio Aryan, which is available on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. I have also raised this matter directly with the social media companies, and it is absolutely clear that they do not give a damn. That content is still online this morning. It advocates antisemitism, Islamophobia, homophobia and white supremacy. Why is it still on there and what are the Government going to do to remove it?

[Mr Wallace]

As I said earlier, one of the reasons that some of these things remain online is that the servers of the companies are often abroad and out of our jurisdiction. We are seeking the powers to do something about that through the online harms White Paper. If these companies have a nexus in the UK, it gives us more power. If they do not, we have to look at other technical issues and see whether we can do this another way. The White Paper is imminent, and I am happy to meet the hon. Gentleman and any Member from across the House to discuss whether they think it is too soft or too hard, or what needs to be done to improve it.

The hon. Gentleman points out one of the real challenges. The United States’ first amendment protects freedom of speech. We often approach companies in America asking them to take down websites and so on, and we get a first amendment response—that is, that they are obliged to United States law and the first amendment. That is why we ultimately have to seek an international solution to go alongside whatever regulation we look at here.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 22nd January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am pleased to hear what the Minister is saying, and I commend the work of my Front-Bench colleagues—and those in the other place—who have pushed for it. Does he agree that this is also the perfect time to look at, in particular, the issue of far-right and extreme-right groups? Obviously Prevent already addresses it, and does some excellent work—I have regular contact with my local police force about that—but does the Minister agree that we need to do much more to tackle organisations such as System Resistance Network and Radio Aryan, of which he is well aware, and which spew out hate and bile?

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman has been a good campaigner on that issue, which he has brought to the attention of the Home Office on a number of occasions. One of the reasons why I think this is the perfect time to review Prevent is that I truly believe that if the public knew how much it does in respect of the far right, there would be more support for it, not less. It is having significant success. Half the Channel cases involve the far right. The work that has been done over the last two years clearly shows that Prevent is not about a particular group or ideology, but is similar to other forms of safeguarding that are carried out every day by our social workers, teachers and police.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman is right: this will be a public review and we will be able to debate its results in the House and ask for contributions from colleagues and members of the public and groups alike.

Prevent was started by the hon. Gentleman’s Government and I believe it is on a successful flight path. It has diverted hundreds of people, both on the right and Islamist extremists, from the Channel programme back into the mainstream. It is not perfect; not everyone responds to the work that is done and they have to volunteer into the Channel programme. It is high risk, and Labour will inevitably be sitting on the Government side one day and they will carry that risk as well. It is not perfect, and it is better received in some communities than others. I do not mean that in terms of religious communities; I represent a seat that covers north Preston, in Lancashire and this programme is having very good success in some parts of the country. It is not always delivered as well as it should be, but colleagues from around the House from all parties come to me asking for Prevent co-ordinators, suppliers and community groups, and other colleagues who come with concerns.

It is the right time to do this. I started publishing statistics as Minister as I was keen to ensure they were out. We have done two years of statistics and they show clearly that it is not a mass spying operation; there have been 7,000 referrals compared with 621,000 for safeguarding, child abuse and domestic abuse. Also, the proportion of people diverted out of the programme are the same as in other safeguarding areas and in the last few years over 300 people have received help on Channel and stopped being a concern in the future. That is 300 people who could have posed a very real risk to our constituents, so I am proud of where we have got to, but am also very open to improving it and moving it forward.

[Stephen Doughty]

Programmes like Prevent and Channel are needed because of the grooming the Minister was talking about a few moments ago. I was pleased to hear what he said about the joint work between his Department and DCMS, particularly with regard to online content, because he will be aware that I am very concerned about online broadcasting and online radio stations, particularly Radio Aryan, which has been exposed by BBC Wales, The Mail on Sunday and the excellent work by Hope not Hate. Will the Minister undertake to look specifically at that issue, because it is producing some vile content that will undoubtedly draw people into far-right and extreme right-wing activity?

