Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebatePeter Grant
Main Page: Peter Grant (Scottish National Party - Glenrothes)Department Debates - View all Peter Grant's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe are now sitting in public again, and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make any declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
One of the witnesses this afternoon is from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. I am a member of that institute.
Q So noted. We will now hear oral evidence from Stephen Pegge, managing director, commercial finance, at UK Finance. Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I should like to remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 10.30 am.
Stephen Pegge: Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to come along today. My name is Stephen Pegge. I am managing director, commercial finance, at UK Finance. UK Finance is the trade association for finance and banking. We have around 300 members, many of whom provide services to companies, and we are involved more widely in supporting small and medium-sized enterprise policy.
Q Thank you for your evidence today, Mr Pegge. I understand that you helped to establish the covid-19 lending schemes. The Government have suggested that some companies have been dissolved to avoid paying back Government loans given as coronavirus support. Have you seen any evidence of that? If these measures go through, do you believe, from your experience and what you have seen, that the Insolvency Service is adequately resourced to deal with the expansion of powers it would have through the Bill?
Stephen Pegge: Yes, we have seen instances of this practice being used to try and avoid liability under bounce back loans. Back in May 2020, UK Finance with the British Business Bank established the bounce bank loan fraud collaboration group. It involves attendees from the Cabinet Office; CIFAS, the UK fraud prevention service; the Treasury; BEIS; and the National Investigation Service—NATIS. The aim is for intelligence to be shared, good practice to be developed and a threat log to be maintained and fed into the National Crime Agency and the National Economic Crime Centre. In fact, this was one of the practices which had been identified through that and has led to some efforts more recently to try to intervene and intercept these cases of dissolved companies involving Companies House and BEIS.
In the meantime, it is always possible that these cases may well have got through and there is some evidence—again, reported by the Insolvency Service—that there could be around 2,000 such cases which are dissolved and where currently the powers to investigate do not exist, so it is a real problem. If it were to become a more popular route for fraud, while there are mechanisms to deal with it and creditors can object when they get notice through alerts when these situations are gazetted, unscrupulous individuals can still get through and it is important that it is closed as a loophole.
As regards the resources of the Insolvency Service, we have all been conscious that, while the number of insolvencies has been low during a period of suspension and the generous support that has been provided to businesses through public agencies and the finance industry, we would expect that to rise significantly in this next period. There is already some evidence that it will do so. It is important that the Insolvency Service is resourced sufficiently to be able to deal with this. The evidence at the moment is that they have been involved in disqualification of directors in something like 1,000 or so cases across the last year, so it is quite possible that there might be a rise in the amount of work that they will need to do. We would certainly support any investigation into what additional resources might be necessary.
Q Good morning, Mr Pegge. You have described the loophole of company directors being able to dissolve the company in order to avoid their liabilities. Another way that directors can act is to set up two or three companies, transfer all the assets out of a company, dissolve the company with the debts and retain the companies with the assets. Is that a loophole that will still exist, even if the Bill goes through? If that loophole continues, is there a danger that that then becomes the route of choice for dodgy directors to avoid their liabilities?
Stephen Pegge: I think the practice you are describing is sometimes called phoenixing—setting up a company in the same location with the same assets purporting to be the same business with the same directors. It has certainly been a matter of concern for some time. Putting in place these measures should help to discourage and mitigate the risks of phoenixing: I do not think it entirely removes it. As you say, it is possible, even without these additional powers of investigation, for that to take place, but certainly where there is evidence of abuse, the fact that the Insolvency Service will have powers under the discretion delegated by the Secretary of State to investigate the directors, take action against them in terms of disqualification more generally, and seek compensation from them personally for losses suffered will discourage the practice of phoenixing, which I know is a concern. As I say, I do not think that it entirely removes it, but it certainly will discourage it, and to some extent remove some of the possibilities of it taking place.
Q Welcome, Mr Pegge. Do the Government proposals address all the problems that have been identified with the dissolution process in relation to liabilities and directors’ conduct?
Stephen Pegge: This is certainly a very important contribution to addressing major issues, and it is the one that we have been most concerned about recently. We have seen, as I mentioned, real evidence of dissolution being used as an attempt to avoid liability, but I stress that in many cases dissolution is an efficient and appropriate way for companies to be removed from the register where there is no money owing and that business is ceasing, without going through the time and cost of liquidation, which obviously is available as an alternative—for solvent businesses through members’ voluntary liquidation, or in insolvent situations through creditors’ voluntary or compulsory liquidation. I am not aware of significant other means by which we need to deal with abuse of dissolution. This is the one that has been most to the fore in the evidence that we have seen of abuse, certainly through the fraud group.
Q Finally, what effect do you think there would be on lending if this regime did not come into place or the loophole were not closed? Would there be a chilling effect?
