Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Peter Luff and Julian Huppert

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

They just don’t get it, do they? We do not wish to have that capability gap, but were forced to take additional risks in the defence budget because of the mess we inherited from the Labour party. I regret that and do not welcome it, but it is a risk that we have to take.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

4. What assessment he has made of the implications for his Department’s policies of proposals for further regulation of the international trade in arms; and if he will make a statement.

Trident

Debate between Peter Luff and Julian Huppert

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

I genuinely congratulate the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) on securing this debate.

In recent weeks, there has been quite a lot of commentary on the replacement submarine programme for Britain's independent nuclear deterrent system, often referred to as the Trident programme. Much of it was incorrect, so I welcome the opportunity to discuss the matter. I doubt whether I shall reassure the hon. Lady on every question, as there is disagreement between us on the principles involved, but I have some good news and some clarification.

Before dealing with the scrutiny of the successor systems to our current nuclear deterrent, and for the avoidance of any doubt—I answer also the points raised by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)—let me be clear about the Government’s policy on the nuclear deterrent. The first duty of any Government is to ensure the security of the people. The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security, and has done so for more than 50 years.

The argument is often made that, because there is no immediate threat to the UK, there is no need to replace the current deterrent system; however, if history has taught us anything it is that predicting future events is difficult. We do not know how the international environment will change over the next 50 years. For example, how many people predicted the current speed and the scale of change in north Africa?

[Dr Huppert]

Will the Minister give way?

[Peter Luff]

I shall not give way. I have some important points to answer, and I do not have time to take interventions—except, of course, from the hon. Lady.

We cannot be certain that no existential threat to the UK will ever emerge. As a result, we cannot unilaterally do away with this ultimate insurance policy. That is not to say that, when the time is right, we will not move away from nuclear weapons. Our long-term goal is to have a world without them, and we will do all that we can to counter proliferation, to make progress on multilateral disarmament, and to build trust and confidence across the globe.

In our strategic defence and security review, we went further than any previous Government in giving assurances to non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation treaty that we would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. As part of that confidence-building initiative, we announced that our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling will reduce from not more than 225 to fewer than 180 by the mid 2020s. In addition, we announced that over the next few years we will cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads on board each deployed submarine from 48 to 40, that we will reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120, and that we will reduce the number of operational missiles carried to no more than eight. None the less, on 9 February, the Prime Minister said:

“I profoundly believe that we should maintain our independent nuclear deterrent. I have looked at all the alternatives over the years, and I am completely convinced that we need a submarine based alternative—a full replacement for Trident—in order to guarantee the ultimate insurance policy for this country. I am in favour of a full replacement for Trident, a continuous at-sea deterrent and making sure that we keep our guard up”—[Official Report, 9 February 2011; Vol. 523, c. 296.]

I take this opportunity on behalf of the House to pay tribute to the professionalism of all those Royal Navy and civilian personnel who answer this country’s call to operate and support this vital national capability on behalf of us all—seven days a week, 365 days a year. Last year, I visited HMS Vanguard and met some of our dedicated service personnel; I was truly impressed by their commitment. It is important that hon. Members should remember that, as we speak, those men are out there somewhere in the oceans at this very moment providing Britain’s and NATO’s ultimate security guarantee. They and their predecessors have so far provided a 42-year unbroken chain of continuous at-sea deterrence, keeping all of us and our allies safe. It is a fact of life that the current class of Vanguard submarines is ageing, yet while the nuclear threat remains we will maintain a nuclear deterrent. That is why we are continuing with a programme to replace the current deterrent.

One theme that has emerged—it emerged in the hon. Lady’s speech today—from those who do not see merit in this policy is that the Government are embarking on a programme of replacing the Trident system by stealth and that Parliament has not had the opportunity to consider the issue. That is simply not true. In 2006, the previous Administration published the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent,” which clearly set out why the UK needed to renew its deterrent system, what options were available and how much they were likely to cost. The conclusions of the White Paper remain as valid today as they were when they were first published. That paper was scrutinised by the House of Commons Defence Committee and was debated in full in July 2007. The House voted by a significant majority to

“take the steps necessary to maintain the UK's minimum strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system.”—[Official Report, 14 March 2007; Vol. 458, c. 298.]

