Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]

Pete Wishart Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

As with most Bills, there are aspects of this one that are to be commended, and others that we can argue about. The Bill contains several measures for which the justification is utterly unclear. In introducing the changes to community orders and to the law of self-defence, the Government seem to be ignoring the importance of judicial discretion, and the changes to immigration law seem very harsh. In my contribution today, I will set out the reasons for my opposition to some provisions in the Bill. I would also like to say, however, that the proposals on single family courts, on drug-driving and on judicial appointments are all excellent. The devil will be in the detail, of course, but so far so good in those areas.

Clause 28 provides for the relaxation of the ban on televising court proceedings by granting the Secretary of State the power to revoke the current rules by order, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. Under the current law, section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 bans the taking of photographs, portraits and recordings of judges, jurors and witnesses in all civil and criminal proceedings. By removing that ban, I hope that clause 28 will broaden public engagement with the administration of justice, as well as increasing understanding of the judicial process.

Caution must be exercised, however, to ensure that proper parliamentary scrutiny is given to the detail of these plans. It is unclear to me why clause 39 should provide for any secondary legislation setting out the specific circumstances in which the Government intended to allow filming to be subject to the negative resolution procedure, hence greatly limiting the scope for debate on the topic in this place. Many groups, including Liberty, have expressed concern about the possible repercussions that could emanate from allowing for the filming of civil and criminal proceedings in their entirety. That could well lead to additional anxiety for witnesses—and in certain circumstances to some witnesses being less inclined to appear in court—as well as to the alteration of testimony.

The impetus behind the provision is, of course, welcome, but for the reasons that I have set out, the details of the Government’s plans in this area should be set out in primary legislation. If, however, the televising were limited to the judgment, as is the case in Scottish courts, that would add useful transparency and provide assistance to law commentators, to students and to practitioners.

By contrast, the proposed changes to the law on self-defence in clause 30 seem to have no justification. I do not like falling out with the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith)—the esteemed Chair of the Justice Committee, of which I am a member—but I take a different view from him on this. He will know that, under the common law, defendants are able to use reasonable force against an intruder. That defence was put on to the statute book by section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

The law states that a defendant may use against an intruder an amount of force that he or she believes to be reasonable and proportionate at the time, even if a court subsequently considers that that belief was misplaced. The law as it stands evidently provides sufficient defence for homeowners. Indeed, data from the Crown Prosecution Service show that, between 1990 and 2005, the service prosecuted only 11 cases in which a defendant had been charged under the current law. However, if clause 30 is allowed to go through unamended, it will allow for a defendant to use an amount of force that he or she acknowledges to be disproportionate at the time, provided that the force used is not “grossly disproportionate”.

I have prosecuted and defended many cases involving self-defence, as have other Members, and the existing law has been regarded as perfectly adequate hitherto. If ever I saw a change to the law that would open the door to vigilantism, this is it. In my surgery on Friday last, a farmer came to see me. He was a responsible, middle-aged man, and he told me that three individuals had tried to break into one of his barns to steal a quad bike. There is too much of that kind of thing going on in rural Wales at the moment—but I digress.

The farmer said, “I have a shotgun. What would have happened if I’d aimed and shot above their heads?” I had to put him right on that and he said, “But isn’t there a change in the law?” That is where we are: people think that we are upping the ante. If the purport of the clause is to raise the bar for the police and the CPS in the first place—Justice Ministers have told me that that is the case—I suppose that there is some logic to it, but it could well be dangerous, as my example shows. Ministers do not think that it will change anything in the court and hope that it will lead to the bar being raised in the first place, but as I have said, there is a grave danger that people will take the law into their own hands and believe that it is open season on individuals who roam on their property. The Law Society says that it will end up with greater litigation and that the present law is workable and acceptable.

Clause 31 would put into effect the provisions of schedule 15, which provide for a number of changes to courts’ means of dealing non-custodially with offenders. Part 2 of the schedule would allow courts to defer sentencing so that the offender and victim can partake in restorative justice. This is most welcome. All we need to do, as the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) has said, is look at the Northern Ireland model and make sure that the resources are there. It is an excellent step forward and I am pleased with it.

