Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Stephen Doughty Excerpts

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again today, Mrs Ryan.

I listened with interest to what the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen said. I agree that there is a gap that needs to be addressed. In a number of the cases of which I am aware, both locally and elsewhere, this process of grooming is insidious and often involves what at first appear to be harmless activities, such as taking young people away for an adventure or a sporting occasion—perhaps football. Food is often a common factor: something as innocuous as going for chicken and chips in Cardiff bay may lead to a situation in which material or ideas are put in the minds of vulnerable or unaware young people in particular.

There was the case of Reyaad Khan, who, unfortunately, came from my constituency, although he was living in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) at the time. He had been to fight in Syria, and he was regularly meeting with other people in the local area, having what would probably be innocuous conversations to most people. However, at some point, things get put into people’s minds and suggestions are made. When those are vulnerable individuals, such as those who have become disaffected with friends or traditional sources of authority or guidance—whether that is their local mosque or their family—they can become vulnerable to more alarming suggestions and perhaps to specific suggestions that they commit particular acts or engage in particular activity. In the case of some individuals, the process of grooming is often long, and it is often hazy, grey territory.

Will the Minister say a little more about where he believes the new clauses would take us in terms of the point at which an offence is committed? Obviously, we would not want a whole series of processes to be accidentally caught up in this—legitimate contact between individuals, and discussion and friendship groups. Whether or not we agree with certain individuals and what they might be suggesting, it would not cross the line of being a terrorist offence. Clearly, however, at some point material may be provided, or ideas or suggestions made, that may lead someone to go on to commit heinous activities. Where on the spectrum does the Minister believe that offences will start to be committed, and how will the provisions apply?

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support the clause. The Minister has already set out that extraterritorial jurisdiction is nothing new under our law. It most certainly is not, and the effect of this clause is to extend that extraterritorial jurisdiction to new offences, including under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which is about uniforms and flags associated with proscribed organisations; section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, which is the making or possessing of explosives in suspicious circumstances; the dissemination offence under section 2 of the 2006 Act, which we referred to in our debate on clause 4; and finally to section 1 of the 2006 Act on encouraging terrorism.

I would press the Minister to elaborate a little more on the point made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in his evidence to the Committee, expressing concern about the way in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is applied to UK citizens on the one hand and non-UK citizens on the other. The Minister referred to the Attorney General’s permission being given in certain circumstances, where we have British nationals on the one hand and on the other we do not. While the Opposition wholly support the clause, it would assist if the Minister at least addressed the concern that the independent reviewer raised about the clause in that regard.

[Stephen Doughty]

I agree with the comments the Minister and my hon. Friend have made on this clause 5, but I would be interested in the Minister’s remarks on this point: if an individual has committed these offences or any of the existing offences abroad, it is crucial to detain them at the border when they attempt to re-enter the UK. There have been some worrying reports in the last few weeks about stolen passports or identity documents being available, and being used by criminals and those who have potentially committed terrorist offences overseas. It is crucial that we co-operate with Europol and Interpol, through the databases on stolen documents, to stop individuals who are attempting to sneak back in, perhaps because they have committed the offences outlined in the clause—indeed, they are the most likely to be trying to avoid detection on entering the UK. Can the Minister say a little about what steps are being taken to enforce not only the existing measures, but the measures as outlined in clause 5?

[Mr Wallace]

First, on the point made by the hon. Member for Torfaen, I heard what was said by the reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill, about this issue, but the United Kingdom needs to protect itself in respect of certain offences that are being committed abroad and having an impact on us here. My memory is that the reviewer of terrorism legislation said that he was worried that we would be criminalising people here for things that might not be criminal in the country in which they are doing them.

Let me just reflect on the offences that we are bringing into scope. Under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, it is an offence to make or possess explosives “under suspicious circumstances”. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomber and the training videos that were used to show how to make that bomb. The training video was prepared and filmed potentially anywhere in the world. I see training videos that show people with immaculate English from the backstreets of Raqqa or wherever. It seems bizarre that in the safe space that they have been operating in, they can handle, possess or make explosives and use that as a way to bring back knowledge to train people here. Sometimes the only evidence we have is over there rather than over here, and it is important that we find the ability to prosecute these people.

Similarly, if someone is filmed in Syria dressed head to foot in a Daesh outfit, with a flag and sword and beheading-type posturing, and then they use the footage over here, that is a challenge at the moment. It may be easy in that environment, because Syria is a failed state. We are looking at a state that does not really have the rule of law: it has a dictator who does not really believe in the rule of law. It is clear, in relation to some examples, that we need to find some offences to deal with the problem; we need to bring them into scope. I think and hope that we will be able to raise more prosecutions against people who we know have been there, although we do not at the moment have the offences on the statute book to prosecute them.

