Defence Spending

Debate between Peter Luff and Dai Havard

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Peter Luff (Mid Worcestershire) (Con)]

As for others who have spoken in this debate, it is likely that this will be my last debate in Parliament. I am glad that it is on defence—the defining purpose of the state and of Parliament. I will seek not to repeat what others have said, but I want to say this. We have no more important role than to keep those who elect us safe from our enemies. This view is not as popular as it was. Elections, we are told, are not won and lost on defence; there are no votes in defence. I am not so sure. If the political establishment is seen to be playing fast and loose with our security, we will all pay a heavy price in further disillusionment and alienation.

The 2% NATO floor or target, to which we are all politically and morally committed, is the minimum that we should spend, yet it is far from safe. I do not generally favour targets for spending of any kind, and I certainly do not favour writing them into law, but the unavoidable truth is that if we are to achieve our current objectives, spending of that order is needed. I understand the scope for increased efficiency in the area of human activity; indeed the increased sophistication of the technology behind military equipment enables us to do more with less, which means that fewer people are needed to deliver the same effect than even a decade ago.

A Type 45 destroyer is considerably more capable than the Type 42 that it replaces and needs a smaller crew. And there are opportunities to do more with less. That is one of the purposes of the UK-French defence relationship. The application of the whole force concept could increase the effect and efficiency of defence. So our debate about national security must not lapse into sentimentality. It is not sentimental to speak up for defence. I want to do so by addressing three things—the financial background, the fact that defence is a long-term game and the threat to essential investment in science and technology.

The Chancellor is right to say that strong defence depends on a strong economy. That is why as a Minister in 2010, I swallowed hard and accepted significant cuts to defence capabilities, even though they led to some very challenging gaps in capability. But for a trading nation like ours, the protection of the sea lanes and the maintenance of an open rules-based trading system are crucial. So a strong economy also depends on strong defence. Prosperity is built on peace. The urgent question to both Front-Bench teams today is this. The funding post-2015 that is needed just to achieve Future Force 2020 is based on a 1% per annum increase in the equipment budget and flat real for the non-equipment budget. That is what the chiefs of staff and Ministers were promised at the time. So will Ministers and shadow Ministers commit today to both the equipment and non-equipment figures that we were promised?

The commitment on the equipment budget made only by my party is welcome. There is a long list of very important capabilities, but it is not enough on its own. The significant cuts that appear to be pencilled in for current expenditure—RDEL, or resource departmental expenditure limit—are deeply worrying. I commend Professor Malcolm Chalmers excellent paper, “Mind the gap; the MOD’s emerging budgetary challenge.” It is an objective, factual assessment of the cost pressures facing defence. I doubt that the Minister can offer reasons to disagree with any of its deeply worrying conclusions, but even in the optimistic scenario that Professor Chalmers outlines, under which defence is given the same protection as health and education, those cost pressures would still force a total cut of 8.7% over the next 10 years—about £35 billion in total.

If further cuts are to be made, they would sadly have to be based on a refreshed and less ambitious strategic approach. The decisions in the 2015 review, then, could redefine Britain’s role in the world. There are other strategies, depending more on diplomacy, soft power and development assistance, for example. They are all vital components of our national security, but are they credible without strong defences too? No. Not when, for the first time since the cold war, Europe faces a real military threat on its borders. The world is more dangerous than it has been for decades.

In some ways, though, the 2015 SDSR will be easier than the last one. Crucially, a major programme of reform has rebuilt the MOD’s credibility, and its performance on equipment acquisition has been transformed. From both the industrial and security perspectives, the 2010 SDSR succeeded in protecting the very special US-UK defence relationship, but will this last? President Obama, the US Chief of Staff and the US ambassador to the UN have all warned us and are sending us a clear message about what they fear is the future of UK defence spending.