Stephen Pegge: As you say, it is a matter of a chilling effect. It is one other factor that would weigh on finance providers’ minds when making lending decisions. This is a crucial time for lenders to provide finance. If you look at the latest Bank of England figures, for May, which were published last week, some £7 billion of new lending was provided to SMEs.
Latest surveys suggest that high proportions of loan applications are being sanctioned—something like 85%—and we want that to continue. The expectation that this sort of loophole is being closed should build confidence. It will ensure that there is discouragement of bad actors, so that it does not grow out of proportion, which we fear might otherwise be the case.
Q Good morning again, Mr Pegge. I apologise because I think I mispronounced your name earlier because I tried to read it without my glasses on. In an earlier answer, you referred to the retrospective nature of parts of the Bill. You indicated that you supported them. In particular, you referred to the fact that the Government had made it clear since 2018 that the legislation was coming.
Clearly, we are not creating a new offence that was not illegal at the time. We are considering legislation to make it easier for the authorities to act against people who may have committed offences, which I think is an important distinction. Even given that, is there an argument that the retrospective power should apply only to the date when the Government first published their proposals to legislate? Would you still support the Insolvency Service if it wanted to take action in relation to things that had happened in, say, 2015 or 2016? Would you have any concerns about that?
Stephen Pegge: As you say, this is essentially a technical loophole, which the Bill seeks to close. All it does is confer powers of investigation, with significant and rigorous practices in terms of investigation. The risk of miscarriage of justice is relatively limited. I do not have a particular date in mind. The point I was trying to emphasise was that this has widespread support and has had for some time.
Thank you for joining us today, Mr Pegge, and taking the time to give evidence to the Committee. We are grateful.
We should be moving on to the next panel now but apparently the next witness is not ready. I will adjourn the Committee for a short time. We will reconvene when we have the next witness online. Thank you.
Q Good morning, Mr Kerr. May I come back to the retrospective nature of parts of the legislation? The three-year period will be permitted because that is what the current timescale is. Given the notorious complexity of a lot of financial misconduct cases and the fact that they are long drawn-out processes, is there an argument for that three-year period to be extended in cases where there is an indication that there is not only misconduct, but potentially criminal fraud? I am thinking about cases in which the potential fraud runs into the tens of millions of pounds. Is there an argument that in those cases, there should be no hiding place for criminals of that scale, simply because of the length of time they have managed to get away with it?
David Kerr: That is a fair point. I suppose the statute of limitations could be considered a relevant backstop, but I will come back to my previous point that we have a three-year limit in relation to investigations into directors’ conduct in insolvent situations, and that has been with us for 35 years. I have not heard any suggestion from the Insolvency Service that that has proved to be inadequate. This is effectively an extension of the same power into dissolved company circumstances. I have not seen or heard any evidence to suggest that it is an inadequate period.
Q You say that you have not heard any such representations from the Insolvency Service. Have you had any such representations from lenders or creditors? They may take a different view from the Insolvency Service if it is their money that is at stake.
David Kerr: Perhaps some in the creditor community would like it to be a six-year period, but I do not think they have argued strongly for it, and I do not think there is a necessarily a case made for that. From a creditor perspective, in an ideal world, perhaps it would be open ended. That may be unrealistic.
Q Thank you for giving evidence, Mr Kerr. Can you talk a little bit more about the deterrent that you spoke about? How much of an impact do you think the measure, and especially the threat of disqualification, will have on providing the necessary deterrence?
David Kerr: The current disqualification provisions act as a deterrent to some extent, because directors know that, in respect of every company that goes into an insolvent liquidation or administration, there will be some inquiry. There is an obligation on the insolvency practitioner to carry out a certain amount of inquiry into the contacts of the directors of those companies and make a report in each of those cases to the Insolvency Service on their conduct. The provisions do not provide for the same report. It will have to be triggered by something else, whether that is a creditor complaint or other information, but it will provide the opportunity for the service to make the same inquiry.
Q Thank you, Ms Rees, and good morning, Dr Tribe. Following on from that last question, there are three kinds of sanctions available now: the director disqualification, the compensation order and, ultimately, criminal prosecution. Are there significant differences, first, in the burden of proof required for each of those actions, and secondly, in the cost and time taken to bring any of those actions to fruition?
Dr Tribe: I think you are right to point out that there are different avenues that could be visited on the directors that we are talking about. We are not necessarily talking about directors in the general run of business; we are talking about people, as perhaps you suggest, who engage in criminal behaviour. For example, with the bounce back loan scheme, a form of fraud could lead to a prosecution.
What we are dealing with today, though, particularly with this amendment to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, is a regulatory function, so we are dealing with a lower burden of proof than we would if it was a criminal sanction for any subsequent prosecution for fraud. In that sense, on the Insolvency Service’s work on what is known as a jury question in the context of directors’ disqualification, with each case being looked at on its facts, the determination whether whatever has occurred has been deemed to be unfit does have that lower evidential burden than any subsequent criminal activity that the prosecuting authorities might address. In that sense, the disqualification regime is perhaps better able to get deterrent-type results than mounting subsequent criminal prosecutions. We know, of course, that the criminal justice regime is also having some problems with funding. If the disqualification regime is able to achieve any public policy outcomes in terms of deterrent, in a regulatory manner, that is perhaps quite effective.
