Arms to Syria

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

Given that the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Leader of the House have given firm pledges about having a vote before arming any rebels, the motion is somewhat academic. With everything that is going on in the middle east at present, I mean no disrespect to the Minister when I say that I regret that we are not having a wider debate on the middle east, possibly with the Foreign Secretary replying.

The concern arose when the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary said yesterday said that there was possibility that they would have to act without having time for the House to express an opinion. I think that that is not an unreasonable position, and I for one trust the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to make the right decision if they find themselves in those circumstances.

[Mr Baron]

May I respectfully suggest that my hon. Friend could not be further from the truth when he says that this is an academic debate? Quite the opposite. There is a clear showing that the Government have moved some way since we first discovered that they were lobbying for the arms embargo to be lifted. No assurance was given in the early days, as illustrated by the fact that there were media exchanges where proponents of arming the rebels were clearly making the point on the Governments behalf that they were not confined by a vote in this place. This debate, plus the efforts of parliamentarians on both sides, have been useful in getting clarity from those on the Front Bench.

[Richard Ottaway]

I have no wish to quarrel with my hon. Friend. What I was saying was that the motion was academic. The debate is very important. On his second point, the words that the Foreign Secretary used yesterday were almost identical to the original words used by the Prime Minister.

A number of criteria must be met before we intervene in these situations. We must be clear that the situation has been properly thought through. The first criterion should be that we should not intervene unless it makes a difference to the lives, prosperity and security of the Syrian people. When we examine that closely, it is a hard ask. It is increasingly unlikely that we will move to a situation where President Assad is forced out. He has the support of Iran and Hezbollah and Russia, who are using as a justification for their support for Assad their concern over the interpretation of the Libya resolution. They argue that there was a generous interpretation of that resolution and the bombing campaign went too far. I see that as a diplomatic excuse on their part. The Russians are concerned for two primary reasons. One is that, with an eye to Chechnya and the Muslims at their back door, they do not wish to offend their Muslim community and they do not want to lose their port on the Mediterranean.

The second criterion that must be met is that we ask ourselves whether we have exhausted all diplomatic solutions. Hopes must rest on the Geneva conference but optimism is fading. The earliest that the conference will take place is in September. I agree with others when I say that I believe Iran should be present at such a conference. I wish the Secretary of State for the United States and Mr Lavrov on behalf of the Russians well in trying to set an agenda. The most likely outcome is a rehash of the Annan plan and that President Assad will stay in office. That may turn out to be the least bad option.

On this point, I detect that the Government have changed their position. At the outset it was a precondition that President Assad should go. Of late, speeches by the Foreign Secretary and the Minister in the House of Lords have dropped that requirement. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm when he winds up whether it is a pre-condition that Assad should go as part of any negotiated settlement, or whether he accepts that we may yet have to work with him.

Thirdly, we have to ask ourselves whether there are military operations that we can sensibly undertake that will make a difference. The region is in turmoil. It is no longer the regime versus the rebels. The rebels are split into good rebels and bad rebels. Chemical weapons have clearly been used, although it is not clear by whom. The concern now, and it may well be the reason why the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary set out the option to take action without consulting the House, is that those chemicals stocks may fall to the rebels. I would be grateful if the Minister, in his winding-up speech, could confirm his assessment of the risk set out by the Intelligence and Security Committee the other day and what steps he will be taking if there is a threat that they may fall into the wrong hands.

On the military side, where do we go from here? I for one do not think that throwing a few cases of rifles into the rebels’ hands will make a difference. As many have pointed out, the Saudis and Qataris are already supplying a large number of weapons. If we supply more sophisticated weapons, that will produce a response from Russia, which has pledged to match like for like. However—this is important—it might be the only way we can bring Assad to the negotiating table, so to that extent I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).

[Andrew Bridgen]

My hon. Friend is making his points with great passion. I recently saw an interview with a very reasonable gentleman who lives with his family in Damascus. He made the point that although he was no fan of Assad, if the rebels win, his wife will probably have to take the veil and his daughters will not longer be able to go to school. He felt that his country would go back 100 years. What is my hon. Friend’s view of that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Ottaway]

I think that is a slightly exaggerated view, but no doubt there is a risk that women will be intimidated in a fundamentalist Islamic society.

To return to my point about bringing Assad to the negotiating table, I am beginning to agree with the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes)—I am afraid that I must disagree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington—that some form of no-fly zone might yet turn out to be the only credible solution, and it would address the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay about weapons falling into the wrong hands. We have to ask ourselves whether that is possible with a sophisticated air defence system. If it does happen, it should be on an international basis. Why must we always look to the west for solutions? Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Turkey all have perfectly good air forces, and there is a case for an international coalition.

The fourth criterion that must be considered is whether we are prepared for the long term. We have learned many lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan and much needs to be done to stabilise the region. The fifth criterion is this: exactly what is our national interest? That must be spelt out before any intervention. If chemical weapons are to be used as a justification for an intervention—I have made this point to the Minister before—the House should be shown the evidence about their use. All options must be on the table, which is why I am uncomfortable about the motion, because in truth they are not.

