Health Service Medical Supplies (Costs) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebatePhilippa Whitford
Main Page: Philippa Whitford (Scottish National Party - Central Ayrshire)Department Debates - View all Philippa Whitford's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe Department of Health receives income from a number of different sources. It mostly deals with expenditure but also receives income from activities conducted through the NHS. One source of income is the rebate through these schemes, which forms part of the funding available to the Department. We have committed that funds available out of the scheme will go into the NHS. The hon. Gentleman raised the issue of the £10 billion. I gently remind him that, in 2014-15, the funds available to the NHS from the Department of Health were £98.1 billion, and by 2021 that figure will be £119.9 billion, which in cash terms is a £20 billion increase and in real terms is a £10 billion increase.
As the hon. Member for Burnley said, the system functions quite differently in Scotland. We have a new medicines and rare diseases fund, rather than a cancer drugs fund, which means that the use of funding to access new medicines is not limited to one cohort of patients. Our fund is £90 million, which, given that we are less than 10% of the UK population, means it is proportionately almost three times the size of the cancer drugs fund. As was mentioned, this is very much funded by the PPRS. It is committed to that. The pharmaceutical industry expects the rebates to be used to enable access to new medicines. One problem here is that the rebate goes into base funding, which means it disappears like water in the sand.
We have so many debates in this House about patients who are struggling to access new treatments. Amendment 46 talks about innovation and research, which we support in Scotland. We are quite a research-oriented country. Our research funding to our universities is 30% higher, in proportion to our population. The NHS in Scotland commissions research, particularly on things like informatics and data management around health and social care, which are the big challenges we face in the future.
The Scottish Medicines Consortium, which makes our decisions in the same way as NICE, was reformed in 2013. Since then, we have had a 40% increase in drugs being passed. What we see in England is that even if a drug is passed at the level of NICE, it sometimes does not come into use in the NHS, because the funding is simply not earmarked to make it available.
I do not have complete recollection of what the Secretary of State said, but he may have been referring to things such as the over-prescription of antibiotics, which we know is a problem globally. A great deal of work is being undertaken right across the NHS and with other health bodies around the world to reduce the scale of antibiotic prescription.
Is it not the case, however, that we seem to be developing this additional rationing system between NICE and patients of the NHS? I am talking about NICE’s recommendations being accepted but not funded. The hepatitis C drugs are basically being rationed to a certain number of patients per month, even though they have been passed by NICE and trying to eliminate the viral load in the community can be more effective in the long term.
Inevitably, some decisions have to be taken when introducing new drugs as to the extent to which they are applicable. Those are clinically-led decisions. There is not a completely bottomless funding pot for the prescription of medicine, so those decisions have to be taken by ordinary clinicians within their practices and within the infrastructure of approvals, which is entirely independent and led by NICE in England.
With respect to the Minister, that is not what I am hearing from clinicians who work in the field of HIV and hepatitis C. They are being told, “You can have”—for example—“50 patients a month,” and they are having to pick who gets the drugs and who does not.
I will not be drawn into the detail on a specific drug, because the hon. Lady may have access to information that I do not, but in relation to hepatitis C, as she has raised it, there has been a discussion between the trust and NICE. As I understand it, the trust is continuing to work with NHS England collaboratively to discuss the issue of access to the new hepatitis C drugs. We will always have some discussions about applicability when a new treatment is introduced, to see whether it is appropriate for all conditions; it may be that only some benefit from the drug. I think that that is as far as I can go on this issue.
To return to the Government’s view of the amendment, we are concerned that it would in effect circumvent the critical system of checks and balances around clinicians’ prescribing freedoms. That would present a danger to patients and the sustainability of the NHS. It is also not the purpose of the Bill to address matters other than the cost of medicines and medical supplies.
Treatments that do not demonstrate efficacy, safety and value for money should not be routinely available on the NHS. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, an internationally respected organisation that provides evidence-based guidance to the NHS, ensures that the treatments recommended for patients deliver value for money and improved patient outcomes. NICE’s recommendations are developed free from political interference and help NHS organisations to design services that are in line with the best available evidence and that meet the needs of their local populations.
Then I will continue.
Certain companies appear to have made it their business model to buy the marketing authorisations for medicines without any patents outstanding. They then de-brand the medicines and abuse the existing freedom of pricing for unbranded generic medicines. Although the practice is not widespread, it must be addressed, which is the reason for the clause.
