Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Richard Shepherd and Dominic Raab

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Raab]

I want to make a few brief comments about the important and, in many respects, symbolic issue that is being raised in the wider context of the Bill.

I think that there are strong principled arguments in favour of judicial oversight in relation to the power of temporary exclusion, especially when it involves a British citizen. A range of points have been made about that, but I want to stress that this is a very strong power. We are talking about the exercise of state power—Executive power—against the citizen. I think that, both in that context and in the broader context, the presumption, or general principle, should be that there ought to be a judicial check. I say that first in the light of basic principles of natural justice, and secondly because the focused, efficient exercise of state power requires checks and balances. The House of Commons is one of those checks on state power, and the courts are another.

I do not think that judicial oversight would weaken the exercise of that power; I think that it would strengthen it, because it would prevent arbitrary abuse. It would ensure that the power was exercised against the crazed fanatic rather than the misguided youth who finds himself wrapped up in some business of which, on reflection, he genuinely wants no part, let alone mistaken cases involving the genuinely innocent. We know from the exercise of state power, particularly under recent counter-terrorism legislation, that there is a risk of innocent people becoming wrapped up in cases. We do not think that the Secretary of State or other Ministers act from any sense of bad faith, but, given the accumulation of state and Executive power, the broader that power becomes in the absence of checks and balances, the more likely it is that innocent people will be caught up in the net. That is my first principled argument.

My second argument is that there have been a number of objections to judicial consideration of the exercise of the power by the Secretary of State. It has been suggested that it may be an emergency power and that the courts are too slow. I think that it is the other way round. If British jihadis come back to this country after being up to no good in Syria, or wherever they may have been, it is hardly an emergency power. A wider argument could be that we are locking the stable door after the horse has bolted, but it is certainly not an emergency power in that sense, although of course we want to keep track of the individuals who are returning home.

I do not buy the argument that the courts would be too slow. In practical terms, of course, the individual could be barred from returning until the court had given due consideration to the application by either the Secretary of State or the individual concerned. I do not entirely understand either the public safety argument or the emergency argument against some form of judicial oversight.

The second point has been made about judicial review, but that is clearly about process rather than the substance relating to an individual case. Notwithstanding the proliferation of judicial review claims—which the Government are rightly trying to curtail—I do not think that judicial review will provide an adequate judicial check on the exercise of state power of this nature, given how intrusive it is in relation to the rights of the individual citizen.

Let me make one broader contextual point about the power and the amendments. Hundreds of British jihadis are coming home from abroad following some form of involvement in foreign conflicts and thousands of individuals are under the radar of M15. However, according to the Home Office’s annual update, released in March 2014, the number of people convicted of terrorism offences under terrorism legislation, or wider legislation, dropped from what was a pretty meagre 54 in 2006-07 to 27 in 20013-14.

The real hole in the Bill is the gaping gap in our ability to enforce the law, and that is true of successive Governments across the board. We have a huge, broad criminal base, and we have very wide powers, but what is missing from the Bill, and, to some extent, from in the debate, is a reference to measures—not necessarily legislative to improve law enforcement. We seem constantly to legislate, although not necessarily hyperactively: I think that a great deal of consideration has gone into the Bill. The elephant in the room is our inability to enforce the laws that we already have. I do not subscribe to the view that there is a zero-sum game between liberty and security. The justice system is a powerful tool in the fight against terror and should not always be viewed as some sort of heavy, onerous baggage that is weighing us down.

I hope that the Minister’s clarification of the compromise changes that are likely to be forthcoming in the Lords will be sufficient to enable me either to abstain or to vote with the Government if the new clause is pushed to a vote.

[Sir Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

I greatly appreciate the speech that we have just heard. It reflects many views that I have held for a very long time. The fear that I express about the current provisions of the Bill is not a criticism of the Ministers who introduced them, but it echoes some of the comments that have just been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab).

When we undergo the whole process of facing the state as individuals, we are at a great disadvantage. I would not know which of our celebrated barristers was the effective one; I would not know how to protect myself adequately; I might not speak the language properly; I might not entirely understand the customs of the country in which I live. But what we are looking at in the Bill is surely beyond the exigencies of this moment. How is it that we reconcile our people, of all origins and all faiths? How is it that this land returns to the one that in my fictional memory was a happy, secure, less threatening place than it appears today?

I have a fear about the Bill and in particular about not allowing our traditional processes of proper judicial supervision or not being able, through the courts, to look at whether or not something is reasonable. It is that, in our fear for our own people, for those who were born here, we undermine the concept of allegiance and loyalty to the Crown and, more importantly, to our fellow citizens and our own country. That is why I am very cautious.

The power of the state grows greater; I hear echoes of that. It is true. In exigencies and times of threat and worry, we demand more and more of the compulsion of the state to answer our problems, but as has been pointed out, we have had more and more legislation on these difficult areas. A barrister may not know what their client is accused of. Secret courts have come into existence. All that is a modern feature.

During the second world war, we had the defence of the realm Acts. We are not there yet, but this is a compulsive process. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh)—Gainsborough, what a wonderful name—seems to think that the rule of law is just what the public want. I am a democrat and I believe that we exercise the right, and will do so shortly again, to determine where these fundamental decisions are made and who makes them. People say, “But the public demand,” but is it not the duty of the House to reflect on whether the outcome of that demand is the appropriate response? All I am asking in support of those who support the amendment is, should we not stand up for the processes in which we have trust, or had trust, and should we not be very cautious in the actions we take?