Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Sarah Sackman and Marie Tidball

Tuesday 8th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

T2. Last month, a devastating report by Women’s Aid revealed that a total of 67 children have been killed over a 30-year period by a known domestically abusive parent, in circumstances related to the courts’ use of the principle of the presumption of contact. Two of those children, Jack and Paul Sykes, are the sons of my formidable constituent, Claire Throssell. All these deaths were preventable. Will the Minister update the House on the progress of the Government’s review of the presumption of contact?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

The killings of Jack and Paul were horrendous crimes and I would like to pay tribute to my hon. Friend and to her constituent, Claire, for their tireless campaigning on these issues. I am sure that she would agree that the guiding principle for any reform must be children’s welfare. That is why we have requested a review of the presumption of contact. We will be publishing findings and next steps very shortly.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Sarah Sackman and Marie Tidball

Committee stage
Wednesday 29th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

Q Lord Sumption and Dr Graham, you will have seen that clauses 26 and 27 include criminal offences. Do you have any views on the operability of those criminal offences?

Dr Graham: My only contribution here can be that similar offences in other jurisdictions have been held to be perfectly compatible with European human rights law.

Lord Sumption: I have no problem about the criminal-isation of people who abuse or distort the system, which is what those two clauses envisage.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Q Dr Graham, thank you for your written evidence, which was very helpful and stated your view that the strength of the clauses in the Bill make it compatible with the European convention on human rights in relation to article 2 on the right to life and article 14 on freedom from discrimination. Can you explain why you hold that view? What has been the view of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to assisted dying laws in other signatory states?

Dr Graham: There are two main challenges to this legislation, and to legislation like it, in relation to the European convention. As you say, one relates to article 2 and one relates to article 14. The article 2 challenge can be dismissed fairly quickly, because we have authority from the European Court saying that

“the right to life enshrined under Article 2 could not be interpreted as per se prohibiting the conditional decriminalisation of euthanasia.”

As a matter of precedent, that is fairly clear.

The trickier argument comes with article 14, which is the anti-discrimination right. There is an argument that goes something like this—I hope that those who hold this view think I am giving it a good airing. By allowing some groups to access assisted suicide, but not other groups—in this Bill, allowing terminally ill adults who meet the criteria in the Bill but not non-terminally ill adults who do not meet those criteria—you are treating two different groups in different ways, and that is discriminatory. There is an argument that, because of that, the courts would find that the Bill is unlawful and needs to be expanded—that groups outside of the terminally ill that meet the criteria of the Bill need to be given access to assisted suicide. I think that argument does not work for a few reasons, chief among which is that in our jurisdiction treating different groups differently is not unlawful. Treating different groups differently without good justification is unlawful.

The question of justification, while it is for judges and the courts, is a question on which judges have deferred heavily to Parliament, especially in areas that involve difficult social, ethical or moral issues. If I may be forgiven for reading from a court’s judgment one more time, in the case of SC the Supreme Court said:

“The ordinary approach…gives appropriate weight to…the primary decision-maker”—

the primary decision maker being Parliament—

“a degree of weight which will normally be substantial in…matters raising sensitive moral or ethical issues.”

We can all agree that this Bill involves sensitive moral or ethical issues.

My point is that when it comes to justification, courts are very deferential to Parliament. Courts think that Parliament should be deciding whether treating two groups in different ways is justified or not. That is why, in my view, there is no real truck to the argument that article 14—the anti-discrimination right—will be operative and cause the Bill to be declared incompatible with the convention in any way. I hope that is an adequate summary of my view.