Billy Wright Inquiry

Shaun Woodward Excerpts

Tuesday 14th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr Owen Paterson)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement. Today I am publishing the report, which I received yesterday, of the Billy Wright inquiry, set up by the previous Government to investigate the death of Billy Wright in the Maze prison on 27 December 1997. I thank Lord MacLean and his panel for their work on the report.

The inquiry was established following the recommendation of Judge Cory that there was sufficient evidence of collusive acts by the Northern Ireland prison authorities to warrant the holding of a public inquiry. The inquiry was asked to determine whether the state facilitated, or attempted to facilitate, Billy Wright’s death, whether acts or omissions by the state were “intentional or negligent”, and “to make recommendations”.

The panel’s conclusions are clear and unequivocal on the central issue of collusion. There was no state collusion in the murder of Billy Wright. The panel finds that

“We were not…persuaded that in any instance there was evidence of collusive acts or collusive conduct.”

However, the panel concludes that

“some…actions did, in our opinion, facilitate his death.”

The report details a number of serious failings prior to Billy Wright’s death. The panel is clear that where failings are identified, they were the result of negligence rather than intentional acts.

The panel criticises specific decisions taken in relation to the prison. Specifically, the panel finds that

“the decision to allocate Billy Wright and the LVF faction to H Block 6 in April 1997 alongside the INLA prisoners was a wrongful act that directly facilitated”

his murder.

The panel also makes a series of criticisms of the management and operational running of the Maze prison at the time. Wrongful omissions identified by the panel included the

“failure…to strengthen the roof defences…failing to ensure that the exercise yards…were secured and checked each night”

and the failure to carry out a “full risk assessment” before the Loyalist Volunteer Force prisoners were returned to H block 6 in October 1997. Overall the panel identified

“a serious failure on the part of the NIPS and its Chief Executive to deal with recognised management problems in HMP Maze in 1997.”

The Cory report covered a number of issues relating to the day of Billy Wright’s murder, including the malfunctioning of a camera and the standing down of a guard in the observation tower. With two exceptions, the panel conclude that

“none of these occurrences facilitated the murder of Billy Wright”.

In relation to Billy Wright being called by name for his visit, as was “the practice”, the panel

“do not draw any sinister conclusion from this fact but conclude that it did assist his murderers”.

The panel also finds that the

“cutting of the hole in the fence alongside A Wing prior to 27 December undoubtedly facilitated the murder of Billy Wright.”

The panel makes a number of conclusions relating to intelligence received prior to Billy Wright’s death, in particular that the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s failure to communicate a key piece of intelligence was a

“wrongful omission which facilitated the death of Billy Wright in a way that was negligent rather than intentional.”

The report is also critical of the failure to disclose, and in some cases the destruction of, documentary evidence by institutions and state agencies. Although the panel finds that the Northern Ireland Prison Service supplied

“the available documentary evidence which allowed the Inquiry to fulfil its Terms of Reference”,

it is clear that files were destroyed, for which the NIPS apologised unreservedly in its submissions to the inquiry. In relation to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the report notes

“the lack of adequate and effective systems for information management, dissemination and retention with the added element in certain cases of a suspicion that this amounted to deliberate malpractice”.

Those are serious and profound failings. The NIPS has already accepted negligence in the civil proceedings brought by the Wright family in 2002. The prison service told the inquiry in its closing submission that it was a matter of profound regret to the service and its employees that Billy Wright was murdered while in custody. It apologised to the Wright family for any failings that were exploited by the murderers. I reiterate that on behalf of the Government today. There was no collusion. But, as the panel makes clear, Billy Wright was in the

“protective custody of the state”

at the time of his death. Whatever horrendous crimes Billy Wright or the LVF committed, his murder in a high-security prison should never have happened. It was wrong and I am sincerely sorry that failings in the system facilitated his murder.

There are three recommendations in the panel’s report. They cover the retention of prison records, whether any relevant lessons can be learnt for HMP Maghaberry, and whether a process similar to the Patten reforms of the RUC should be established for the Northern Ireland Prison Service. As the House is aware, prisons in Northern Ireland are now in the main a devolved matter. I will meet Justice Minister David Ford on Monday to discuss these recommendations.