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. In protecting people from being groomed and exploited, we all have concern about three main areas. In communities, we need to make sure that people are not groomed by radicalisers and not seduced once they have latched on to what they have seen on the internet from online preachers or elsewhere. That is why the Prevent programme is there. There is also the question of the cause of what drives people to feel that they are lesser or outside the support of the state, which is why we need to do a lot more around Islamophobia; we must challenge Islamophobia. It is happening; it happens in Lancashire and around the country, and if we do not tackle it as a Parliament and a Government it will give some cause and grievance that will be used to recruit people. We probably all dealt in the past in our inboxes with ridiculous BNP-sponsored emails about veterans getting less than an immigrant, with photographs of soldiers and comments like “This veteran gets nothing, but the immigrant gets more,” which turned out to be complete fiction. We must work on that, and where there is a genuine grievance we must make sure it is not hijacked by those who want to exploit that into terrorism or violent extremism.

There is also the question of the method of delivery of grievance and grooming, which is the internet. We need to make sure that Ofcom works alongside the Government, but it is of course independent and can make its own judgments. Organisations like Ofcom are there to regulate what is being broadcast to us. The last stage is what part of this legislation does—recognise that where legislation is written for broadcasters and the internet, it moves with the times. Often when Ofcom has banned people they have flipped on to Facebook and launched a broadcast channel, without any controls. So we must be much more agile to do that.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 11th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the tone of his comments. I am happy to give him as much assurance as he would like. I am very conscious as to the issue around the Irish border and its sensitivities. I will certainly seek to give him that reassurance in writing. If there is any further assurance that we can seek to give in relation to the PSNI, I will definitely do that.

SNP Members have made a similar point about their concern about the border. With all due respect to them, they make a strong point—and also with regard to the European arrest warrant—about the value of seamless sharing and the value of the Union, but there is an issue whereby they seek on a daily basis to erect barriers between our Union. It is no good their saying that they like the seamless tool of the European arrest warrant while at the same time seeking to split our great nation and erect barriers between a political and economic union. They should just remind themselves that they cannot have it both ways.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) made a clear point on the European arrest warrant. It is very clear that the Government’s offer on security to the European Commission is unconditional. We wish to have the European arrest warrant or something as identical as possible. Some Opposition Members made a point about the current Brexit Secretary’s position. I assure them that if that was not our negotiating position, I would not be standing here as the Security Minister. The key to good security is partnership, and not just on the European arrest warrant. One fault of the new clause is, why not say the Schengen information system II? Why not say Prüm? Why not say all the other sharing mechanisms that are really important to our security?

I do not believe that placing this in primary legislation makes sense, first because this is a counter-terrorism and hostile state Bill, and secondly because it is what we are asking for. If it was not what we were asking for, I might understand the pressing need for the new clause, to try to change the Government’s position, but it is what we are asking for. The message I urge all Members to give to the European Commission is, “How far do you want to cut off your nose to spite your face?” It is not a position of the members of the European Union. When I meet their intelligence services, police forces and Ministers, they all agree that they want to give us a security agreement.

It is not because we have better capabilities, which we do. It is because the sum of the parts is greater than the individual parts when it comes to security partnership, and this will benefit us both. It does not matter who has equity of capability. It benefits us both when we work together in a security partnership.

[Stephen Doughty]

If what the Government seek to achieve is no different from new clause 1, the Minister should just vote for it. I ask him in all seriousness, what message does he have for the 80 Members on his own Back Benches who threaten to vote down the Chequers deal because of their concerns about European Court of Justice oversight of those security arrangements? I see the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees- Mogg) in his place. What does the Minister have to say to those Members, who would wreck the security co-operation we have with Europe?