I met with the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth on the issue of the border. There is a balance to be struck. How do we stop and examine data at the border? How do we verify people’s identity if they come in with an emergency passport or a passport that does not quite fit? Obviously, we will debate that again when we talk about the hostile state powers. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is often used with some success, but I am aware—the hon. Gentleman has discussed this with me—that we have to be mindful of its impact on the wider public. The cost to them of a schedule 7 stop may be missing a flight if they are on their way out of the country and so on. I have asked for us to look at what more we can do around that space to mitigate that.

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that at the moment returnees from the areas where we are seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction are trying to take advantage of stolen identities. There is a country in Europe whose identity cards are pretty weak and are often exploited by organised criminals; it is very easy for them to get into the system and be used. We are alert to that. It is why we are trying to do more with things such as e-gates. I know that there is some negative reporting about them, but they can be quite positive in spotting fake passports. We have a range of methods, and I would be happy to brief the hon. Gentleman privately on how we try to keep our border safe, but yes, we have to be alert to that. Even when people get in, the hope is that through accessing digital media we can bring some of these new offences to bear on them for what they did abroad. That is where we are trying to get to. It is a challenge as we have tended to expect our terrorists to be here rather than abroad. That is another example of how the Bill is really about trying to reflect the modern internet space.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for his comments. One country that has been highlighted as a place where illegal documents can easily be obtained is Turkey. Given the proximity of Turkey to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, could the Minister say a bit about what work has been done with the Turkish authorities to try to deal with people who can easily sell stolen identity documents there, which may be used by people who have committed such offences and are trying to re-enter the UK?

[Mr Wallace]

I met the Turkish authorities when I visited Turkey not so long ago, and we discussed those issues. In their defence, the Turkish are actually pretty good at knowing who is in their country. One of our worries is the Italian identity card, because once people are in the EU, it is much easier. The ambition of a lot of those people is to get an EU identity card or an EU passport, and to move around freely.

We certainly find weaknesses in the system. The Italian identity card has caused our crime and terrorist fighters a challenge, because it is the one that is most used by illegal entrants to Europe, whether for immigration or any other purpose. I am more worried about some of the European issues than about Turkey at the moment. Generally, the Turkish detain people and then those people are managed back through temporary restraining orders. Usually, the Turks know who they are and they hand them over.

[Stephen Doughty]

Just to clarify, I am talking about stolen British documents and perhaps other EU documents, including the ones he suggests, being sold in Turkey to individuals. It is not just about whether the Turkish know who has come in and out, but about people gaining access to stolen Italian or British documents on sale in Turkey.

[Mr Wallace]

I will be quick, because this is definitely wandering off the clause. We wash millions of passenger name records at the National Border Targeting Centre, and if there are cancelled or stolen passports, they match. We are quite quick on that compared with our European allies, and we have a high detection rate, although it is not 100%. We have invested in that capability over the decades and I am confident that although we do not get them all, we do detect them. Obviously, we have to ensure that we continue to review that, and we are doing that as we speak.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Increase in maximum sentences

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[The Chair]

For Members’ information, I am going to—[Interruption.] Actually, I will come back to that. I do not want to confuse the Committee; given that I am confused, that will not be very difficult. I call Stephen Doughty.

[Stephen Doughty]

Thank you, Mrs Ryan. I want to speak about the clause and, with your permission, about my amendment 46, which is starred and would not normally be selectable for today. I wonder whether I might prevail on you to use your discretion; we have made swift progress with the Bill today, and I was obviously followed guidance about when to table these things.

[The Chair]

If I may interrupt the hon. Gentleman, that is what I was going to say. I will allow you to address your amendment, on the understanding that you will not press it to a vote, as it is a starred amendment. However, we have made considerable progress.

[Stephen Doughty]

Thank you, Mrs Ryan. I appreciate your using your discretion in allowing me to speak to the amendment. I do not intend to push it to a vote, but I wanted to probe the Minister on this particular issue.

The power to enter and search home addresses is obviously a significant one, and one that needs to be used with great care and caution. While we all recognise the important need for the security services, police and others to undertake operations—often without notice, and with the appropriate guidance on the necessity for doing so—to keep the public safe and to apprehend individuals who may be plotting terrorist activities or other activities that would pose a risk to the public or others, it is also important to balance those powers with necessary caution and care.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Indeed. None the less, they are meant to achieve exactly the same thing.