So to my second theme—the need to take long-term decisions to protect our operational advantage and our freedom of action. In layman’s terms, that means making sure that we have superior capabilities to our enemies and that we can use them and sustain them whenever we want to. At the heart of this for me is the alarming engineering skills shortage that we face as a nation, especially in defence. This is the area of the 2012 White Paper on defence acquisition, to which I put my name, with which I am least satisfied. The ingredients were all there, but the urgency of the issue was not properly articulated and opportunities were missed. Crucially, commentators did not understand what the White Paper said. It made it clear that

“We will take action to protect our operational advantages and freedom of action, but only where this is essential for national security.”

Here is the commitment to invest in what industry calls the body of knowledge essential to sustain capabilities in the long terms. We cannot protect all the skills and capabilities that we need and would like to on current budgets, but there are areas of capability that we simply must invest in to sustain our security. Short-term budget cuts make this White Paper promise, which is essential to our security, impossible to deliver, with serious long-term consequences.

My third theme is the priority that we must attach to sustaining investment in technology. The centrality of research investment to UK national security takes on greater significance in a new global security context—a context defined by state fragmentation, asymmetric threats and technology proliferation. Belligerent non-state actors are increasingly using technology to counter the traditional technological advantage of conventional military and security forces. Since the end of the cold war, we have seen widespread development of technology by commercial organisations and individuals driven by a consumer society and business sector hungry for tomorrow’s technology today. This has lowered the bar for entry to conflict, espionage, terrorism and serious and organised crime, meaning that there are far more threats out there now than there were. As a result “conflict” will be far less predictable than we have seen before. It simply will not conform to set-piece scenarios in the same way that the west planned for in the last century or in the last SDSR.

If we are not committing to investing a realistic amount in science and technology, I see several things happening. First, we will become less relevant to our key strategic allies—the United States and France. Secondly, we will miss the opportunities to build capability by adapting the best of the commercial and international technology sector because we simply will not know what the cutting edge looks like. Thirdly, we will cease to act as an intelligent client. How do you know what you are buying if you do not know what good looks like? Fourthly, we will be unable to evolve during a conflict. This is potentially the most serious if we cannot defeat the novel threats deployed against us.

If the 2015 SDSR correctly prioritises science and technology, logically the MOD must spend more on it.

[Mr Havard]

The hon. Gentleman is making an important point. The Defence Committee in reports in this Parliament and the previous Parliament has talked about the MOD devoting 2% of the money that it has to S and T as well as R and D so that such spending is structured into budgets.

[Sir Peter Luff]

I could not agree with the hon. Gentleman more strongly. That is the precise figure that I have in mind for the level of resources from the defence budget that should be spent on S and T. It was 2.6% under the previous Government, but it declined under them to 1.2%. The White Paper on technology put a floor under it of 1.2%. It is far too low a floor, and what is more, as defence budgets have shrunk, the sum being spent has gone down too. It is only a third higher than what the Department for International Development now spends on research. Two per cent. is the bare minimum, of rising budgets as well. The trouble is that the Department sees S and T as the cash cow of the spending round. It is a resource that is easily cut because contracts are short term, but the consequences for our security are devastating.

If cuts to revenue spending happen, the science and technology budget will go straight back into the firing line of the Treasury and the bean counters of the MOD. We must not let that happen. Maintaining operational advantage is a race against time to take innovation from the lab and into the battle-space.

Our partners envy our ability to do more with less. Key to this is understanding the operational advantage of technology and moving it quickly into the hands of the military. As Bernard Gray, Chief of Defence Matériel, put it recently,

“The key question is, of all the desirable things in the world, which are the ones you can afford?”

But the country can afford more, as it should choose to do. In the end, this is not about votes, it is about leadership. We must all in this place do everything we can to sustain the national understanding that we maintain peace through strength, not weakness. That is why it is imperative that the next SDSR is well argued, persuasive and properly funded, and why all the political leaders of our nation must show their deep personal commitment to this outcome.