It is of course important to recognise the context to Billy Wright’s death and the conditions in the Maze at the time. The circumstances of the Maze were exceptional, with 500 extremely dangerous terrorists belonging to various rival paramilitary organisations housed within the prison. A large number of the prisoners were convicted of the most heinous crimes and, as the Minister who then had responsibility for prisons, Adam Ingram, said in 1998:

“The Maze is unique. There is no other prison anywhere in the democratic world that has such a concentration of terrorist murderers”.

There is no doubt that those charged with running and overseeing the prison faced an incredibly difficult challenge, and for the most part that challenge was met.

The panel acknowledges the

“organisational and personal pressures and the valiant way in which many staff responded.”

Any failings in the management of the Maze identified in this report should not detract from the enormous courage and sacrifice that members of the Northern Ireland Prison Service made during the troubles. Let us not forget that 29 members of that service were killed during the troubles for carrying out their duties. Many more were injured in the line of duty. And as the report states, many of the families of prison officers had

“to move home because of threats made against them.”

Nor should we forget that responsibility for Billy Wright’s death lies with the INLA and the three individuals convicted of his murder. I condemn their crimes absolutely. There was never any justification for the brutal terrorist campaigns that the INLA, the Loyalist Volunteer Force and others waged. I am acutely conscious of the enormous suffering that such terrorists have caused.

The House will be well aware of the controversies over the cost and length of public inquiries in Northern Ireland. This inquiry has cost more than £30 million and lasted more than five years. Our views on these matters are well documented. Let me reiterate to the House, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has done, that there will be no more costly and open-ended public inquiries.

The report is a clear account of the shortcomings in the management and running of the Maze at the time of Billy Wright’s death. His murder should never have happened. But any allegations that the state colluded in this violent killing have now been examined and rejected. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Shaun Woodward (St Helens South and Whiston) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for an early copy of his statement and join him in paying tribute to the inquiry chairman, Lord MacLean, his panel, the supporting law officers and officials. I also thank the Secretary of State for allowing hon. Members to read the report in advance of his statement.

We join the Secretary of State in putting on record our sincere thanks to the many brave men and women of the Northern Ireland Prison Service, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, many of whom gave their lives in the course of the troubles.

This has been an important inquiry. Whatever the context of the troubles, and whatever the crimes Billy Wright had committed—which led to his serving a custodial sentence—nothing should excuse or condone the terrible events two days after Christmas in 1997 that led to his murder while in the protective custody of a high-security prison. I share the Secretary of State’s expression of sorrow for the events and failings that happened.

Although the report addresses some of the so-called irregularities, we note Lord MacLean’s final paragraph:

“To our regret no explanation emerged in the evidence as to how the two firearms were introduced into the prison and put into the hands of his INLA murderers.”

The absence of an explanation is extremely serious. Furthermore, it has potential implications for current security policy in Maghaberry. Is the Secretary of State satisfied that all the lessons on security in prisons have been learned, especially given the events of the past 12 months?

In his recommendations, Lord MacLean observes that in 1997 the Maze was the sole prison in Northern Ireland holding the most dangerous terrorist prisoners. Given that today Maghaberry is the sole maximum security prison, can the Secretary of State tell the House what assessment he has made of the current policy for accommodation?

This inquiry, which, significantly, was converted to be held under the Inquiries Act 2005, and is therefore fundamental evidence of the good faith and efficacy of the Act, is extremely important to the family of Mr Wright. The inquiry needed to determine whether any wrongful act or omission by the prison authorities or other state agencies contributed or led to the murder of Billy Wright—or, as others have put it, whether there was collusion. The inquiry’s conclusion is very clear. Crucially, it was not persuaded by the evidence it was able to obtain

“that in any instance there was evidence of collusive acts or collusive conduct.”

The Secretary of State accepts this, and so do we.

In accepting the inquiry’s firm conclusion that there was no collusion, however, the Secretary of State will have noted Lord MacLean’s concern to qualify Judge Cory’s definition of the word “collusion”, expressing concern at the “wide definition” used by Judge Cory. How does the Secretary of State reconcile these different definitions, especially given the possibility that further inquiries might also qualify the definition, the consequences of which might allow some to draw contradictory interpretations, and even contradictory conclusions?