Finally, where has international law gone? I believe that there is more than a grain of truth in the remarks my hon. Friend made a moment ago when he argued that to intervene would be illegal. I am not convinced about the legality of an intervention. The intervention in Libya was legal because it followed a UN Security Council resolution. Taking sides in what is essentially a civil war has no legal precedent and no legal authority. Whatever the outcome of this situation, the United Nations must seriously reassess the basis of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

Well, I do not believe so. Let me comment on something that is at the nub of this: the long shadow of Iraq. I am convinced that when this Government took office we were very well aware of the deficiency in trust felt in the nation on account of that. My sense is that, particularly in respect of the area my portfolio covers, in the last two or three years both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have repeatedly updated the House on circumstances as they have arisen. They have been very conscientious in doing that. The National Security Council was created precisely to try to find a structure that could address the concerns about foreign policy decisions that people had felt in the past. I believe that right from the beginning as the UK considered all its options—and I repeat, despite whatever I have said, that all options remain on the table—both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have been very keen to ensure that the House has been engaged, because ultimately this is an issue of trust.

That leads me on to the point made by the right hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Sir Andrew Stunell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) about the possibility of something being sneaked through in the recess. The hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) also talked about that. The whole point of what the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have been doing has been to generate trust in the House. If the Government were to do something and then seek retrospective support in respect of an issue where Members felt we should have come before the House in advance, that trust would be broken, which would run contrary to what the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister wish to convey. It may still be the case, of course, that emergencies arise that require the Head of Government to have the flexibility to make decisions in the national interest, as the House would expect, and the debate on Iran some time ago indicated that no hands should be bound. The clear intention of what I am saying and what the Foreign Secretary has sought to do, however, is that the Government want to keep the confidence of the House by going this extra step. So there is no question of our trying to use the recess or another opportunity to do something, because we would then have to come back to the House—and what would be the House’s reaction? I have tried to make clear the intention on which the Government are determined to act.

In the brief time available, I wish to cover one or two more of the questions raised, including those about Geneva and President Assad put by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas), who spoke for the Opposition. I know that you are very generous to us, Mr Speaker, so if I stray for one minute, having taken an intervention, I hope you will kindly let me do so.

My hon. Friend the Member for High Peak (Andrew Bingham) said that many people were asking what is in our national interest. Importantly, whether a decision is made to arm or not, there is a UK interest that needs to be considered. Let us make no mistake: whether we continue on our current course or do something different, we are involved. As a permanent member of the Security Council, we have an interest in promoting peace in the most conflict-ridden areas. It is to the discredit of the international community that that has not been possible, but that has not been due to any sparing of effort on our part at the United Nations. The conflict has been spilling over into neighbouring areas, as we have seen with Hezbollah and Lebanon. As my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Newmark) said, if empty space is used, that is where a threat to and an attack on the United Kingdom can come from. We know that people are going out there to be radicalised, and that will come back to bite us as well. Whatever is done—whatever decision is taken—nobody in this House can escape the fact that there is British interest in Syria. Accordingly, our main interest is in closing this down and ending the conflict. This is not a plea from me to arm; I am saying that unless the conflict is ended, British interests will continue to be further damaged.

Iran clearly has an interest in this. It did not accept Geneva I. Who knows what is possible, but Iran’s interest is noted and is there. The removal of Assad is not so much a precondition from the United Kingdom; this is not the UK’s involvement in negotiations. It was clear from the beginning that this issue is difficult for an opposition that is being killed daily by Assad’s regime, but the practicalities now are that there are no preconditions if people can get to a position to negotiate that we want.

[Richard Ottaway]

Will the Minister clarify that? If a negotiated settlement comes out of Geneva, does he accept that it may result in President Assad staying in office?

[Alistair Burt]

The point I want to make is that if a negotiated solution emerges, it will have been negotiated by representatives of the Syrian National Coalition. I think that, in a way, it is their call; it is not for us to say. The reason we take the view that Assad’s legitimacy is gone is plain from the facts, but the United Kingdom is not involved in setting preconditions for the negotiations; that is for the parties involved.

I want to correct one misconception that has been abroad: that all the opposition is the same and we are allied with people we have seen performing extremist acts and acts of the greatest brutality. That is not the case. On 20 April, the Syrian National Coalition declared its commitment to democracy, ethnic and religious pluralism, and the rule of law, and it rejected discrimination and extremism. It also declared that it would guard against the proliferation of any supplied lethal equipment and would return such equipment at the end of the conflict, and confirmed that the supreme military council operates under the civilian authority of the coalition.

As for whether each side is as bad as the other, we condemn human rights abuses perpetrated by anyone involved in the violence in Syria, but we note that the last report by the UN commission of inquiry on Syria, published on 4 June, said that although there was evidence of human rights abuses committed by the opposition, those

“did not…reach the intensity and scale of those committed by Government forces and affiliated militia.”

There is no equivalence.

My final point is that if colleagues here are to get us to the position we all want to get to—a negotiated peace—they would do well to consider the graphic description by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) of why that might not happening at the moment. No matter what we decide to do in the future, I suspect that his remarks, and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree, should be taken in by everybody here as we go forward and take the difficult decisions we have to take. This is not easy—there is more than one side to the question—but the arguments raised by my two colleagues will take some consideration by all of us.