Scientific Advice (Emergencies)

Debate between Roger Williams and Lord Maude of Horsham

Thursday 15th September 2011 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General (Mr Francis Maude)]

I am grateful to all Members who have taken part in this important debate for its tone and the many helpful insights that they have provided. I commend the detailed work of the Science and Technology Committee. It was undertaken in an appropriate spirit of interrogation and challenge, and contains measured and thoughtful conclusions which, for the most part, the Government have accepted.

It is important to start by saying that it is unlikely that any Government will ever get this issue completely right. The nature of emergencies means that they are unpredictable; their likelihood may rise or fall, and we do our best to estimate that, but their effects are unpredictable and we can only prepare as best we can and try to manage the risks in a sensible and proportionate way. My family motto is, “Hope for the best while confidently expecting the worst.” That is not entirely a basis on which one can prepare for emergencies because, while we hope for the best, we must plan for the worst outcome.

There is always an incredibly difficult balance to strike between underestimating a situation and appearing complacent about its malign effects on communities and the economy if we do not prepare sufficiently—although we should always err on the side of caution—and investing many resources in preparing for outcomes that are wholly unfeasible but could mean that damage is imposed on the economy or disruption on people’s lives. The nature of emergencies makes it unlikely that that balance will be achieved exactly, but it is important that we strive to get it right.

[Roger Williams (Brecon and Radnorshire) (LD)]

I apologise for not being here at the beginning of the debate, but I was engaged in activities elsewhere in the House. The Minister makes a good point. At times, medical scientists may offer advice that would be hard to deliver in terms of social science. There could be a conflict between pieces of advice that are properly given by two proponents of the same profession.

[Mr Maude]

My hon. Friend is right, and in the end we have to make a judgment and try to prepare in a proportionate way based on the best evidence available, while acknowledging that that evidence will not always be conclusive. The process set in place through SAGE will try to distil the best view, which is important.

A number of Members have raised points about the communication of risk, which is an important issue and difficult to get right. When communicating risk to the public, it is important not to scaremonger, make people agitated or cause them to behave in a way that is not reasonable. Nor should we devote resources to something in a way that cannot be justified. At the same time, we must never be complacent.

I have thought about the concerns raised in the report and by hon. Members during the debate about the concept of the reasonable worst case. It is difficult to get the form of words right. If the word “reasonable” is inserted, it sounds as if it is a situation that we think will happen. In fact, “reasonable worst case” is not what we believe likely to happen; it is the worst case possible if we remove situations that are absurdly improbable. Pitching that statement correctly is quite difficult.

A number of hon. Members mentioned the Blackett review that will be published in the next few weeks, which we will obviously consider. The Blackett panel looked at the concept of reasonable worst case, which it believes—as do the Government—that it is essential to consider when planning and building capability. It believes, however, that we must think about the use of that concept in communicating risk because it may be that the concept of the most likely case is more useful.

Governments will always be anxious about having a figure in their possession that they have not shared. That was the case with swine flu, and I understand the concern of the Health Secretary at that time. The Government did not want to suppress a figure that might have been arrived at properly, even though it proved to be way off beam. These difficult issues need to be tackled in a serious and measured way and it would be useful to have further discussion and debate once the Blackett panel has completed its review. We must get this issue right because, when emergencies happen—as they will—it is important to have some kind of shared understanding across the political spectrum, and between the Government, Parliament and the media, about the way the concepts in question have been used and the need for responsibility when dealing with facts and estimations.

My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central (Gavin Barwell), who could not stay for the end of the debate because he had to be elsewhere, talked about the figures changing in the course of the swine flu epidemic. The truth is that in an emerging epidemic, there are very few cases on which scientists can make assessments; there is very little epidemiology to go on. Arguably, it is better to be honest about the possible worst case and plan for the worst; and then if events turn out very differently, at least that is better than their turning out much worse than predicted. I was asked whether we had used the reasonable worst case approach for the Fukushima event. The answer is yes, that did happen.

On the difficult issues about trying to get right the communication of risk, I am grateful for the Select Committee’s insights. The Blackett panel will produce its conclusions in due course, and we will share them and continue to have discussions and debates.

I was asked what progress had been made in response to the concerns that the Select Committee raised, which I understand, about the role of the Government chief scientific adviser in national risk assessment. Work is under way to set up an independent scientific advice group for the NRA, which will be in place in time for the 2012 NRA. The draft 2011 NRA has been sent to the Government chief scientific adviser, and he will respond to me and my officials in due course. Obviously, it is important that that assessment has the benefit of his detailed scrutiny. We are taking the conclusions and recommendations in the Committee’s report seriously and acting on them.

The Chair of the Committee, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller), asked when SAGE guidance would be published. We are aiming for later this year. We are building in steps that are being taken in the light of the inquiry and the reflections in this debate.

I was asked about transparency. We agree that SAGE should operate on the principle of openness and transparency. The membership, minutes and key scientific advice papers for all three recent SAGE activations, which were in relation to the Japanese nuclear event in and around Fukushima, the volcanic ash eruption and the swine flu epidemic, have all now been published online. Everything is being taken forward, I hope, in the right spirit.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock (Stephen Metcalfe) asked about international collaboration. We work closely with international organisations—the European Union, the UN and so on—and with global leaders in this field. For example, the Singapore Government are a serious leader in this area, and we work with them. We also work with other countries with which we share risks. For example, we work closely with the Netherlands on the risks associated with North sea flooding. There is also ad hoc joint work and research on community resilience and behavioural issues. We work on that with the United States, Canada and the Australians. International collaboration is therefore very important. There is a huge amount of expertise, and it is in the interests of all countries that we benefit from one another’s knowledge, expertise and assessments.

I was asked about volcanic eruption as a risk. I assure hon. Members that the possibility of volcanic eruption is certainly not being omitted from the 2011 NRA. There are two risks in the risk assessment, one of which is a severe, gas-rich volcanic eruption that could reach toxic levels at both ground level and flight altitude. Obviously, that is less likely to occur but would have very significant impacts. We acknowledge that the volcanologists are saying that the likelihood of further volcanic eruptions is higher. We are obviously taking that into account. There is a higher likelihood of a much less severe volcanic ash-rich eruption. A great deal of knowledge was gained from the experience of the eruption last year, and a lot of action has been taken on the back of that.