Currently, our only recourse is to refer such cases to the Competition and Markets Authority, as I mentioned. When the CMA investigates, we must wait for the outcome, and in the meantime the NHS continues to have to pay high prices. The Department consulted on the issue as part of the consultation on the statutory scheme that was launched in December 2015. The Department has been working closely with the Competition and Markets Authority and has referred cases to it. The CMA is about to issue a decision in a case on a high-priced unbranded generic medicine. As I have just said, it has also recently opened another investigation.
The powers under section 262 of the 2006 Act to limit prices of health service medicines can be exercised through directions or regulations. The Government’s intent is to work with directions, which will enable us to limit the price of a specific medicine from a specific manufacturer. The Government are obliged to consult the industry representative body when we want to direct the price of a medicine. In the case of high-priced generics it would be the representative body of the unbranded industry—currently the British Generic Manufacturers Association, which appeared before the Committee last week.
The Government would of course also engage with the company involved before issuing a direction that limited the price of a medicine. As I have indicated, there may be good reasons for a price increase, and it is important that the Government understand the reason behind a price increase before issuing a direction. As I said, the new information powers will help us with that.
My officials have initiated talks with the unbranded generic medicines industry representative body and the CMA to explore how in practice we would determine what should be considered a reasonable price. Any decision by the CMA in the cases that I highlighted earlier could help set a useful precedent. I can reassure the Committee that companies charging unreasonably high prices for unbranded generic medicines is not a common practice. The Government do not intend to use the power where competition in the market for unbranded generic medicines is working. However, the Government need the right legislative tool to be able to address unreasonably high prices of unbranded generic medicines. The clause will give us that tool, and I ask the Committee to agree to it.
Basically, we welcome the measures in clause 2 to try to close the specific loophole whereby companies that are part of the PPRS voluntary scheme and that also produce generic medicines are able to increase the prices of generic medicines. However, the Minister talked about the British Generic Manufacturers Association—largely companies that focus on generic medicines—which would be more to do with clause 3. My understanding is that the change will close the specific loophole relating to large pharmaceutical companies that also produce generic medicines, rather than companies that focus only on generic medicines, which we will come on to in clause 3. We welcome the closing of that loophole, but those two things are quite different and we should therefore not conflate them. It is not the competition authority that would tackle them. That is much more related to purely generic companies.
We will obviously come on to clause 3 shortly. The primary intent behind clause 3 is to modernise the statutory scheme, rather than to address the difference between one type of company that produces only generics and another that produces generics and branded medicines. I am not sure that I agree with the hon. Lady’s distinction.
My point is just that what the Minister has described applies more to clause 3, on companies that produce purely generic medicines, so the attempt would be to strengthen the statutory scheme that they might be part of. It is the production of generics by the group of companies under the PPRS scheme, the big pharmaceutical companies, that is getting under the wire. That is covered by clause 2(2). The Minister was talking about the Competition and Markets Authority and the British Generic Manufacturers Association, and I think clause 3 is more relevant to that. Clause 2 is more of a surgical change, which we absolutely support.
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 3, page 2, line 27, at end insert—
‘(2A) An amount calculated under subsection (2) may only be calculated using the same methodology as an amount payable by any member of a scheme made under Section 261 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (voluntary schemes for controlling the cost of health service medicines) is calculated.”
We support clause 3 in principle and the amendment aims to clarify that. Under the current system, following the National Health Service Act 2006, two schemes operate to control prices of medicines: the statutory scheme and the PPRS voluntary scheme. It is important to align those two schemes, because since 2014 there has been a significant movement of companies deciding to shift from the PPRS scheme to the statutory scheme to reduce the level of rebate payable. That has reduced savings to the NHS, so it requires urgent revision.
We agree with the principles of the Bill on ensuring that both schemes achieve the same level of savings and that the system is not open to abuse. We are concerned, however, that the Bill is not specific about how payments would be calculated under the statutory scheme. We agree with the Secretary of State that the purpose of the Bill is to clarify and modernise provisions to control the cost of health service medicines.
The amendment seeks to clarify beyond doubt that the Bill is in line with the stated aim of achieving equivalence between the two price-control schemes, by ensuring that under the statutory scheme members' rebates are calculated using the same methodology as for PPRS members. We commend the amendment, but will not push it to a Division. I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments.
One issue arises because the statutory scheme was based on prices in December 2013. The further on in time we are, the less proportional the return. Whether it is the same or a similar mechanism, we should avoid having a price rebate to the NHS stuck in time, which might be five years ago, and does not reflect the actual costs of the drugs.