[Mr Wallace]

I would say to them and to anyone else that the first duty of a Government is security, and it is absolutely important that we maintain that. The message to Michel Barnier is that security is not a competition; it is a partnership. I hope he will reflect that in his negotiations with this country, but I do not believe that putting it on the face of primary legislation is the best way to go about it, especially as it is our Government’s ask to the European Union on that issue. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) to withdraw his new clause.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Monday 16th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

14. What steps he is taking to tackle the fraudulent use and sale of British passports.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

The Home Office shares reports of the loss or theft of UK passports via Interpol to prevent the illegal crossing of borders. We also work closely with partners here and overseas to share information and intelligence on that threat and the websites that purport to sell false and genuine documents for criminal purposes.

[Stephen Doughty]

There have been some very worrying reports in the past month that British passports have been stolen and sold for large sums of money in countries around Europe. How many passports have been stolen and subsequently suspended in the past year? Does the Minister agree that it is crucial to co-operate through Europol as well as Interpol to ensure that those stolen identity documents are not used?

[Mr Wallace]

In 2017, less than 1% of passports were reported stolen, but to tackle the threat and the abuse of stolen passports overseas, we have based immigration enforcement officials at international locations—embassies, high commissions and key transit points—to work not only with law enforcement to try to catch the people committing the fraud, but with airlines and border points so that they can spot what a false passport looks like.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Tuesday 10th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Doughty]

It relates to the voting of the Minister. I am glad to see that the Minister actually supported these sensible measures. They were important measures on security co-operation that relate to the two new clauses, on the functioning of the European arrest warrant, and the sharing of data in order to enforce such warrants, and on the nature of our relationship with Eurojust and Europol—crucial mechanisms that the Minister saw right to support at the time. I assume that he continues to regard co-operation with those agencies as very important. Can he be clear on where the Government’s policies are in this area? As my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen asked, does he support us retaining that close co-operation to keep all our citizens safe?

[Mr Wallace]

I had hoped that the Brexit word was never going to pass anyone’s lips in this Committee. On the penultimate new clause, I had hoped we would have had the chance of a long and healthy life. Unfortunately, the word has ventured into the Committee.

The aims of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Torfaen are exactly the aims of the Government’s negotiating position. We want access to the European arrest warrant. We want to play a full part in Eurojust in that way. We have made an unconditional offer to the European Commission on security. However, the difference between our position and the proposed primary legislation is that we want that to be the outcome. The drafting of the new clause is flawed, as it would have a limited practical impact on the new clause. It does not oblige the Government to secure an outcome or prescribe how negotiations are conducted but merely affirms that it is a negotiating objective of the Government to do so.

It is conceivable that the Commission is already well aware of our negotiating aims—in fact, I can tell you that it is. The inclusion of the new clauses could provide the Commission with more weight to leverage those tools in the negotiations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth for setting out the proposals in the new clause, and I hear what he said about his other proposals. It would have been interesting to debate those.

As the hon. Gentleman explained, the new clause would require travel operators to share passenger data with relevant law enforcement agencies and provide for restitution provisions to prevent wrongful denial of travel. I fully share his objective of ensuring that police and others have access to passenger data, but there are already provisions for the transfer of passenger name records for immigration and policing purposes in two different immigration Acts and in the passenger name record data regulations. All of those provisions are subject to safeguards provided for in the Data Protection Act 2018. Given the extensive legislation already in place governing the provision and processing of passenger data supply, it is unnecessary at this time to provide any new powers in this regard.

Turning to the provision of restitution to prevent wrongful denial of travel, I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, but the new clause would have unintended consequences that would fundamentally undermine vital tools that protect this country from terrorism and hostile state activity. Although new clause 8 is intended to help passengers by enabling them to provide information to police that would protect against wrongful denial of travel, it would risk undermining the current no-suspicion element of the power. The effect of the new clause would be to allow some individuals to establish the fact that information exists on them on police databases—information that had been used to inform an examination under schedule 3.

We have already debated the necessity to conduct schedule 3 and schedule 7 stops on a non-suspicion basis, so I will not take up more time by going over the same arguments again. Decisions to examine a passenger under schedules 3 or 7 will be informed by a number of considerations, not just passenger data. Other considerations may include the current threat from terrorism and hostile state activity to the UK; available intelligence; trends or patterns of travel; and observations of passengers and their behaviour while they are in a port or border area.