That is exactly what we are doing.

Given the serious economic conditions that we inherited, we decided to commit ourselves to reviewing the Trident replacement programme to ensure that we were spending only the minimum necessary. That is why, in addition to the disarmament measures I have already mentioned, following the value for money review conducted last year, we announced a number of changes to the Trident replacement programme. For the submarine, this included deferring the delivery of the first boat to around 2028 and consequently deferring the main investment decision—or main gate—until 2016. I note the hon. Lady’s call for the publication of the value for money study, but I have to disappoint her. It contains a number of highly classified documents that are not suitable for release. However, all the important conclusions were published in full on page 38, paragraph 3.10 of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

We were also able to announce our intention to work more closely with industry to improve efficiency in the programme. Since that announcement, we have taken huge steps with our three key suppliers—BAE Systems, Babcock and Rolls-Royce—to develop what we now call the submarine enterprise performance programme, which has three key aims: to retain and develop our world-class design, build and support skills, which are essential for delivering the nuclear programme; to realise significant savings by improving our approach to designing, building and supporting these submarines and, by way of example, through the rationalisation of facilities and sharing of resources; and, with industry, to improve our delivery performance. I saw that for myself a few weeks ago when I visited Barrow and Furness with the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), whom I am pleased to see in his place. I was hugely impressed with what I saw and with the dedication of the work force.

The Ministry of Defence, industry and the work force have risen to this challenge, and I have seen a step change in the way in which we are working with industry to ensure that our nuclear programme is delivered successfully. All in all, the decisions we took during the SDSR allowed us to save £1.2 billion and defer a further £2 billion of expenditure over the next 10 years. I can confirm to the hon. Lady that the figures for the total cost of the programme are as quoted in paragraph 3.10 in the SDSR.

“The review has concluded that the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and associated infrastructure”—

the three separate parts of the programme—

“ remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen in 2006 at 2006 prices.”

Therefore, the cost estimate remains valid. However, we did not say that we would do nothing until 2016. As for the reference to the delay of the Astute programme, I have to say that we have learned our lesson the hard way—if one stops doing something it costs a lot to start doing it again. That is the root of the problem and a mistake that we must not make again with its successor.

Let me stress again that we did not say that we would do nothing until 2016. We must be clear about the scale and challenge of this project. A submarine designed to carry the nuclear deterrent ranks with the space shuttle as one of the most complex engineering feats in the world. The submarine has a nuclear reactor; nuclear weapons; steam systems; hydraulic systems; electrical and electronic systems; and computing systems, as well as tactical weapons and sensors. It needs to sustain its crew while remaining submerged and undetected for months on end. It is a tremendous challenge to bring those complex components together, and we have an enormous programme of work to complete if we are successfully to see the delivery of the first boat in around 2028. The first significant milestone in this process is the so called “initial gate” investment point.

At initial gate, we will agree the broad outline design of the submarine and some of the component designs, including the propulsion system, and set out the programme of work we need to complete so that we are ready to start building the first submarine in 2016. We will also agree the amount of material and parts—and for which boats—we will need to buy in advance of the main investment decision, and yes, that will include steel. However, we are not planning to procure any such items for the fourth boat at this point.

The precise value of the steel and the other long-lead items will depend on the final initial gate approval, but it is likely to amount to around £500 million, some way short of the £1 billion that the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) has cited in the past. There is nothing unusual in that; it is normal practice for most large procurement programmes.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Peter Luff and Julian Huppert

Monday 8th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

Mr Speaker, your characteristic generosity has allowed the hon. Gentleman to proceed with his question. I am not sure that a carrier is a vehicle, but never mind—we will let that go. I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and, like him, I wish we could buy three of our own aircraft carriers; he challenged me on this on Monday. We cannot do that, I am afraid, and I think we have adequate arrangements in place to sustain carrier strike in the future.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

3. What his most recent estimate is of his Department’s likely expenditure on Trident replacement in this Parliament.