The voluntary schemes are introduced and refreshed every five years. The current scheme was negotiated in 2014, so we are two years into that. One reason for having a time limit on the scheme, from the Government and NHS perspective, is that companies like to find ways during the course of time to adjust their commercial behaviour for their benefit. Having the opportunity to renegotiate the voluntary scheme every few years enables us to try to avoid the circumstances referred to by the hon. Lady.
If I could clarify, the voluntary scheme runs for five years but what I was talking about, with regard to clause 3, is the statutory scheme and the price rebate related to a requirement for a percentage reduction from the price in December 2013. That is how the rebate in the statutory scheme is defined. The further one gets away from that date point, the less one gains. It is the statutory scheme I am talking about rather than the voluntary one.
My understanding is that under the statutory scheme, the percentage applies based on sales achieved in the previous year. Therefore, the percentage reduction that we seek for the statutory scheme can be adjusted year by year. That is the intent of what we seek to do. I will seek further inspiration to ensure that I have exactly addressed the point that the hon. Lady makes.
Amendment 43 would have the effect of linking the payment mechanisms of the statutory and voluntary schemes. I understand why that might appear a desirable objective, so I understand the intention behind the amendment. We think there is merit in aligning the two schemes in some respects. However, to require them to be the same is inappropriate, because it removes some flexibility that the Government have, and from which the NHS benefits, in being able to negotiate the voluntary scheme on a periodic basis. The voluntary scheme has other aspects beyond pure price. Aligning the two in what will become a statutory scheme would restrict the scope for the two schemes to operate in a complementary manner.
The voluntary scheme is a matter for negotiation with industry on a periodic basis. As such, there is scope to include a range of measures. Those measures may change with each iteration of the scheme, to reflect the priorities of each side at the time of renegotiation. To illustrate that, the current voluntary scheme includes a range of provisions developed through negotiation with industry that sit alongside the payment mechanism. That includes price modulation, which enables companies to put prices up and down as long as the overall effect across their portfolio is neutral. That may have benefits for them, not only for their sales to the NHS but in the pricing references used by selling to the NHS in jurisdictions in other countries. That is of potential commercial value to companies, which may be willing to accept a higher payment percentage as a result—in other words, a higher discount to the NHS.
There are also provisions on the uptake of new medicines by the NHS, such as making NICE-approved medicines available within 90 days of a NICE decision. We are keen to encourage that. By contrast, the statutory scheme is intended to be a more straightforward approach. As such, the payment percentage applied may be slightly different from that applied to any voluntary scheme, in order to achieve a broadly similar level of savings once all elements of the schemes are taken into account.
As we heard in oral evidence last week, the freedom to negotiate the voluntary scheme is greatly valued by both industry and Government. We intend that any future voluntary scheme should be established through such negotiation, but linking the payment mechanisms would inevitably restrict that flexibility and freedom for both sides. In addition, while the Government welcome the collaborative approach of a voluntary scheme, we cannot guarantee that Government will always want two schemes in future. The amendment would constrain the Government’s discretion to run a single scheme if they and the House thought it best to do so. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Burnley to withdraw her amendment.
The clause amends the provisions relating to statutory schemes in section 263 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which describes the purposes for which the Secretary of State can make statutory schemes. The amendments make it clear that a statutory scheme may require companies to make payments to the Government, based on their health service sales. For those companies not in the voluntary scheme, the Government operate a statutory scheme. That is currently based on a cut to the list price of products, rather than a payment mechanism on company sales, as in the voluntary scheme. The cut to the list price has delivered fewer savings to date than the payment mechanism under the voluntary scheme.
That was the point I was trying to make earlier. One is a percentage return on sales and profits, and the other is a cut in price. The further we are from the time set, which was December 2013, the less value we have from that in proportion to current prices.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that clear to the Committee. The different approaches to price control between the voluntary and statutory schemes have led to some companies making commercial decisions to divest products from the voluntary scheme and sell them through the statutory scheme, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the voluntary scheme and savings to the NHS. The introduction of a payment mechanism in the statutory scheme would save the health services across the UK an estimated £90 million a year, as set out in the impact assessment.