We know that terrorists and hostile state actors are aware of the UK’s security measures to counter their activities, and intelligence shows that they flex and adapt accordingly. If we implement the process proposed in the new clause for confirming or amending any of the data that may be used in consideration for making a stop, terrorists and hostile actors will adapt their methods of travel to minimise the chances of alerting, and being interdicted by, the police, or will recruit individuals who are unknown to law enforcement to bypass data checks.

New clause 8 would undermine the utility of the powers, and compromise police and operational partner efforts to keep the public safe. However, the hon. Gentleman makes a valid point about when the powers are used and the financial consequences that they can lay on individuals stopped, and I met him recently to discuss that; indeed, I have constituency cases on the issue.

We are doing work in response to the hon. Gentleman’s points, to see what we can do to ensure that the data we have is used at the earliest opportunity for individuals transiting through ports, and to ask stronger questions of police officers about whether measures are necessary. For example, most of the loss occurs when people are exiting the UK—while they are on the outbound leg of a holiday, rather than the return. We are asking basic questions about whether measures could wait until they return. Obviously, if the intelligence or threat is high enough that they cannot, those measures will be taken. Also, we are looking at what we can do to speed up the data at check-in at the gate.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for giving way, and I have listened carefully to the arguments he has made on the other parts of the new clause. On the issue of speed, is he satisfied at the moment that all airlines, in particular, are sharing information quickly enough, and that their systems allow that to be done, so that we can detain people who might be going to commit acts and ensure that we do things at the earliest possible stage?

[Mr Wallace]

I believe the airlines are, but of course some of the data is held by airports. If someone checks in at security, that may, at the moment, be airport data, not airline data. How can we get that data to our police in a timely manner so that the most appropriate time is when I emerge from check-in or my baggage search, rather than when I am on an aeroplane, or just about to get on an aeroplane, and the clock is ticking down after I have been shopping in the terminal and so on?

I am absolutely determined—I picked up on the hon. Gentleman’s points from our meeting—to see what we can do to improve that. It slightly depends on the age of the airport and how its systems work. For now, I am content to see how that work goes, to see which airports can do that and which cannot, and to feed into the data other information that the police might have to better inform them.

I am not sure we will get many challenges from the Russian, or the hostile, state, but, in the terrorism space, if the powers are to continue to have predominant public support for their necessity, we have to ensure that they are targeted and sympathetically used—I do not want the powers to end up in the same debate as stop-and-search, which made that a toxic power for so long. I will be pressing to ensure that that happens, and I will happily update the hon. Gentleman.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for his comments. On the basis of what he said, I am happy not to press the new clause at this stage. I ask that he keeps this matter under review and looks at it closely, because we need to ensure that information is shared as quickly as possible, both from the point of view of keeping the public safe and ensuring that the powers are used effectively. We need the co-operation of all travel operators, airports and ports of entry and exit as much as possible. However, given what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Wallace]

On a point of order, Mrs Main. Before we draw to a close, I would like, to conclude these proceedings in an orderly manner, to put on the record my thanks for your chairmanship and Ms Ryan’s chairmanship. I do not think that those on either the Government or the Opposition Benches disappointed the Chair—I hope not.

I also thank those on the Opposition Front Benches. I am always amiable to the hon. Members for Torfaen and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, and try to accommodate them. As I set out at the very beginning, I have sought, where possible, to concede. I have conceded on the suggested improvements to clause 3—the three clicks—and to the Scottish National party about clarifying that there will be no charging for public order and the right to protest.

I do not know about you, Mrs Main, but I sat for years on the Opposition and Government Back Benches listening to the valiant efforts of Opposition MPs, who get no recognition whatever. I always promised myself that I would never allow that to happen as a Minister.

