Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill

Sammy Wilson Excerpts

Wednesday 12th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Paul Murphy]

Not so much wiser, I think.

I vividly recall that we decided on the final number for the Assembly in the middle of the night on Maundy Thursday. There was an argument that the Assembly should be bigger than it turned out to be—some of the smaller parties thought it was essential that they should all be represented—but we came to what appeared to be something of a compromise with 108 Members. I absolutely agree with the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds). When the Government were dealing with the United Kingdom parliamentary boundary changes, they were challenged—I challenged them, as did the right hon. Gentleman and others—about the consequences of reducing the number of MPs in Northern Ireland for the Assembly, and therefore for the whole balance that had been agreed. That is now water under the bridge, so it is not an issue today, but it shows the mentality at the time.

In Wales, we have a population of 3 million compared with a population of 1.5 million in Northern Ireland, and an Assembly of 60 Members compared with an Assembly of 108 Members in Northern Ireland. That is obviously quite a difference. The Government recently appointed the Silk commission, which has recommended that the number of Members of the National Assembly for Wales should be increased because it has now achieved primary legislative powers and therefore has an insufficient number of Back Benchers to scrutinise legislation.

I very much take the point that there is no great merit in having a set figure if there is agreement to reduce it. My only mild criticism of the amendment is that it specifies a figure of five, and if, with agreement, the parties said that it should be four, the Bill would prevent them from implementing that. Nevertheless, a reduction from six to five is a start. Two important principles lay behind the number that was chosen: first, the need to make the Assembly in Northern Ireland as pluralist as possible so that as many points of view as possible are represented, which was a good approach; and, secondly and crucially, the need to ensure that changes are agreed with the political parties in Northern Ireland. I would be interested to hear what the Minister says about any consultations he or his predecessors had with Northern Ireland’s political parties to come up with the final figure and final recommendation that we are considering.

A few weeks ago, Northern Ireland was, in a sense, captured by a crisis about a so-called one-sided deal that may have occurred some years ago. I do not want to go into the details of that, but merely say that anything that is one-sided will eventually flounder. Everybody has to agree; otherwise, eventually, the deal will not last. This can be very difficult. For example, our agreeing on the release of prisoners in Northern Ireland—perhaps the most difficult part of the Good Friday agreement—was based on the agreement of the parties involved in the talks. Therefore, the key aspect of the amendment, which I wholly support, is the importance of getting general agreement.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that a deal brokered and supported by one party for republican terrorists who are on the run from justice in Northern Ireland cannot be described as a “so-called” one-sided deal? It is a one-sided deal, and its secrecy makes it a dirty deal as well.

[Paul Murphy]

Mr Deputy Speaker will stop me if we go into the details of what we discussed some weeks ago, but I will simply say that the principle of all parties agreeing a policy is critical to its success. The issue, as the hon. Gentleman has just said, is one that involved not just political parties, but paramilitary organisations as well. The principle, however, has to be agreed: there must be agreement between the parties all the time, even if it takes weeks, months or even years to achieve it. Otherwise, it will be so fragile that it simply will not continue to have any validity at all.

I agree with the Lords amendments. I will also be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the consultation that was held on the details of the size of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naomi Long]

I appreciate the opportunity to do so, but I will not go too far, because Mr Deputy Speaker will be quick to reign me back in. In terms of what the AERC is looking at, we want a review of the question of an addition to the numbers of Members and Departments. We also want to move away from the Assembly’s designation system—which I believe copper-fastens sectarianism within our structures and manages division rather than addresses it—towards a weighted majority voting system. I believe that that would be much more fluid and that it would allow Government and, indeed, Assembly decisions to be taken much more quickly and easily than is currently the case with our mutual vetoes, which do not serve Northern Ireland well.

I would also like the Assembly to have opposition structures similar to those in this place, which has a properly financed and funded Opposition who can hold the Executive parties to account. It is a very difficult job. During my time in the Assembly I sat as part of the unofficial Opposition—we were not in the Executive—and although it was a very nice place to be and we could be critical of what was going on without having the responsibility of making the decisions, it was not properly funded or researched. Often it was done on a shoe string in comparison to the support received by the majority of Assembly Members, who were members of Government parties and had access to the relevant structures.

[Sammy Wilson]

I think that anyone listening to this debate would be surprised to hear that, while there appears to be a willingness to see the changes mentioned by the hon. Lady, there has been absolutely no move towards making them. Indeed, a properly structured, effective Opposition could be easily obtained if those who talk about it were prepared to drop out of the Executive and take up opposition positions, but, of course, they do not.