In response to the Government’s consultation on introducing a payment mechanism in the statutory scheme, the pharmaceutical industry queried whether the Government had the powers to introduce a statutory payment system. The clause clarifies the existing powers to make it clear that the Government have the power to introduce a payment mechanism in the statutory scheme. The ability to make the statutory scheme by way of regulations rather than setting out the detail in primary legislation provides us with the flexibility to respond to changes in the wider economy, the medicines market and patient needs. We have provided illustrative regulations to support scrutiny of this delegated power.
The clause makes a further amendment to section 263 of the National Health Service Act 2006. Currently, the power to make a statutory scheme cannot be applied to members of a voluntary scheme, which means that if the Government introduced a statutory scheme for unbranded generic medicines—although we have no current plans to do so—we would be unable to apply the scheme to manufacturers of unbranded generic medicines that have a mixed portfolio of branded and unbranded generic medicines, and are members of the voluntary scheme. The clause therefore amends the Act in such a way that the power to make a statutory scheme cannot be applied to products covered by the voluntary scheme rather than member companies of the voluntary schemes.
The Government’s view is that, for the most part, competition works well to keep down the price of unbranded generic medicines. Should that situation change, this amendment would enable the Government to use their clause 2 powers to take action beyond individual products or companies. I hope that is clear to the Committee. If so, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 3 should stand part of the Bill.
No, I mean the Home Secretary.
We believe that competition is the best way to drive prices of medicines down for the NHS, and generally speaking that works well. In the case of the specific unbranded generics where there is a single supplier, we have seen that there is an opportunity for market abuse, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire that the clauses are designed to use the device of price controls to avoid excess profit abuse by individuals in British companies, which we have seen.
I gently remind the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West that successive Governments since 1957, including the Government whom he proudly supported for many years, had price controls in place for the cost of medicines.
The Minister was obviously not happy with the amendment on aligning the two schemes, but he talks about a mechanism of price control under clause 4. Will he give us even the broad principle of what he thinks the price control mechanism in the statutory scheme will be?
To clarify, therefore will the situation continue to be that the statutory scheme is based on a price reduction as opposed to a percentage above a mark being returned to the NHS, as in the voluntary scheme? Will it be a similar mechanism to what we have today?
I believe that that is the case, but if I have misunderstood the hon. Lady’s question I shall clarify that later in the sitting, if I may. Our intention is to consult on the matter, so the precise mechanism has not yet been finalised; hence there is some uncertainty.
I can help the hon. Gentleman directly with a specific example. The Secretary of State already has those powers under the 2006 Act, which the hon. Gentleman’s Government enacted.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Control of maximum price of other medical supplies
I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 5, page 3, line 39, at end insert—
‘(7) Before making regulations under Clause 5 the Secretary of State must conduct a consultation on the potential effect of this clause on the maintenance of quality of those medical supplies, and seek representations from manufactures, suppliers and distributors of medical supplies as part of the consultation.”.
This is a probing amendment on an issue of concern. The Secretary of State has obviously had powers since 2006, and perhaps earlier, to seek to control the price of medical supplies. That power has not really been utilised, and neither have the informatics of that. When controlling the price of drugs, the quality of those drugs is controlled by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency so that pushing down the price does not result in loss of quality.
My concern is that, beyond a kitemark or a CE mark, we do not have anything in the United Kingdom that controls quality, particularly of consumables such as swabs and gloves. As a surgeon for 30-odd years, I can tell the Committee that the range in quality of things such as surgical gloves can be immense. A surgeon might use two or three pairs of gloves during an operation. If there is a leak in those gloves that is not visible, it might be only when the surgeon washes their hands afterwards that they see they have blood on their finger, which means that staff are exposed to blood contamination. Poor-quality swabs might result in thread or fluff coming off inside a patient, which can contribute to sepsis. There is no quality controller specific to medical supplies, so if we just drive down the price, we may drive down the quality.
We use a lot of central procurement in Scotland, and NHS National Procurement has helped us to control our prices for everything from consumables through to major machine purchases, which is already saving money for the NHS in Scotland. If there were a reduction in quality, our concern is that it would be UK-wide. It would be something that producers were doing, which would in turn undermine what the devolved Government were trying to do. Procurement remains devolved, but if the quality started to drop overall, that would affect all the devolved health services, as well as NHS England.
The amendment calls for consultation and for consideration of some form of quality regulation or control that would mean those items having to be way above the very basic CE level, at a point considered high enough quality for NHS use.