I thank my officials, who have been very patient when I have said, “That makes sense. Why can’t we do it?” to which the whole Government says, “The Minister might actually change something!” The Bill manager, in particular, has been incredibly patient. I am still determined to improve the Bill before it gets on to the statute book.

I thank the Clerks, the Hansard writers and the Doorkeepers for keeping us on the record and safe. I thank the lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Treasury, and our witnesses, who set out their clear positions at the beginning.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 5th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Doughty]

Obviously I do not expect the Minister to share any information here if it would be inappropriate to do so, but he mentioned the clever way in which hostile states may attempt to penetrate this country and undertake acts, whether that is the Skripal poisoning or other activities. Could he reassure us about measures in place at, for example, general aviation airports, smaller seaports and so on? Obviously, a lot of our focus is understandably on major locations such as Heathrow or Eurostar terminals and so on, but hostile states are well known for using alternative routes or, indeed, diplomatic channels to bring in individuals who conduct serious offences.

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. Again, it goes to the reason we have the no-suspicion stop. They are most likely to be trained, capable agents of a country, not amateurs, or they may be disguised using amateurs. Look at the history of the cold war. That is why we sometimes have to respond to more general intelligence specifics. Let us say we had intelligence that a hostile state was seeking to use a minor port, a west coast port or a private air strip. That is all we would have, but if the threat was significant enough we would then have to—and we do—deploy individual police and Border Force officers from each region to cover that. However, that is quite wide. It is not, “Ben Wallace is coming in on flight X, Y or Z”; perhaps it is our responding to a flight plan. It is sometimes that simple.

I have come from a Cobra meeting this morning where we have seen the consequences of some really hostile state activity, which has put two innocent British citizens, who are very seriously ill, in hospital. We are being taken advantage of as an open country. I am afraid that there is far too much intelligence officer activity, not always under diplomatic cover in this country, from some of our adversaries, and we have to make our border a bit harder for them. Diplomats will not be covered by that—we will still be obliged under the diplomatic conventions—but their families may be. It goes back to the question on suspicion. I might have a suspicion that X is doing it, and they are a diplomat, but they may say, “Well, I’m not carrying that in; I’m not risking myself, but I’ll get someone else in the wider party who doesn’t have diplomatic cover to do it.”

I am afraid that is why it is really important for us. It is why the last Labour Government thought it was important on the terrorism issue. The Law Society of England and Wales witness said in his evidence that he had no concern about the suspicion part of the powers. He had some concerns about legal privilege, and I listened with interest to that part of his submission. That is why I think it would set us back in our national security and counter-terrorism work if we lost the power to do that. I am afraid the Government will therefore resist the amendment, and I ask colleagues on both sides of the Committee to reflect on that, and hopefully the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Doughty]

I agree with the comments the Minister and my hon. Friend have made on this clause 5, but I would be interested in the Minister’s remarks on this point: if an individual has committed these offences or any of the existing offences abroad, it is crucial to detain them at the border when they attempt to re-enter the UK. There have been some worrying reports in the last few weeks about stolen passports or identity documents being available, and being used by criminals and those who have potentially committed terrorist offences overseas. It is crucial that we co-operate with Europol and Interpol, through the databases on stolen documents, to stop individuals who are attempting to sneak back in, perhaps because they have committed the offences outlined in the clause—indeed, they are the most likely to be trying to avoid detection on entering the UK. Can the Minister say a little about what steps are being taken to enforce not only the existing measures, but the measures as outlined in clause 5?

[Mr Wallace]

First, on the point made by the hon. Member for Torfaen, I heard what was said by the reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill, about this issue, but the United Kingdom needs to protect itself in respect of certain offences that are being committed abroad and having an impact on us here. My memory is that the reviewer of terrorism legislation said that he was worried that we would be criminalising people here for things that might not be criminal in the country in which they are doing them.