Q You also mentioned, as some other witnesses have, what is known as phoenixing. There is a variant of that practice whereby, rather than creating a new company immediately after the old one has been dissolved, you create what looks on the surface like a legitimate group company structure, and then over time, you very quietly shift all the assets over to one company, leave all their liabilities in another one, wind up the company with the liabilities, and then the directors help themselves to the company with the assets. Does this legislation do anything to address that particular loophole, and if not, what further changes are needed to prevent, or at least strongly discourage, that practice?
Dr Tribe: That is an interesting question because it highlights the long history of English and Welsh and Scottish company provisions when we are thinking about the nature of groups of companies and then single entities, and how structures and groups are used and how we move value between one entity and another.
There is the quite interesting case of Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd where, because of an employment claim, value was moved into a new entity, and of course the claim was left with the original company, meaning that that employee had an empty shell through which to pursue their claim, which was problematic. The judge at first instance was able to say, “No, in the interests of justice, you can switch your claim to that new entity.” That judgment was overruled subsequently, but it does raise an important point. Indeed, in the case that overruled it, the group reconstruction that occurred was held to be legitimate for tax reasons. There are instances of the kind of behaviour that you are talking about that can perhaps be problematic in the pure phoenixing sense, but then there are legitimate reconstructions that happen where the intentions of the directors were for tax efficiency or some other purpose that is not unfit or nefarious in the way that we are discussing.
In terms of the misuse of the corporate form, one can go right back through our company law history to recite many examples of essentially what we are talking about—phoenixing, or what has been called centrebinding—and some of the critique of pre-packaged administration is around the same point. Is it appropriate that the corporate form is able to be used in this way so that the creditors of company A are left languishing while all the value is moved into company B in the way you have described?
That takes me back to my introductory response point, which is that in English and Welsh and Scottish law, for a very long time we have used the separate juristic person—the company as a thing. It is a really sacrosanct idea that, just like I am not responsible for your debts, and you are not responsible for mine, we have that structure in place for policy reasons, and have done since the 19th century originally, to aggregate wealth and entrepreneurial activity. I suppose you as the legislature expect that, as part of that privilege that you have allowed incorporators to use, over time you will get some form of abuse, and that element, which is hopefully as small as possible, has to be dealt with, like we are trying to do today, or, to some extent, tolerated.
Q Finally, I want to look at the retrospective nature of some of the provisions from a legal point of view. First, do you have any concerns not about the principle of creating a retrospective offence, which the Bill does not do, but about retrospectively giving powers to an enforcement agency that we used not to have? Do you have any concerns about the natural justice issues that that might raise? Alternatively, are there circumstances where the three-year time limit is too short and where you would be in favour of allowing the Insolvency Service to go back more than three years before the dissolution date?
Dr Tribe: On your first point, which was about retrospective activity, it is much like the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 reforms, which have successfully been passed. We have seen lots of new cases on the provisions that were in that Bill; it has been very successful. The reforms in that statute were mooted much earlier, in 2018. It is the same with this suggestion to close the dissolution loophole. Much like with the 2020 CIGA provision, the coronavirus has freed up legislative time to get both sets of provisions—the CIGA activity and the dissolution activity—in front of you to get it on to the statute book. Some of this was discussed by Sarah Olney on Second Reading.
What does it mean in terms of the retrospective nature of what you are doing? We had the idea some time ago, and corona has meant that we have had to address it against the backdrop of the bounce back loan scheme. Unfortunately, the abuse of that scheme seems to be so massive—as we have seen, there is a £16 billion to £27 billion projected shortfall, or loss—that we need to go back in time to look at some behaviour. Of course, we are not generally speaking about breaches of duty in the general sense of directors’ duties. We are talking about what could be seen as the use of the corporate form purposely to avoid the insolvency provisions and the oversight that they can give, with the powers that are currently in the Act that we are dealing with.
That needs to be dealt with, and if it is in a retrospective way—you may have seen in late June that there was a disqualification order for 12 years because of some fraudulent activity that had occurred with a Mr Khan and his Birmingham-based business, where he had forged documents to get a bounce back loan of £50,000. The Insolvency Service successfully brought that action following administration. Some Glasgow-based companies have also been wound up in the public interest because of bounce back loan abuse. To answer your question briefly, it is the bounce back loan fraud that has meant we have had to act retrospectively. No, I do not have any issues on that point.
On your question about three years, I suppose that again goes back to funding and time limits, and whether the Insolvency Service is adequately resourced to deal with the amount of dissolutions—whether it is 5,000 as predicted, or whether the forthcoming PwC report shows that it is much worse. If it is well resourced, the time issues might not be such a problem. If it is not, they perhaps will be.