After every major conflict we have cut defence and regretted it. The Crimean war, the first world war, the second world war, the cold war—cut and regret, cut and regret, cut and regret, cut and regret. As Hegel said,

“We learn from history that we do not learn from history.”

In 2015 we celebrate the 800th anniversary of the foundation of our freedoms, Magna Carta, and the 750th anniversary of the beginning of our representative democracy and Simon de Montfort. It would be depressingly ironic if in 2015 of all years a timid Parliament, an intellectually feeble SDSR and another round of austerity combined further to weaken our defences and threaten our freedoms at such a dangerous moment in world history.

Engineering Skills (Perkins Review)

Debate between Peter Luff and Dai Havard

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Dai Havard (in the Chair)]

I am not sure whether economics is social engineering, but thank you for the debate, Minister. Do you, Mr Luff, wish to say anything for 30 seconds?

[Peter Luff]

I was not expecting the opportunity.

[Mr Dai Havard (in the Chair)]

I am giving you the opportunity; you can grab it or not.

MOD Logistics (Bicester)

Debate between Peter Luff and Dai Havard

Wednesday 18th April 2012 Westminster Hall

[Peter Luff]

To be fair to the hon. Lady, I did not ask. I will check that, but I am sure that they would have been drawn to my attention had they been made. It is a fair question to ask, and I cannot give her a guarantee. There has been no Cabinet Office involvement, though; I assure her of that.

I will not arbitrate on Donnington and Bicester today. I have been to Bicester. I shall go to Donnington in July. I shall be even-handed, entirely, I promise both the hon. Member for Telford (David Wright) and my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Tony Baldry). I shall not be arbitrating there. I think that I shall be able to give the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View the reassurance that she wanted on all the fundamental points she made in her speech, because this is a bipartisan issue.

Successive Governments over decades have dealt with problems with logistics, which is often the Cinderella of defence, and to which insufficient political attention is often given. That is one reason why I welcome the debate. It is good that the subject should be exposed in the House, and good to have the opportunity to record some of the remarkable achievements of people who work in logistics, often in adverse circumstances.

I think that I detected in the speech of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd—if I am wrong I apologise to him straight away—an underlying hostility to the role that the private sector can play in delivering defence outputs more effectively. We, like the previous Government—it is a bipartisan policy—have found that using the private sector appropriately enables significantly better outcomes to be achieved for defence. Many of the things that we are doing in the logistics operation build on decisions made by the previous Government. We understand the role that the private sector can play.

I assure the right hon. Gentleman that no information that it is proper to put in the public domain, within the limits of commercial confidentiality, has been concealed. Detailed information is available, for example, on each and every contractor involved—I think that 17 are on the list—including exactly how much money they are paid and exactly what they do. I have written to members of the Public Accounts Committee with that information. I have the schedule here, and if we have time before the Division in the House is called, I may even read out all 17 names, what the contractors do and how much they were paid in 2010-11. I shall make sure that the information is available to the right hon. Gentleman after the debate.

No information is concealed. Indeed, the National Audit Office rightly goes over logistics regularly, and another NAO report is due out in the fairly near future. If the NAO has not spotted such things as the right hon. Gentleman is concerned about, and all the information is genuinely available, I am frankly suspicious about whether the allegations have any foundation. However, I will double check. Question after question has been answered, and nothing that it would be improper to conceal will be concealed. Some information, as the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View was kind enough to note, sometimes must be kept private for reasons of commercial confidentiality. That is frustrating for politicians and democrats, but sometimes it is important. However, we shall be as open as we possibly can.

I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and will address some of his points in my speech—I have already done so in part; but I want to explain a little more about logistics commodities and services at Bicester, and the wider operation, to put his remarks in context. The organisation provides remarkable support to the UK armed forces, particularly to those serving on deployed operations, not just in Afghanistan but particularly there. LCS Bicester is one of three main storage and distribution depots for non-explosive stores, operated by Defence Equipment and Support. The other two are LCS Donnington, in Shropshire, in the constituency of the hon. Member for Telford, where I am going in July, and LCS Dulmen, in Germany. The role of those sites is to receive, store, maintain, issue and distribute non-explosive matériel on behalf of the UK armed forces and other Departments.

