(2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThat intervention was slightly more in scope and was also about Edinburgh, so I was happier to take it.
The hon. Gentleman is right. Indeed, in advance of the Bill Committee debate and the debate that we are having now, I spoke to Edinburgh city council and to some of the event organisers, who told me that it is exactly because Edinburgh has become a place where fringe events take place regularly that these considerations have been normalised. Our city has put a lot of the necessary infrastructure in place, along with the thinking and the organisational requirements—and there is also a corporate memory between the small venues—to cope with terrorist events. As Andy Burnham pointed out in his evidence, Edinburgh is one of the national leaders on this front. However, I recognise that not every community has that advantage, which is why the Bill will extend to other communities the measures that already benefit mine.
The hon. Member said earlier that these were “prompts”, and that what we should consider was what happened after an attack. What is worrying is that the Bill goes beyond that. It talks about occasions on which it is suspected that a terrorist offence might take place or is taking place. That is not an “after”. The Bill creates an obligation for those who are in charge of the event in question to prevent individuals from entering. Before an event or while it is happening, there is a security obligation on some of these small groups to prevent people from entering the premises. That is not a prompt; it is a huge burden on the organisers.
The right hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. Again, having been on the Public Bill Committee, my argument is that the Bill is proportionate.
I fully understand the reasoning and the demand for a Bill such as this when it became known that, after a terrorist event, lives were lost because of bad organisation. If it is possible to introduce legislation that helps to avoid a situation that we have seen develop in the past, then of course we should do it. However, we have to be cognisant that when we introduce legislation, it has consequences for the people to whom it applies.
As we have heard time and again during the debate, Members believe that this legislation is both proportionate and practical. If Members genuinely believe that that is the case, there is absolutely no reason why new clause 1 should not be supported. We are entering a new field and imposing new regulations on bodies that were not regulated in relation to terrorism before, so surely it is important that we find out whether or not the objective and the intention is actually fulfilled. One way to do that is to monitor the effect over a period of time.
I have some concerns about the legislation, which people have already raised. In many cases, I do not think that the measures are practical. Secondly, I do not believe that they will not have an impact. That is not what Members expected and it is not what they want. Members across the House have said that they think the legislation may put people off engaging in activities that they would have undertaken in the absence of the regulations—activities that make a valuable contribution to their communities.
There is always a danger that people interpret the legislation that comes before the House, and sometimes our own rhetoric encourages them to do so. They may think a result of this legislation will be that it reduces the danger of people suffering a terrorist attack. To be clear, that is not and cannot be the purpose of the Bill. Terrorist attacks can be stopped only if we have intelligence, the security forces can act on that intelligence and we act in time. As the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray) pointed out, the legislation is more about what happens after the event. However, it is not only about what happens after the event. The legislation puts obligations on people before they make a decision to undertake an event. Some of the wording in the Bill raises concerns.
To clarify, I was not saying the legislation was only of value after an event. I said that part of its value was the impact it had on planning for the period after an event. On the burden the right hon. Gentleman talks about on people making preparations, does he accept that it is important that they consider the potential impact of events and think in advance about that in taking those decisions? That is how we will avoid the kind of atrocities we have seen.
Let us look at some of the language and the requirements in the Bill that are totally reasonable. For example, the Bill sets out that people who are organising events should have plans
“for evacuating individuals from the premises”.
As far as I know, that already happens. At many of the events I attend, before the event even starts, somebody stands up and says, “Here are some house rules: in the event of a fire, the exits are here, here and here. Leave in an orderly way. When you get outside, meet at a certain point, so we can check everybody is out of the area.” There are measures in the Bill that are reasonable and that I would assume people are already doing. If they are not doing them, then it is not onerous on them to start saying that at the beginning of an event.
However, the Bill applies to retail as well. It is easy to communicate that kind of information to people if they are in a theatre or at some kind of concert, but it is a bit more difficult to communicate that to individuals when they are moving in and out of retail premises. We have to be careful about the practicalities of what we ask people to do.
Let me set out some of the things I have concerns about, which I believe are unreasonable to require of organisations. First, “public protection procedures” have to be
“followed by individuals working on the premises or at the event if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring, or is about to occur, on the premises”.
I suppose it is fairly obvious if something is “occurring” —we know if something is happening—but what if it is likely or “about to occur”? Are organisers meant to liaise with the police and get intelligence from them—intelligence that the police may not be able to divulge, or may not even have? What onus does it put on individuals in terms of preparation, given the random nature of terrorism? We have seen somebody go into a pre-school class with a knife. Nobody could have anticipated that.
Furthermore, when an event is occurring, or might be about to occur, the organiser has to prevent individuals from entering the premises. If I were organising an event, I would want to know what kind of security requirement that puts on me as the organiser. Am I meant to ensure that a security presence is there? What kind of security presence? We have talked quite a lot tonight about the fact that many events of 200 people could be organised by ordinary community groups. I think of theatre groups in my constituency. The only interest that people who organise such events have is acting. They do not have any of the skills that might be required to prevent people from entering the premises, so do they need to have security apparatus, such as security people?
The next measure about which there is a degree of ambiguity is the requirement that organisers do not divulge security information relating to the premises or event. I understand that they should not send out plans of the building in which they will be operating, showing the doors through which people can come in and get out, and the easy and hard ways into the premises. However, the Bill goes further than that. The organisers cannot give information about the event. The whole purpose of an event is to publicise it. Where will it be held? At what time will it be held? How many people can be facilitated? How do people get tickets? The point that I am trying to make is that there is language in the Bill about which I would have a lot of questions, were I an individual who was subject to it, because if I did not get it right, there would be a fine of up to £5,000 or £10,000.