Let me just reflect on the offences that we are bringing into scope. Under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, it is an offence to make or possess explosives “under suspicious circumstances”. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomber and the training videos that were used to show how to make that bomb. The training video was prepared and filmed potentially anywhere in the world. I see training videos that show people with immaculate English from the backstreets of Raqqa or wherever. It seems bizarre that in the safe space that they have been operating in, they can handle, possess or make explosives and use that as a way to bring back knowledge to train people here. Sometimes the only evidence we have is over there rather than over here, and it is important that we find the ability to prosecute these people.

Similarly, if someone is filmed in Syria dressed head to foot in a Daesh outfit, with a flag and sword and beheading-type posturing, and then they use the footage over here, that is a challenge at the moment. It may be easy in that environment, because Syria is a failed state. We are looking at a state that does not really have the rule of law: it has a dictator who does not really believe in the rule of law. It is clear, in relation to some examples, that we need to find some offences to deal with the problem; we need to bring them into scope. I think and hope that we will be able to raise more prosecutions against people who we know have been there, although we do not at the moment have the offences on the statute book to prosecute them.

I met with the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth on the issue of the border. There is a balance to be struck. How do we stop and examine data at the border? How do we verify people’s identity if they come in with an emergency passport or a passport that does not quite fit? Obviously, we will debate that again when we talk about the hostile state powers. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is often used with some success, but I am aware—the hon. Gentleman has discussed this with me—that we have to be mindful of its impact on the wider public. The cost to them of a schedule 7 stop may be missing a flight if they are on their way out of the country and so on. I have asked for us to look at what more we can do around that space to mitigate that.

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that at the moment returnees from the areas where we are seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction are trying to take advantage of stolen identities. There is a country in Europe whose identity cards are pretty weak and are often exploited by organised criminals; it is very easy for them to get into the system and be used. We are alert to that. It is why we are trying to do more with things such as e-gates. I know that there is some negative reporting about them, but they can be quite positive in spotting fake passports. We have a range of methods, and I would be happy to brief the hon. Gentleman privately on how we try to keep our border safe, but yes, we have to be alert to that. Even when people get in, the hope is that through accessing digital media we can bring some of these new offences to bear on them for what they did abroad. That is where we are trying to get to. It is a challenge as we have tended to expect our terrorists to be here rather than abroad. That is another example of how the Bill is really about trying to reflect the modern internet space.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for his comments. One country that has been highlighted as a place where illegal documents can easily be obtained is Turkey. Given the proximity of Turkey to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, could the Minister say a bit about what work has been done with the Turkish authorities to try to deal with people who can easily sell stolen identity documents there, which may be used by people who have committed such offences and are trying to re-enter the UK?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I met the Turkish authorities when I visited Turkey not so long ago, and we discussed those issues. In their defence, the Turkish are actually pretty good at knowing who is in their country. One of our worries is the Italian identity card, because once people are in the EU, it is much easier. The ambition of a lot of those people is to get an EU identity card or an EU passport, and to move around freely.

We certainly find weaknesses in the system. The Italian identity card has caused our crime and terrorist fighters a challenge, because it is the one that is most used by illegal entrants to Europe, whether for immigration or any other purpose. I am more worried about some of the European issues than about Turkey at the moment. Generally, the Turkish detain people and then those people are managed back through temporary restraining orders. Usually, the Turks know who they are and they hand them over.

[Stephen Doughty]

Just to clarify, I am talking about stolen British documents and perhaps other EU documents, including the ones he suggests, being sold in Turkey to individuals. It is not just about whether the Turkish know who has come in and out, but about people gaining access to stolen Italian or British documents on sale in Turkey.

[Mr Wallace]

I will be quick, because this is definitely wandering off the clause. We wash millions of passenger name records at the National Border Targeting Centre, and if there are cancelled or stolen passports, they match. We are quite quick on that compared with our European allies, and we have a high detection rate, although it is not 100%. We have invested in that capability over the decades and I am confident that although we do not get them all, we do detect them. Obviously, we have to ensure that we continue to review that, and we are doing that as we speak.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Increase in maximum sentences

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I rise to support the amendments, but I wish to raise a separate point about obstructions. First, I want to understand fully from the Minister why all the new powers are necessary. I represent a constituency where we host many major events. We have the National Assembly for Wales, we hosted part of the NATO summit, and we hosted the UEFA champions league final, including the fan zone. I regularly see such measures—bollards, traffic restrictions and blockages—being put in place anyway, so why are all the additional powers necessary? Substantial powers seem to be available to the police and other authorities already to restrict traffic or make areas safe.