Last year, the National Audit Office published a report called “The use of information to manage the logistics supply chain”. In that report, the NAO—it is not I, a Minister, saying this, but the NAO—acknowledged the improved performance of the MOD’s supply chain and its effectiveness in supporting our forces in Afghanistan. In particular, the NAO’s report noted that the operational supply chain is more complex than the standard industry supply chain, which is not something that people often acknowledge.

To pick up on the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury, the UK’s delivery performance is comparable with that of commercial operators. We are doing as well as the commercial sector, which is a great tribute to all those involved, and a significant achievement. That is why I am suspicious about the allegations made by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd.

The defence equipment and support logistics commodities and services operating centre, of which MOD Bicester is a part, is key to the successful delivery of those services. The defence inventory is huge, complex and comprehensive. As at 31 December 2011, the gross book value of the inventory, excluding explosive stores, was about £29 billion. That represents 500,000 different line items, covering everything from clothing to medical supplies and engine parts. Those items are distributed to approximately 3,500 sites across the UK and around the world. Up to 8,000 issues are sent every day—some 1.2 million every year—ranging from small washers to aircraft wings. That is indeed a huge and complex operation. Given the sheer volume of items moved by the organisation—I am in no way complacent, because we do not tolerate error, either—it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made.

Turning to one mistake in particular that the right hon. Gentleman has made much of in the past, there is an appropriate saying: a lie is around the world while the truth is getting its boots on. Let us look at those boots once more. An item that should be routinely requested is sometimes marked as urgent by the unit itself; or items may be sent individually when they could be packaged together. That is normally the fault of the requesting unit.

In the specific case of the boots couriered to a unit in Northern Ireland, which the right hon. Gentleman raised at Prime Minister’s questions, that is exactly what happened. The unit used the wrong process to order the boots. It realised the mistake too late. I am not going to allow civil servants to override front-line decisions and say, “We do not think that is urgent. The officers in charge might think it is urgent, but we disagree.” That would not be right. The responsibility lies with the unit to use the appropriate requesting process.

What happened in this instance was a regrettable mistake, which the unit tried to correct too late. It was not corruption; it was not fraud; and it was not improper. It was a straightforward human error. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not repeat his assertion. I am entirely satisfied that there was no fraud involved at all. The mistake was made by the Army, which it regretted and tried to correct.

I cannot guarantee that such mistakes will not happen again—we are all human beings who have feet of clay and who make mistakes—but I am absolutely confident that this is not a systematic problem. The right hon. Gentleman made that assertion in his speech, but I dissent from that view firmly and absolutely.

LCS Bicester is a well-run operation, which I am sure is also true of Donnington. The restructuring of the former Defence Storage and Distribution Agency—DSDA, of which LCS Bicester was a part—has produced significant savings. The FDSCi—future defence supply chain initiative—report, which followed the DSDA restructuring, was published in November 2009 by the previous Government and presented to the House, and I would be happy to send the right hon. Gentleman a copy. It forms the basis of my remarks today and represents more information in the public domain, which I hope will reassure him.

Between 31 March 2008 and 31 March 2012, the operating costs of DSDA and its defence equipment and support units fell from £285 million to £231 million a year. That represents a reduction of nearly 20% over four years. When calculated on a like-for-like basis, taking into account inflation, the cost of improved service and other exceptional one-off costs, the saving is 26%. That is an impressive achievement for which the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View should take her fair share of credit, on behalf of the previous Government, who initiated some of the changes.

