(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Absolutely, and I will come on to that point later in my remarks, because it is absolutely clear that the risk here, with such a small guaranteed sum, is with the taxpayer.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate, because it is important that this matter is debated in Parliament. However, the particular issue that we are considering here needs to relate to the deliverability of the process by which the contract has been offered, and there is no real way that we can assess, all those years into the future, whether the winning bidder can produce what is meant to be there. Therefore it is a matter of great concern that there does not seem to be a proper assessment process about how the bid is actually given out.
I agree, and again my hon. Friend raises points that I will return to later in my remarks.
It is absolutely for sure that we are dealing with risk—risk in the assumptions and economic risk. However, the only bidder for the contract that does not seem to have put up a lot of money is the company that has been awarded the contract. Again, I will return to that point later.
Economic assumptions are central to franchise bids. Governments expect rail companies to predict GDP trends over the lifetime of a franchise. As the Government cannot manage to predict GDP over the short term, how can we have confidence that any bids based on long-term projections have credibility? If an economist can tell me that those projections are credible, I suggest that the Government employ that economist as the current lot of economists cannot manage to.
I will indeed do that. I had not considered the idea of asking the PAC to look at this issue, but I undertake now to ensure that I send a letter to that effect to the Chairman of the PAC before I leave Parliament today.
When my hon. Friend does so, will she ensure that she asks for the recommendations of an earlier PAC report on procurement to be considered within the context that has just been described by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash)?
Indeed I will, and I will seek further advice from my right hon. Friend on that point as well.
There is considerable difference in value when one bidder offers £800 million worth of investment and the other bidder offers £350 million. Unbelievably, there are reports that FirstGroup scored higher in the bidding process on customer service than Virgin did. Can the Minister tell me how the scoring system squares that with the results from various customer satisfaction surveys of FirstGroup’s current users—in other words, FirstGroup’s passengers—that show that those users rated the Great Western service as the second worst service around? It is not unfair or illogical to assume that, if a company offers a certain service on one line, it may offer something similar on another line. So can he explain how an anonymised scoring system is better informed than the passengers who actually use the railway system and FirstGroup in particular?
Sustainability is one of the watchwords in every aspect of public expenditure. Ensuring that the bids that are submitted can be sustained over the life of a franchise is essential. One of the reasons why hon. Members asked for the debate is that recent franchise experiences have shown that the highest bids—the riskiest bids—are not necessarily sustainable bids. The Government have even admitted that the successful bid for the west coast main line is indeed the riskier bid.
I was intrigued to hear that, during the tendering process, the Department for Transport informed one bidder that it did not view a 5% margin as sustainable. In the light of that information, that bidder reworked its bid and achieved a 7% margin. That leaves me perplexed, when I read that the successful bid is based on a 5% margin. If that is true—I assume that it is—given the lack of information and transparency, a whole series of questions are raised. Does the DFT believe that a 5% margin is sustainable? Did DFT officials give each of the bidders the same information? If they did offer the same view on sustainability to each bidder, why was a bid accepted with a figure that they believed to be unsustainable? That is an important question because it relates to risk and, in turn, how that relates to the guarantees being sought by the Government.
There is considerable contention about the guarantee that the successful bidder was asked to put against the bid. In the first case, my understanding of the guarantee is that it is based on the assessment of risk using a set formula. It is argued that if the Department had applied that formula uniformly, FirstGroup would expect, reasonably, to have been asked to put up a guarantee of around £600 million, not just the £215 million asked of it initially, which was finally reduced to £200 million. Secondly, did any negotiation take place with FirstGroup on the level of guarantee? If so, what were the circumstances? How did we reach the very small guarantee figure of £200 million, if the Department had been applying the same formula across all bids? If there was no provision within the invitation to tender for the guarantee to be negotiated, how does the Minister explain the variation in the figures from potentially £600 million down to £215 million, and finally to £200 million? Those figures are relevant to mitigating taxpayer risk.
We must not forget that in recent years a number of train operators have handed the keys back to the Government on franchises such as the east coast main line. I believe that Members want to be assured that that will not happen again and that taxpayers have an assurance that they will not be held to ransom by Dick Turpin train operators asking them to stand and deliver, having secured the contract on a bogus premise, taking their profits and scarpering when it is time to deliver the promised high return.