Secondly, what steps will the Government take to ensure that appropriate notice of likely disruption is given to residents, or indeed to businesses, in areas that will be affected by the measures? Also, what compensation might be available to those who face significant disruption to, for example, business activity? Obviously, I appreciate that in very short-notice situations, when a specific threat arises, it may be impossible to give appropriate notice, and sometimes things need to be done to protect the public. That should be at the forefront of all our minds. However, we are talking about major events that are planned many months in advance. Unfortunately, I have seen many examples of businesses, in particular, and residents experiencing disruption that could quite easily have been avoided if better information had been made available about safe travel routes, or likely disruption of business opening hours and so on. That can be quite significant.

For the UEFA champions league final there were, rightly, extensive bollards and access gates, and all sorts of other road traffic measures, for several weeks in advance, as well as during and after the event. However, despite the availability of information about the fact that the event was happening, it was not always clear to Cardiff Bay residents—of whom I am one—or businesses what routes would be available, when they would be open, and what disruption was likely. I know of some businesses that lost substantial amounts because the placing of barriers and bollards obstructed the business and impeded access. Such things are side effects of necessary measures, but we must recognise that they are a consequence of holding major events, and of the provisions needed to keep them safe.

I would like, first, to understand why all the new powers are necessary and, secondly, what steps the Minister believes security authorities, police and local authorities should take to mitigate the effect on residents and businesses.

[Mr Wallace]

I should say at the outset that although ATTROs have been available for a long time they are not a substitute for the existing public order powers to put traffic management systems in place, and for the protection of large crowds. I would not want the measures to be used as a new opportunity for imposing charges when events are held, or for concocting a spurious terrorist link to try to regain money. They are designed for occasions when there is a specific terrorist threat to an event, or when an event is likely to attract a terrorist attack. That might be said of the recent Commonwealth summit, or similar events, as opposed to a champions league football match that is in the diary, a major sporting event that everyone knows is about to happen. For such events the local authority has always had the power under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to charge the organisers. I would not want a situation in which everything—the galas or village fetes we attend—suddenly becomes a terrorist threat, to some over-eager person.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I will raise a separate imagery issue, particularly on flags, that I hope the Minister will address.

I am well aware that several organisations use slight variants of logos, wording and other insignia on flags and other material. I also know that that has been an issue on what most of us would look at and consider to be an ISIS flag in support of that organisation, but on which clever alterations have been made by individuals trying to evade prosecution for displaying that item. For imagery displayed on the internet or elsewhere, it may be that individuals will seek to avoid prosecution under the clause or other ways by making slight alterations to that imagery. Will the Minister explain his definition of “reasonable suspicion” that those individuals support such an organisation?

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 2 makes it an offence to publish an image of an item of clothing or other article associated with a proscribed organisation in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a member or supporter of that organisation. As the hon. Member for Torfaen explained, the amendment would add a reasonable excuse defence to the new subsection (3)(1A) offence. The hon. Gentleman indicated that his intention is to ensure that the offence does not bite on those who may have a legitimate reason to publish such images, such as journalists or academics.

I am happy to assure the hon. Gentleman that the Government share that intention, and that that outcome is in fact already secured by the current drafting of clause 2. The words “in such a way” will hopefully answer both the fears of the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about his T-shirt and the general issue of having not only to display such an image but to do so

“in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

It is important to recognise that the mere publication of an image associated with a proscribed organisation is not enough on its own to constitute an offence. The offence will only be made out if the image is published in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of the proscribed organisation. In cases of a journalist featuring an image of a flag in a news report or an academic publishing such an image in a book or research paper, it would be clear from the circumstances that they are not themselves a member or supporter of the organisation. This approach provides certainty to such individuals that they will not be caught by the offence. It also offers the advantage that the same formulation has been in force since 2000 with the existing section 13 offence in the 2000 Act of wearing or displaying such an article in a public place, and is therefore well understood by the courts.