Similarly, the cost of transporting MOD equipment has fallen by 21% over the same five-period period. I repeat that I have the detailed information on the use of companies and couriers that I would be happy to share with the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd. I will resist the temptation to read them all into the record, because it is a long list. I am surprised that he highlighted Palletways in particular. I assure him that there are people on the distribution list who get paid more than Palletways. Again, on a like-for-like basis, allowing for the impact of inflation and so on, the saving on the transport costs is 29%. It is 29% cheaper in real terms, which is a big achievement. A key performance is the average cost per transaction—the processing of an issue of receipt. The equivalent cost has fallen from £103 per transaction for the financial year ending 31 March 2008 to £79 per transaction in the year ending 31 March 2012. That is an increase in efficiency of 23%. Those are good and impressive figures.

Over the same period—I appreciate that this is a good news, bad news story—manpower numbers have reduced by more than 2,100 posts and the service to the customer has significantly improved. The average customer wait time—this is a really impressive statistic—has fallen from about 49 days to four days. That is an important figure, considering that our armed forces are heavily committed in operations in, for example, Afghanistan. I pay an even-handed tribute to both Bicester and Donnington in that respect. The operation of LCS Bicester and the two other main storage and distribution depots is a genuine success story. If there were an hon. Member for a German constituency and if they were present, I would congratulate him or her as well, although storage and distribution represent only one element of the management of our equipment.

We are proud of the spares and equipment availability in operational theatres such as Afghanistan, as it ensures that commanders are not constrained in conducting their missions. The same could be said for the manner in which we supported Operation Ellamy in Libya, which was another success for a logistics operation. Support for such operations must be our first priority.

Nevertheless—this is the scandal to which I alluded in my opening remarks—there is no disputing the fact that the defence inventory is, and has been for many years, too large in both value and volume and that any avoidable delay in reducing it will create many future challenges. We have to deal with the issue. There are a number of reasons for this situation. Many items are bespoke and have been purchased in bulk, based on an estimate of need stretching across several years, even decades in some cases. Other items are purchased with a view to ensuring that sufficient stocks are available to deal with a sudden surge for a short-notice or large-scale military deployment. However, that is far from the whole story.

There is a legacy—I am not making a point about the previous Government—of under-investment in the information systems to track and manage stores. The truth, as I said during my opening remarks, is that logistics is the Cinderella of defence, and that is manifest in this case. It does not seem to be a priority for investment, but it should be. Too often, the Department is unable to locate with confidence what it holds. It thinks and is reasonably sure that it has something, but it just cannot prove it to accounting standards quality when it should be able to. Moreover, it has often held too much just in case something happens.

I visited some of the warehouses in Bicester recently—I met my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury immediately before I saw them—and they are jaw-dropping. Stuff is being held that simply should not be held and it should be disposed of. The £29 billion stock holding is far too high. Too much inventory is stored for too long and at too great a cost to the taxpayer.

This is not just a British problem. Army surplus stores exist around the world. The situation seems endemic to defence, but we must cope with it. The inventory is large and it is growing, and we are determined to tackle it head-on. We have not been idle. The Department is making progress in improving inventory disposal through the stock transition programme, which was set up to meet Treasury targets to reduce inventory holdings in our main storage and distribution depots. We have arrested the rate of growth—it is still growing—in the defence inventory as a result of those disposal measures, and we are committed to bringing purchasing activity under much stricter control.

In December 2010, I announced to the House the introduction of the future logistics information services project, which represents a step-change improvement to the quality of logistics information available to the armed forces. It will ensure the long-term delivery of operationally essential logistics information to both the MOD and industry, and the significant financial efficiencies will contribute to the Government’s strategic deficit reduction programme, without reducing operational capability.

One of the logistics information systems that will be managed under FLIS is the management of the joint deployed inventory, or MJDI—I love these acronyms—which is now up and running and has reached its initial operating capability. MJDI will bring huge improvements, enabling the entire deployed inventory—the inventory that is overseas on service—to be seen on one system. It will encourage better use of stock, which in turn will lead to reduced repeat demands, lower stock levels and saved costs in storage and transport, all generating improved operational performance. Importantly, it will enable operational commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate and timely information.