At Weston Park, the British and Irish Governments agreed to look into the possibility of public inquiries into several cases of alleged collusion. The inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane has not yet been established. The House will know that when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, we made it clear that it would be in the public interest to make an urgent decision on how to proceed with the Finucane inquiry once, and as soon as, Lord Saville had produce his inquiry.

The Government handled the publication of the Saville inquiry with great dignity, sensitivity and skill. Three months have now passed. In his statement today, the Secretary of State quoted the Prime Minister’s words that there would be no more costly and open-ended public inquiries, but he missed out the qualification that the Prime Minister used in his statement on Lord Saville’s report. So in the light of the Secretary of State’s words today, is he effectively telling the Finucane family that they will not have an inquiry?

The Secretary of State rightly sets great store by the work of the Historical Enquiries Team. However, where we differ is in the belief that the HET can deal with all the problems of the past. He must appreciate from the inquiry published today that the HET would have neither the budget nor the resources to mount an investigation such as the one into Billy Wright’s murder. This inquiry alone would have exhausted the entire budget of the HET, which is now tasked with looking at several thousand unsolved deaths and murders.

That brings us to the nub of the issue. Most of the families of those who died in the troubles simply want to know the circumstances of the deaths of their loved ones, and so bring closure to terrible grief and tragedy. Northern Ireland cannot be held in the grip of its past, but it will not be released from that grip just because the British Government say so. Reconciliation will require a process—and a process for everyone—but one that must recognise that no one size can fit all. Closing down the inquiry route for all, without having established a proper alternative, resourced and adequately funded, would be to take a serious risk with the stability not just of the politics, but of the lasting peace of Northern Ireland. On that, the Secretary of State should be cautious. I urge him to reflect carefully.

[Mr Paterson]

I thank the shadow Secretary of State for his opening comments. He asked a number of questions. First, on the lessons for prisons, he played a huge part in ensuring that prisons were devolved. It is not for me to make judgments today about the comments in the tribunal’s report. I have a meeting with the devolved Minister, David Ford, on Monday, and I will go through those recommendations with him. The same applies to the right hon. Gentleman’s questions about Maghaberry. There are 70 separated prisoners in Maghaberry at the moment, which is an enormous contrast with the concentration of 500 prisoners in the Maze in 1997. Again, however, if there are lessons to be drawn from today’s report, they are to be drawn by the devolved Minister and those who work under him, and then put into practice.

On collusion, the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly pointed out that there is a contrast between Judge Cory’s definition, which ran to 765 words, and the shorter version, which Lord MacLean came up with. For the benefit of the House, let me read the concise definition of collusion that Lord MacLean came up with in the report:

“For our part we consider that the essence of collusion is an agreement or arrangement between individuals or organisations, including government departments, to achieve an unlawful or improper purpose. The purpose may also be fraudulent or underhand”.

That is a good distillation of what Judge Cory was aiming at. We have to take the definition given by the tribunal in the report, and the report was quite clear: there was no collusion in this case.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the Finucane case. As with the last time he raised the issue, I have written to the Finucane family. He wrestled with the problem when he was in office, and although I am fully aware of the difficulties and sensitivities associated with the case, it is right that I talk to the family first, before deciding how we proceed further.

The right hon. Gentleman then talked about the past. He quite rightly contrasted the £30 million spent on the one death that we are discussing today and the £34 million that was the original budget, over six years, for the HET, which is looking into 3,268 deaths. My view is that this asymmetrical approach to the past, with an extraordinary intensity of effort put into a small number of cases, is not fair and is invidious. I hope that we will get the same reaction today that we had to Saville—that it was an effort well spent—but for the future, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, there is no consensus on how we handle the past.

The right hon. Gentleman called for submissions reacting to the Eames-Bradley report, which he received in October and which, in fairness to us, we published in the summer. I am listening to parties in this House across the board, and the Minister of State and I are going round Northern Ireland talking to numerous people and groups. Sadly, however, as he saw from those replies to Eames-Bradley, there is just no consensus. It is not for us, as the Westminster Government, to impose one; rather, it is our task to try to find a way forward in close collaboration with local politicians and local groups. That is how we intend to approach the past.