Change of Name by Registered Sex Offenders

Debate between Pauline Latham and Joanna Cherry

Thursday 2nd March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Pauline Latham (Mid Derbyshire) (Con)]

I apologise for being late, Madam Deputy Speaker. I would have liked to contribute to this debate, but the ticket machine broke and I missed my train. I apologise for coming into the Chamber just to make an intervention. This is such an important debate, and I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) for securing it and for her work.

As the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) has just said, the ability for people to apply for a DBS check to work with children after changing their name by deed poll entirely defeats the object of the sex offenders register. Does she agree that the requirement for sex offenders to notify the authorities themselves is entirely unfit for purpose and that there needs to be a much more robust and centralised mechanism through which sex offenders can apply to change their name?

[Joanna Cherry]

I could not agree more.

The hon. Lady reminds me that, at the outset of my speech, I should have congratulated the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) who, as always, is completely across the subject. She often raises important issues, both in this House and in the public domain, that others have not dared to raise. I pay tribute to her for that.

I am talking about the Huntley case because it is disgraceful that, 18 years later, safeguarding loopholes remain whereby applicants can submit identity documents for DBS checks that display a new identity, despite the efforts of various hon. Members. At least the Government have acknowledged the safeguarding loophole whereby registered sex offenders are able to change their name by deed poll, but I am afraid that the ability to change identity in a more fundamental way, about which the hon. Member for Telford spoke so powerfully, by simultaneously changing one’s name and one’s gender, remains unaddressed.

In our public life, across the United Kingdom, self-identification has become a de facto right without legislation. Any individual can easily, and for any reason, change their name and gender on documents commonly used to establish identity via a process of self-declaration. That includes documents such as passports and driving licences, which can be presented for the purposes of a DBS check and show the individual’s new name and acquired gender instead of, and as opposed to, their sex.

The DBS grants enhanced privacy rights to individuals who change their gender when changing their identity. Those are exceptional rights that are granted only to individuals in that group. The result is that identity verification is compromised, meaning that there is no guarantee that the information returned during the check and displayed on the certificate will be accurate or complete. Those exceptional privacy rights also allow an applicant who has changed gender to request that all their previous names are withheld from the DBS certificate that is issued. That right to conceal previous identities is not given to anyone else; disclosing previous identities is a key component of safeguarding, and DBS certificates issued to all other individuals display all other names the applicant has used.

No doubt there were good reasons for the privacy requirements set out in section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act. I hasten to add that I am completely in favour of equal rights for trans people, but I am not in favour of a system that allows sex offenders to exploit the principle of self-declaration to evade the safeguarding process. Applicants who change their gender are also permitted to conceal their sex, and the DBS certificate issued will display their acquired gender instead. That right is not granted to any other individual; the importance of sex to safeguarding means that for all other applicants, their sex is always displayed on the DBS certificate. These are all serious risks to safeguarding that compromise the validity and reliability of the DBS regime.

This is a particular problem as we roll out digital identities, including for DBS checks, because there is a risk that the existing loopholes will be perpetuated in the digital realm. In the drive for convenience and ease of use, digital identities risk creating a new safeguarding loophole. In-person identity verification acts as a safe- guarding protection in and of itself, yet digital identities can be shared remotely, meaning that that important step is removed. The current operation of the DBS regime means that identity verification is compromised and organisations requesting DBS checks cannot have confidence in the information that is disclosed.

There are steps we could take to close the loopholes: the mandatory use of national insurance numbers for DBS checks and identity changes; having DBS certificates that display the sex registered at birth; and having DBS certificates that display other names used for all applicants, including those who have changed gender as part of changing identity. We are talking about rules of safeguarding that apply to people who have been convicted of sex offences, so all of this should be a no-brainer. In order to be effective, the rules of safeguarding must apply equally to everyone.