Rather unusually, I start by thanking the hon. Lady for proposing the amendment. She has raised an issue for which we have considerable sympathy. She touched on the way in which medical products are procured in Scotland. I can confirm that we are looking to introduce more centralised purchasing across the NHS under the efficiency proposals made by Lord Carter in the other place. One of the areas of focus was the variability, in purchasing terms, of standard commodity items. She mentioned surgical gloves—I will not go into detail on those with her, because she has obviously used them considerably more than I can conceive of and is therefore very experienced when it comes to the variability not just in price but in quality of such commodity products. We are looking to introduce closer central purchasing—I think 12 items are currently being trialled or introduced in parts of NHS England.
We recognise that, as currently drafted, the Bill does not explicitly state in relation to section 260 that the Government are obliged to consult industry. I am aware that the 2006 Act, in relation to controlling the cost of medicines, does explicitly state that there is an obligation on the Government to consult. The hon. Lady’s amendment is appropriate in its intent. I invite her to withdraw it at this stage, but I undertake to work with her. My officials will consider how to amend the amendment to give it the effect that she seeks, but in a way that works in the context of the Bill. There are technical drafting issues with the amendment that mean that it would give us some unintended difficulties. That is the Government’s position on the amendment; I hope she is happy with that.
The hon. Lady referred to the effect of any pricing controls for medical supplies on the maintenance of those products’ quality. I can assure the Committee that the Government will take into account all relevant factors, including any concerns raised by industry about the quality of medical supplies, when making and consulting on price controls if they were to apply to medical supplies. The Government would not be in favour of putting any of those many factors in the Bill, because it may unnecessarily constrain the conduct of future Governments or the NHS.
If there is a move to more central procurement, will the Minister consider some form of quality control regulation or power at that point, so that central procurement is not just driven to accept the lowest price and there is some safety mechanism, in the same way we have the MHRA for drugs?
We will consult with industry on the impact of the Bill on medical supplies. Although I am not going to give the hon. Lady an absolute assurance that we can introduce a threshold for quality, which is quite hard to prescribe given the immense variety of supplies we are talking about, there is a clear intent that, if we are centralising procurement of equipment, that equipment has to meet a quality threshold in order to be acceptable to the clinician. I understand the point she makes. The intent is not to buy substandard equipment to treat patients, but to remove variability in pricing for the same equipment depending on different purchasers, which is inappropriate and means effectively the taxpayer is the funder of all these different entities.
Yes, I think that is the correct answer. We do have those powers under the 2006 Act, but they have not been used, partly because generally speaking medical supplies is a competitive market. We have not seen the kind of abusive price behaviour that we are trying to address elsewhere in the Bill.
I would like to clarify the reason for introducing this, if there has not been a problem in the market, as we have seen with the price hikes in generics, and it is much harder to do. Why are the Government extending a power they have had for 10 years but never used?
In essence, we are trying to bring the regimes for medical supplies and drugs into the same environment, so that we are able in future to use the powers, which we are introducing for the first time for drugs, for medical supplies on the same basis, so that we do not have to treat one thing under one Act and the other under another. I hope that is clear.
I am not aware of any particular examples of medical supplies that we are concerned about at this point. However, I am sure that, if there are people outside watching who have good examples, they will let the Committee know before we conclude our deliberations.
Reverting to the hon. Lady’s amendment 47, we understand the intent behind it. We are not fully convinced that the current drafting would have precisely the effect that she is hoping. I invite her to work with me and my officials between now and Report. The Government will be happy to consider how we could best introduce the requirement to consult in relation to section 260. On that basis, I invite her to withdraw the amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 amends section 260 of the 2006 Act, which enables the Secretary of State to control the maximum prices of medical supplies other than health service medicines. As we have just discussed, the Government have powers to control prices of medical supplies and we are not currently using those powers. It is important that we continue to have those powers, should we decide it is necessary to control prices of medical supplies in the event of market abuse.
With an increasing spend on healthcare products, the Government need the tools to be able to control prices, if there is any indication that medical suppliers do not provide value for money to the NHS and the taxpayer. The measures would ensure that the same enforcement and territorial extent provisions apply to controlling the cost of medical supplies and health service medicines.
Existing enforcement provisions in relation to medical supplies are draconian compared with those for medicines. Currently, a contravention or a failure to comply is in fact a criminal offence in relation to medical supplies, whereas it is not in relation to medicines. We are aligning the enforcement provisions to those for medicines and making them much more proportionate. That is done through clause 7, through consequential amendments. On that basis, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 5 stand part of the Bill.