I have little to add to what has already been set out. At the evidence session I asked Corey Stoughton of Liberty the question about this issue. It is, of course, an article 10 right, and I would not have thought that anybody on the Committee would wish to curtail the right to peaceful protest.

I support the underlying purpose of the clause. Anti-terror measures at events are extremely important, and I see no issue with that, but we have to strike a balance so that they do not restrict legitimate rights of protest. The right of assembly is rightly protected in the European convention on human rights and incorporated into our domestic law under the Human Rights Act 1998. We should protect it, and protect article 10. On that basis, I commend both amendments to the Committee.

[Stephen Doughty]

I rise to support the amendments, but I wish to raise a separate point about obstructions. First, I want to understand fully from the Minister why all the new powers are necessary. I represent a constituency where we host many major events. We have the National Assembly for Wales, we hosted part of the NATO summit, and we hosted the UEFA champions league final, including the fan zone. I regularly see such measures—bollards, traffic restrictions and blockages—being put in place anyway, so why are all the additional powers necessary? Substantial powers seem to be available to the police and other authorities already to restrict traffic or make areas safe.

Secondly, what steps will the Government take to ensure that appropriate notice of likely disruption is given to residents, or indeed to businesses, in areas that will be affected by the measures? Also, what compensation might be available to those who face significant disruption to, for example, business activity? Obviously, I appreciate that in very short-notice situations, when a specific threat arises, it may be impossible to give appropriate notice, and sometimes things need to be done to protect the public. That should be at the forefront of all our minds. However, we are talking about major events that are planned many months in advance. Unfortunately, I have seen many examples of businesses, in particular, and residents experiencing disruption that could quite easily have been avoided if better information had been made available about safe travel routes, or likely disruption of business opening hours and so on. That can be quite significant.

For the UEFA champions league final there were, rightly, extensive bollards and access gates, and all sorts of other road traffic measures, for several weeks in advance, as well as during and after the event. However, despite the availability of information about the fact that the event was happening, it was not always clear to Cardiff Bay residents—of whom I am one—or businesses what routes would be available, when they would be open, and what disruption was likely. I know of some businesses that lost substantial amounts because the placing of barriers and bollards obstructed the business and impeded access. Such things are side effects of necessary measures, but we must recognise that they are a consequence of holding major events, and of the provisions needed to keep them safe.

I would like, first, to understand why all the new powers are necessary and, secondly, what steps the Minister believes security authorities, police and local authorities should take to mitigate the effect on residents and businesses.

[Mr Wallace]

I should say at the outset that although ATTROs have been available for a long time they are not a substitute for the existing public order powers to put traffic management systems in place, and for the protection of large crowds. I would not want the measures to be used as a new opportunity for imposing charges when events are held, or for concocting a spurious terrorist link to try to regain money. They are designed for occasions when there is a specific terrorist threat to an event, or when an event is likely to attract a terrorist attack. That might be said of the recent Commonwealth summit, or similar events, as opposed to a champions league football match that is in the diary, a major sporting event that everyone knows is about to happen. For such events the local authority has always had the power under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to charge the organisers. I would not want a situation in which everything—the galas or village fetes we attend—suddenly becomes a terrorist threat, to some over-eager person.

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The clause makes four substantive changes to the 1984 Act. First, it removes the requirement to publish notice of an ATTRO in advance if doing so would, in the opinion of the chief police officer, undermine the purpose of having that ATTRO in place—as I said earlier, this is an anti-terrorism rather than a public order measure. If the champions league final has been in the diary for a long time, we obviously expect the chief police officer and local authorities to engage with communities and businesses and say what they are planning to do. However, it may be best not to advertise to everybody that we are implementing anti-terrorism measures because there has been a threat at short notice to a city’s Christmas market, for example. We want to give discretion to the chief police officer regarding anti-terrorism measures.

[Stephen Doughty]

I entirely understand the Minister’s point. He mentioned events that have been in the diary for a long time, and I am concerned that more work should be done to ensure that those access routes are properly handled. Does he agree that wherever possible, particularly for locations that regularly host major events and that may be subject to a general or specific terrorism threat, permanent measures should be put in place in a sensitive way? People can get used to such things and understand why they are there, and there is then no need for sudden changes to road patterns or access points.

[The Chair]

Order. We are drifting very much into a stand part debate, so I may take the view that we will not need a stand part debate after debating these amendments.