Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement

Debate between Peter Grant and Matthew Pennycook

Monday 10th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I shall come on to say, we need urgent, rapid progress on this issue, given the time constraints that we face.

Many Brexiteers—although, I must make clear, not all—continue to belittle the Irish border issue on the grounds that it is a problem that has been exaggerated by nefarious Brussels bureaucrats or those at home who seek a close future relationship with the EU. Having initially dismissed the issue as posing no threat to the peace process, they now seek to talk down the Good Friday agreement. Their behaviour is not only irresponsible, but misunderstands the significance of the open border as the manifestation of peace on the island of Ireland. The border is a deeply political problem, not just a technical problem. It is about not merely how we avoid a hardening of the border, but how we ensure continued co-operation in a range of areas—economic and social as well as political—as set out in the Good Friday agreement.

Anxiety on both sides of the border and across all communities about the risk of no deal, or the failure to agree a legally binding backstop, is very real, and it is growing. Of course, the best means of solving the issue would be to secure agreement on a future relationship that is compatible with protecting north-south co-operation and avoiding a hard border, thereby ensuring that any legally binding backstop that might be agreed will never be used, yet the ideological red lines that the Prime Minister outlined in her Lancaster House speech are fundamentally incompatible with securing a future relationship of that kind.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my frustration that although the UK Government agreed in December last year that their primary responsibility was to introduce specific proposals for the Irish border, in the intervening period we have seen next to nothing of substance from them? All they are doing is throwing stones at the partly completed proposal that the EU has had to introduce out of sheer desperation because the UK has offered nothing in return.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. In fact, over recent weeks I have seen some of the most ardent Brexiteers—people who wanted to take back control of our borders, incidentally—saying that they would just leave the border completely open. They are not going to be the ones who erect infrastructure. I welcome the fact that the Prime Minister has made it clear that because we chose to leave, the onus is on the UK Government, as well as the EU27, to come up with a solution that avoids any hardening of the border.

The Chequers proposals were designed to move the negotiations on, but it is patently obvious that they cannot command a majority in this House and would not be acceptable to the EU without further significant modifications of the kind that the Prime Minister cannot deliver because of the bitter divisions in her own party. The negotiations on this issue are at an impasse. Despite a summer of talks, little progress has been made on agreeing a legally binding and operable backstop. It is imperative that progress on this issue is now made and made quickly. With the second week of October being the effective deadline for sign-off at the October EU summit, there are now only a matter of weeks before the issue must be resolved. Both sides have an obligation, based on the solemn commitments they have given, to defuse the tensions that have built up around this issue, and both sides must now redouble their efforts to deliver a solution. What would make a legally binding backstop easier to agree, because it would ensure that it would be less likely to be used in the future, is a very clear signal on what the future relationship is likely to look like. That point was made at the end of last month by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

That brings me to the final issue I want to touch on before drawing my remarks to a close—the framework for the UK’s future relationship with the EU, or, more specifically, the political declaration that will accompany the divorce settlement if agreement is reached across all outstanding areas. Arguably, it is the contents of that political declaration, more than the details of the withdrawal agreement itself, that the House will focus on when it comes to pass judgment on the deal that we all hope—genuinely hope—the Government are able to conclude and put before us later this year.

Madam Deputy Speaker, you may have noticed that the notion of a so-called blind Brexit has received a great deal of attention over recent weeks, yet it has always been a distinct possibility. That is partly because there is every incentive for the Government, practically and politically, to bring back a withdrawal agreement that contains a political declaration that is highly ambiguous. To do so would be unacceptable. A vague political declaration on the future framework would not be a solution to the problems that we are grappling with; it would be tantamount to avoiding those problems altogether. As the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (Jo Swinson) said earlier—she is not in her place now—that would leave the UK in a far weaker position during the transition than we would otherwise be, and we on the Opposition Benches would not accept that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Peter Grant and Matthew Pennycook

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: Second Day: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

I absolutely agree; and the unpicking of, or wheeling back from, some of the progress we felt had been made in the Florence speech is one of our concerns.

The Bill before us was drafted before the Florence speech, but rather than amend the Bill to reflect the evolution of Government policy outlined by the Prime Minister in that speech, the Government chose instead to fashion a legislative straitjacket for themselves in the form of enshrining “exit day” for all purposes in the Bill as 11 pm on 29 March 2019. Let us be clear: bringing forward amendments to stipulate that exit day for all purposes of the Bill had nothing to do with leaving the EU. The article 50 notification made our departure from the EU on 29 March 2019 a legal certainty, so, for the purposes of the Bill, exit day could be left in the hands of Parliament.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman just used the phrase “legal certainty” in referring to our departure from the EU on 29 March 2019. Does that mean that he has seen legal advice that article 50 cannot be revoked? Is the Labour Front-Bench position that it is impossible, as opposed to politically inexpedient, to consider revoking article 50?

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me down an avenue that has nothing to do with the point I am making, which is that it remains unclear why the Government tabled three exit day amendments to their own Bill which have sown further confusion. We do not know why they did that—whether it was driven by Tory party management considerations or some other reason. The effect of those Government amendments would have been to end the jurisdiction of the ECJ on 29 March 2019, thereby preventing agreement on a transitional period on current terms.

The Government clearly soon realised their mistake and to save face enlisted the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who is not in his place, to table amendments to loosen the legislative straitjacket they themselves had created. But his amendments, which the Government have accepted, only provide a limited form of flexibility. Ministers may now amend the definition of exit day in clause 14 for the purposes of the Bill if the date when the treaties cease to apply to the UK is different from 29 March 2019. However, there is good reason to argue that that power might not be sufficient to facilitate transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now. If it is not—this might end up being the most bizarre aspect of the Bill’s curious parliamentary process—the Government will find themselves in the ludicrous position of having to amend this Bill when they bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill later this year.