To give a specific and important example, a four-year Bowman radio equipment asset management improvement programme was introduced in 2010. Since then, we have made good progress and a coherent and auditable inventory baseline has been established. It is not rocket science, but it is hugely important and we are doing it. Process improvement in the way in which the data are captured and managed will in future enable the Department to identify and track assets more effectively. This is really important stuff.

We recognise the importance of having a comprehensive corporate strategy to tackle the myriad complex issues, and have commissioned the development of a strategic plan for the management of the defence inventory. It is intended to deliver the correct conditions to incentivise and mandate improved inventory purchasing and disposal behaviours. We have a lot of attics at the MOD, and they are too full of stuff. We need to get rid of stuff, as well as acquire stuff more thoughtfully. The strategic plan is a significant piece of work and it has just completed phase 1 of its milestone.

The financial savings and efficiencies secured by LCS Bicester and all the storage and distribution sites over the past five years are impressive, but, as I have already said, there is a long way to go if we are to provide the best possible support to military operations and maintain the agreed quality and service to our armed forces.

In response to the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View, in August 2010, I announced that DSDA would renounce its agency status and that a new organisation, the logistics commodities and services operating centre, which brings together the key commodities purchasing, storage and distribution elements of the Department into one organisation, had been created. LCS Bicester is part of the LCS operating centre. The primary role for LCS is to provide support to military operation and force generation by undertaking procurement and inventory management of all non-explosive commodity items, including food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies; the storage and distribution of those commodity items, together with all other non-explosive stock across defence; the disposal of surplus MOD equipment and the operation of the British Forces Post Office.

LCS is currently developing a transformation project, which aims to consider how we can improve further our inventory management and stock control, rationalise current stock holdings—we are trying to thin them down, rather than fatten them up—and improve and rationalise storage infrastructure. That will include releasing surplus for disposal, which will be of interest to the hon. Member for Telford and my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury. The project will also seek to improve commodity procurement and logistic processes, and optimise the size of the LCS organisation itself. The storage infrastructure requires investment to improve its condition and to rationalise the numerous dispersed locations.

Should the programme be taken forward—frankly, I expect that it will be—the first step will be to initiate an assessment phase, to explore the alternative delivery models available and whether they represent value for money, which I think addresses one of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View. The work would explore two options for delivering support in the future: industry integration and an in-house developed value for money benchmark. That review will consider all existing facilities. I emphasise that it is far too early to say what the implications will be for individual sites and that no decisions have been made.

In advance of the work at Bicester, however, a planning application for the retained footprint and for the sale and development of surplus land has been submitted to Cherwell district council, to prepare the way to the approach to defence logistics and to secure the value of the surplus land.

We must not forget that it is the people who work at LCS Bicester, Donnington and the other sites associated with it who make logistics operations succeed. The efficiencies and improvements that have been implemented at those sites are testimony to the quality of the people whom we employ, and I am grateful to them for what they do. I have met many of them and know that they are focused on providing the best support to our service personnel deployed on operations. I fully understand the vital role that they play. They are rightly proud of what they have achieved, and they continue to achieve a great deal.

I am enormously grateful for the commitment and dedication of all those who work to ensure that our armed forces receive the best logistics support possible. It is our job to ensure that the right framework is in place to make it work. That challenge has been ducked for too long—for decades, not just in recent years. Indeed, arguably we are addressing decades of neglect in these issues, and it will take time to deal with them. The change will come, but it will come slowly and incrementally. I am determined that we should improve the way that we do things.

If the criticisms made by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd contain any significant truth, I will, of course, want to address them very honestly and frankly. We need to do the best we possibly can to ensure that our armed forces can fight and defend our freedom as effectively as they have done in the past.

[Mr Dai Havard (in the Chair)]

I suspend the sitting until 4 o’clock or until such time as we can reconvene if Divisions take place in the House.