Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

John Bercow Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd January 2014 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendments

[Mr Speaker]

I must draw the House’s attention to the fact that financial privilege is involved in Lords amendments 13, 14, 88 and 100. If the House agrees to the amendments, I shall cause an appropriate entry to be made in the Journal.

Clause 2

Meaning of consultant lobbying

[Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment (a) to Lords amendment 1.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government motion to disagree with Lords amendment 1, and Government amendments (b) and (c) in lieu.

Lords amendments 2 to 4, 101 to 103, 5 and 6.

Lords amendment 7, and amendment (a) thereto.

Lords amendments 8 to 15.

[Mr Allen]

I am delighted to initiate the debate.

The Bill has a chequered history as regards Parliament’s involvement in it so far, which, I am sorry to say, has demonstrated in spades the contempt that the Executive have for the legislature. I would like to expand on that just a little before I get into the detail of the amendments.

The contempt started when this Bill first came to the House, and is continuing to the very end of the process without relenting. We started this Bill having had some pre-legislative scrutiny of what we all called the lobbying Bill, only to find that one day before the summer recess a mega-Bill was presented, two thirds of which had not even seen the light of day in public let alone been discussed, analysed or subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny by this House. That is our job, but we were prevented from doing it because this Bill was presented far too late in the day, one day before a summer recess. Just to add insult to injury, it was then stuffed into the parliamentary sausage machine one week after we returned from the summer break.

That story has been repeated throughout the passage of the Bill. One might have thought that, even if only for the sake of window-dressing, there would be the odd pause, the odd break, the odd extension, or a gap between consideration by their lordships and this House, but not a bit of it. That demonstrates the way the Government treat this House, particularly when they have an embarrassment such as this Bill in front of them.

Mr Speaker is an authority on these matters and he will correct me if I am wrong, but I do not believe that it was possible to have a shorter period between consideration yesterday in the second Chamber and consideration today in Parliament. Could the House have squeezed that period even more? Could we have met last night to discuss this?

The Government had a pause in the other place, which I welcome. Six weeks is not wonderful and my Select Committee called for six months—we called for the job to be done properly. We were grateful for those six weeks, however, but there was no opportunity for colleagues in this House to consider what their lordships had said and read it carefully, because, as we know, amendments were being made up to the very last moment in the second Chamber. None of us had that opportunity—Front Benchers, colleagues who are interested in this issue and above all Back Benchers, and, may I say, the Select Committee, which seeks to represent Back Benchers and which has the legitimacy of being a Select Committee elected by Members from all parts of this House in a secret ballot, with a Chair elected by the whole House. Despite that legitimacy, none of us was allowed to see any paperwork or the Order Paper after that consideration in the second Chamber yesterday. It is an absolute disgrace, and it cannot be allowed to continue if we are to have any reputation in this House for doing our job on accountability and scrutiny effectively.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Allen]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

I hope that it is a point of order, rather than a point of frustration.

[Mr Allen]

It is a point of order. In view of the response from the Deputy Leader of the House, I shall probably not press my amendment to a vote, so that the House can vote on the issue of special advisers. It is not satisfactory not to regulate that in some shape or form.

[Mr Speaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point, but my initial suspicion was nevertheless valid. It was a point of great interest and it is on the record, but it was not a point of order. Never mind—he has made it.

[Tom Brake]

I need to make some progress, as we do not have much time for the debate.

We should streamline public services, not impose additional burdens on them. We should provide the public with relevant and useful information, not overwhelm them with huge volumes of unhelpful and extraneous data. The House accepted these arguments in our debates on part 1, and did not seek to extend the scope of the measure in the manner proposed by hon. Members. We should respond to the Lords amendments constructively by proposing an amendment in lieu in respect of the proposed extension to capture special advisers, but we should not seek further to extend the scope in a manner that the Lords have specifically rejected.

Briefly, Lords amendments 2 and 3 deal with recipients of communications. They are minor amendments and improve drafting to clarify and provide greater consistency in the terminology used in relation both to the recipients of the lobbying communications and to the communications themselves. Lords amendment 4 is a minor amendment that clarifies the fact that the term, “Minister of the Crown” does not, in the context of the Bill, capture the two bodies of persons, the Defence Council and the Board of Trade. As clause 2 makes clear, the communications that the register is intended to capture are those that are

“made personally to a Minister of the Crown or permanent secretary”.

The definition in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 includes the Defence Council and the Board of Trade. Both those entities, however, are bodies of persons with which it is not possible to make personal communications. As such, the Lords amendments remove those bodies from the definition, and in doing so provide further clarity regarding the communications that fall within the scope of consultant lobbying.

Lords amendments 5, 6 and 7 deal with the code of conduct. In Committee in both Houses, the Opposition tabled amendments that required lobbyists to sign up to a statutory code of conduct and face sanctions for any breaches. As we exposed during the debates in both Houses, the Opposition’s amendments were based on a miscomprehension of the role of codes, both statutory and voluntary, in the regulation of lobbying. While the Opposition suggested that such codes are in existence and operate successfully in other jurisdictions, we have not been able to identify any international precedent for the type of code that has been proposed. Furthermore, the Opposition could propose just one provision for inclusion in that code: a prohibition on inappropriate financial relationships between lobbyists and parliamentarians, which is unnecessary, given the fact that there are parliamentary codes, as well as laws, on bribery and corruption. Once the shortcomings of the Opposition’s amendments were demonstrated, both Houses were able confidently to reject them.

My Lords—not my Lords—the objective of the part 1 provisions is to enhance transparency.

[Mr Speaker]

The Deputy Leader of the House knows something that we do not.

[Tom Brake]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I do not anticipate a sudden transformation of the House into the other place.

The objective of the part 1 provisions is to enhance transparency and scrutiny. We are not seeking to regulate behaviour. During the debates, however, the Government heard calls from both Houses on the importance of ensuring that the statutory register complemented the existing self-regulatory regime. That reiterated the message of inquiries by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. The self-regulatory regime is the mechanism by which the industry promotes the ethical behaviour that is essential to the integrity and reputation of the lobbying industry. We are grateful to Members in both Houses for their thoughtful suggestions as to how we can best ensure that the register complements the regime and, after careful consideration and discussion with the industry and transparency groups, we have concluded that the most effective option is to provide for a statutory link between the statutory register and the industry-hosted voluntary codes of conduct.