Recent polling conducted by Make Justice Work suggests that 70% of victims believe that they should have the opportunity to communicate with the offender so as to show them the impact of their actions. I think that that is probably right. However, the findings of a poll conducted by the British Crime Survey showed that 69% of victims who were offered a meeting with their perpetrator said no to the opportunity. The onus is now on us as individual politicians and the Ministry of Justice to increase public confidence in any proposed scheme.

The changes introduced in part 7 of schedule 15 are likewise welcomed. If passed, part 7 would ensure that all contracts made between the Secretary of State and probation trusts would require the trusts to make specific provision for female offenders, thus taking into account the particular needs of this demographic group. I pay due regard and tribute to Baroness Corston for the work she has done. The provisions in part 7 were included as a result of a successful non-Government amendment on Third Reading in the other place. I hope that the Government will accept these vital measures in this place.

Other changes proposed by schedule 15 are less welcome. Part 1 would amend section 177 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to guarantee that courts imposing community orders must include a mandatory punitive element. This could mean electronic tagging, exclusion orders and so on. I am at a loss to see why the Government are going further down the road of electronic tagging. Actually, I find it baffling, because the Government’s own impact assessment, published in March 2012, acknowledged that the measures could lead to an increase in reoffending as a result of rehabilitative requirements being sacrificed to make way for punitive requirements.

Part 4 of schedule 15 relates to electronic monitoring, on which the Government’s own impact assessment, dated 4 January 2012, suggests that

“the UK evidence points towards a more neutral impact on re-offending”.

It does not work. The current spending on electronic monitoring is £120 million and, as a result of this Bill, it will rise to £360 million for something that does not work—and this from a Government who seek “more for less”. Conversely, the impact assessment observes:

“Research on supervision suggests that the supervisory relationship between the offender and the case manager plays an important role in securing compliance and promoting desistance.”

Why, therefore, are the Government now seeking to privatise that so that trained professionals will not deal face to face with offenders, which is the proper way of doing it? The Government have also proposed major changes to the probation service and I am concerned about the effects they will have.

Clause 20 would revoke a restriction listed in the Senior Courts Act 1981, thus providing for the transfer of immigration judicial review applications from the High Court to the upper tribunal.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that the Scottish Parliament passed a legislative consent motion allowing this House to legislate on its behalf, but clauses 20 and 21 were introduced at a later stage without any consultation with Scottish Ministers. This has caused great upset in the legal fraternity in Scotland, particularly those who are acting and operating in our judicial system and with particular regard to referrals to the Court of Session. Does he agree that the Government should have consulted Scottish Ministers before including clauses 20 and 21 in the Bill?

[Mr Llwyd]

Absolutely. We always thought that the devolved Administrations were part of the respect agenda and that the Government would consult them. I find it astonishing that that has not happened with regard to such an important matter.

On clause 20, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and Liberty argue that no case has been made for the change, which will impact on almost all immigration and asylum applications. Crucially, the upper tribunal stands charged with not having demonstrated its ability to deal with the UK Border Agency’s conduct in the same way as the High Court has done. ILPA cites examples of UKBA failing to respond quickly to the upper tribunal’s orders and its failure to adequately plead its case as problems that plague many cases.

As a result, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has recommended that the Government insert further provisions into the Bill to make sure that immigration and nationality cases in which human rights such as life, liberty and freedom from torture are at stake continue to be decided by the High Court. I hope that the Government will reconsider that point.

Clause 34 would remove the right of appeal against the refusal of a visa to visit a family member, except on grounds of human rights or race discrimination. I will not retread the ground very well and adequately covered by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and others. I fully agree with them and hope that the Government will reconsider the provision, because it could be harsh in the extreme. I also agree with the Law Society and the JCHR, which argue that the measure cannot be passed in the light of the poor quality of so many decisions made by UKBA, as evidenced by the high number of successful appeals against refusals.

There it is—as always, there are some very good things, but there are some pretty poor things as well, and one hopes that many of them will be improved and some deleted in Committee.