For that reason, although I totally agree with the objectives behind the amendment, it is not necessary to add “reasonable excuse”. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Torfaen to withdraw the amendment.

On the point raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, the existing offence of displaying a flag talks about doing so “in such a way” that inspires people. If there is evidence that someone is doing it in such a way as to commit that offence, they will be prosecuted.

As to the T-shirt, I will give the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North an alternative. If I bought one with a statement on it such as “Scotland Forever”—the sentiment is shared by the vast majority of decent Scottish people and not just a few lunatics in the Scottish National Liberation Army or whatever they are called—I doubt that that would be as clearly synonymous with any terrorist organisation as a National Action one. Clearly, if someone had bought a National Action T-shirt—and they could fit into it, which would probably be a challenge for some of its supporters—and it then became proscribed, of course they should remove it, because I do not want people walking around with terrorist T-shirts once an organisation has been proscribed. However, I do not think that “Scotland Forever” would fall into the category of a symbol of a terrorist organisation. I hope that gives him some comfort that we will not arrest people who think that Scotland is forever.

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, I can. The way I reflected on that was to seek to find out what happened with the existing offence, which has the same wording of “in such a way”, and how many failed prosecutions of people who are journalists or academics there had been under it. My understanding is that there have been no cases of prosecuting people who use the fair reason that they are a journalist or are researching something. The fact that it has been on the statute book for a long time already, and that it has not produced the failures that some people feared, suggests that the law has already accepted that wording in such offences. I do not fear that there will be a surge in wrong or failed prosecutions.

[Stephen Doughty]

I am sorry to press the Minister, but I would like clarification on variants. Material that glorifies the activities of the IRA, for example, has been published by organisations and is available on the internet. Individuals are removing the “I” from IRA and putting an asterisk or something like that into the imagery, but the rest clearly glorifies the activities of a proscribed organisation. In his view, would that be caught be the legislation? Would someone photo-editing an ISIS flag and leaving everything else such as guns in the picture—they are glorifying terrorist activities but making a slight alteration—be caught in the legislation?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, because the key is “in such a way”. Someone does not have to fly a swastika. The hon. Gentleman may have seen that some of the far right used to fly a red flag with a white circle but no swastika in it. Someone on an al-Quds parade might think that they can alter the Hezbollah flag and somehow pretend it is not to do with the military side, but that will not save them if they are using it in such a way as to commit that offence. Someone does not have to use the full wording, but we, the prosecuting authorities, have to prove that they are doing it in such a way as to incite or commit that offence. I warn those clever terrorists out there who think they can get away with it by swapping a few letters around that that will not make a difference.

Money Laundering

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Monday 19th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Can the Minister rule out any dirty Russian money having made its way to any politically exposed person in the UK, political party or think-tank? Will he say whether the database of PEPs is being run routinely against known sources of dirty Russian money?

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman will know that the Electoral Commission is the arbiter of policing political funding. I know what he is trying to get at. We are confident that all our donations are in accordance with the law, as set out for UK citizens. I would rather be taking money under that premise than from Max Mosley.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Ben Wallace

Monday 5th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

14. Not least in the context of the expansion of the Prevent duty, is the Minister currently satisfied with the level of support being given by social media and internet companies to police and other public authorities for tackling online radicalisation, as well as for tackling those who are preparing terrorist acts themselves?

[Mr Wallace]

Every day the police get good co-operation from many multimedia companies and internet service providers. We would, of course, like to see more, and will keep pressing companies for more because it is very important that we all protect vulnerable people from the effects the internet can have in turning them into radicals and attracting them to terrorism.