Trident Renewal

Debate between Pete Wishart and Michael Fallon

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I certainly recognise the importance of Devonport and all our naval bases in sustaining our naval operations, including the submarine fleet.

In the context of 17,000 nuclear weapons globally, we cannot gamble with our country’s national security. We have to plan for a major direct nuclear threat to this country, or to our NATO allies, that might emerge over the 50 years during which the next generation of submarines will be in service. We already know that there are substantial nuclear arsenals and that the number of nuclear states has increased. Russia is modernising its nuclear forces, actively commissioning a new Dolgoruky class of eight SSBN vessels, preparing to deploy a variety of land-based ICBM classes, and planning to reintroduce rail-based intercontinental missiles. North Korea has carried out three nuclear tests, threatened a fourth, and carried out ballistic missile tests in defiance of the international community. Iran’s nuclear programme remains a real concern: we see a worrying lack of progress from Iran with the international agency on the military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State is right to discuss some of the new, emerging external threats, but the major external threat faced by this country is from IS—from jihadists. Would they not be encouraged if we threatened them with nuclear weapons?

[Michael Fallon]

There are of course current threats to this country from ISIL and the jihadists, as, indeed, there are from Russia’s behaviour over the past year or so, but we must also plan for future threats to this country, including nuclear threats. Some may well argue, like the hon. Gentleman, that in the face of terrorism and the other immediate threats that we have seen over the past year, a nuclear deterrent is somehow less relevant. That is an argument, but we have never suggested that those other threats should or can be countered by the nuclear deterrent. We are clear that the nuclear deterrent is the only assured way to deter nuclear threats.

Others have suggested that we should move away from continuous patrols and have a part-time deterrent, as if our enemies did not work the full week, but there is simply no alternative to a continuous at-sea deterrent that can provide the same level of protection and the ability to deter an aggressor. We know that because successive Governments have looked at the different options for delivering a deterrent capability. Most recently, the Trident alternatives review in 2013 demonstrated that no alternative system is as capable or cost-effective as a Trident-based deterrent. It also found:

“None of these alternative systems and postures offers the same degree of resilience as the current posture of Continuous at Sea Deterrence, nor could they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances.”

All the previous studies have also shown that four submarines are required to maintain the continuous posture.