Europe

Debate between Robert Walter and Martin Horwood

Wednesday 30th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Walter]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I would remind him—I can remember it—that the economy was already in a difficult situation caused by the energy crisis. We had three-day weeks and other problems.

[Martin Horwood]

I think the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) made a good comparison with Harold Wilson and the 1970s. Like our Prime Minister now, Harold Wilson wanted modest reforms, but was unable to satisfy the Europhobes in his own party. Within five years, that party was voting for exit from the European Union—despite the referendum. Is that not a little bit of a warning from history?

[Mr Walter]

It is a warning from history, but if the hon. Gentleman listens to what else I have to say, I hope that he will accept that I will be campaigning to make sure that that does not happen. I had rather hoped that the question of Britain’s membership had been settled decisively back then—my view has not changed—but I believe that the prospect of a national vote would give our country an opportunity to have a serious national conversation about Britain’s relations with the European Union. I welcome that, because I think that for too long the debate has been dominated and, to an extent, distorted by mistrust and by a suspicion that more EU integration means less sovereignty for the United Kingdom.

We need to set the record straight. For those of us who support the European project, this will serve as an opportunity to explain what Parliament and politicians have done in the people’s name over the last 40 years. It will also give us a chance to expose the myths purveyed by those who would have us turn our backs on both our European history and our European future.

It is true that the Europe we joined in 1973 was created on the basis of a vision of a post-war Franco-German elite. It is also true that Schuman, Monnet and de Gaulle himself saw ever-closer union as meaning an eventual federal Europe. But that was another time, and another Europe. The EU of today is markedly different, and the EU of tomorrow will, I believe, be even more so. In the Commission and, to some extent, in the European Parliament, there are those who still see the EU as a centralising project, but in national Parliaments—including this one—and among the peoples of Europe there is no craving for that original centralised model.

Brussels is not Europe, and the people who work there have no monopoly on the European vision. Schuman’s plan was fundamentally about eliminating trouble, anxiety and distrust from a continent ravaged by centuries of conflict. Today, our focus is not on keeping the peace, but on consolidating prosperity. The treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 by just six countries with a combined population of 173 million. By the time the Lisbon treaty came into force, more than half a century later, the Union comprised 27 member states with a combined population of more than half a billion. With Croatia, we are soon to number 28. Enlargement, one of the EU’s greatest success stories, is set to continue, bringing more change to the character and direction of the European project.

As its membership has changed, the EU has embarked on a different path. If we reflect on the way in which European institutions have evolved since that original blueprint, if we look at the aspirations and stated aims of EU member states—all of which want to protect their identities and interests—and if we consider the actions that member states have taken independently, across a wide spectrum of policies, it is clear to us that there is no great craving for the centralising project envisaged by the founding fathers. The proof is all around us.

After 40 years of British membership, there is really no overarching bureaucracy or executive. The Commission and the Council are small in comparison with many national Government administrations. The Commission’s budget is barely 1% of Europe’s GDP. Countries retain sovereignty over many areas that might have been expected to be transferred in a federal system. Member states have their own foreign policies and their own armies, which they can deploy at will, and they do. Member states can choose to opt out of a raft of agreements that they oppose, and they have: that has been proved.

We should not forget, of course, that treaties require the consent of every member state, even if they are supported by the vast majority of the population of the EU. That is an important point. When consent is not given, Europe must go back to the drawing board, and that has been done. In 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected, by referendum, what was then the constitution. In 2008, Ireland rejected the Lisbon treaty in the same way. Did those countries threaten to leave the European Union? No. Did the EU respond by trying to coerce those countries into accepting a treaty that was judged unacceptable by the people? No. What happened was that the countries returned to the negotiating table, and their Governments renegotiated the aspects of the treaties that conflicted with their national interest. They made the case for their concerns to be addressed, and they were.

I think that there is a lesson here. We in the UK have our concerns and suspicions, and the EU has many shortcomings. We are therefore right to push for reform, but these examples show us that the EU is not heading inevitably and inexorably towards some sort of federal superstate, even if some people within the Commission and the European Parliament still harbour that goal. Every country has its own corner to fight, and it has the power to do so. We are far too reluctant to admit this, but the UK has time and again proven itself to be an influential leader in the EU.