Future Flood Prevention

Paul Monaghan Excerpts

Monday 27th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dr Paul Monaghan (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (SNP)]

This debate follows major inquiries into the social, economic and environmental impact of flooding in England which were undertaken by the Environmental Audit and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committees. I participated in the EFRA Committee’s inquiry, and I took a close interest in the development of the Committee’s conclusions and the preparation of the final comprehensive report, which focused heavily on the future management of flood risk. That report called for the UK Government to strengthen policies to protect communities in England from increasing flood risk.

Last November, when the EFRA Committee published its report, we criticised the UK Government’s fragmented, inefficient and ineffective approaches to flood risk management. I should make it clear that the report was not an academic exercise, but the product of a great deal of work and time spent visiting areas of England that had been badly affected by poor and inadequate flood prevention, and also the Netherlands, where we sought out a number of governmental organisations and inspected world-class flood prevention measures to understand how prevention was managed in a country where it is considered absolutely critical.

The evidence that we collected in the Netherlands stood in stark contrast to the evidence collected in England. When visiting communities in England that had been badly affected by storms Desmond, Eva and Frank, we observed a great deal of activity directed towards the purchase of large displacement pumps and the implementation of risk management systems that could only sensibly be described as reactive. There was nothing new, novel, innovative or insightful in any of the activity that I observed in England, and I was left with the impression that communities shared my disappointment and lingering concerns. In England, a predominant view that emerged was that flooding represented a failure to deliver an adequate emergency response at a time of crisis.

In the Netherlands, the situation could not have been more different. Our detailed conversations with the Delta commissioner, the special envoy for international water affairs, and many other internationally renowned experts were insightful, and highlighted many new, novel and innovative methods of proactively managing and controlling the flow of water to eradicate the risk of flooding. The people of the Netherlands would view a flood as a failure of water management governance arrangements.

The contrast is perhaps best explained by the fact that the Netherlands views flood prevention as a social issue that requires a determined and co-ordinated strategic political approach to guarantee effective water management and the protection of life and property. The approach implemented by the UK Government’s Environment Agency suggests that flooding is considered to be a largely unpredictable but occasionally inevitable consequence of extraordinary weather conditions that require an effective emergency response.

The EFRA Committee did not focus on the purchase of more or larger displacement pumps, but proposed a new and innovative governance model to recognise flooding as a social problem. Like the Netherlands, we advocated a strategic focus on co-ordinated, efficient action to deliver flood prevention. We recommended that the UK Government establish a new national floods commissioner for England, to be accountable for the delivery of strategic, long-term flood risk reduction outcomes agreed with the Government. The commissioner would deliver the strategy through new regional flood and coastal boards to co-ordinate the regional delivery of national plans, in partnership with local stakeholders. The boards would take on current lead local flood authority and regional flood and coastal committee roles, and a new English rivers and coastal authority would assume the Environment Agency’s current role in focusing on the efficient delivery of national flood risk management plans. That governance model would streamline organisational responsibilities, co-ordinate resources and pool expertise to allow each body to deliver their unique role, with funding firmly linked to outcomes, including financial outcomes.

Our recommendations were intended to deliver the following: first, the adoption of catchment measures on a much wider scale, including sustainable drainage systems; secondly, simplified flood risk communications; and, thirdly, improved organisational and resource resilience in all its forms, including spatial planning, building regulations, insurance and emergency response. In addition to shifting the UK Government from a reactive approach directed at flood management towards a more informed and insightful proactive approach focused on flood prevention, the Committee’s recommendations were designed to make better use of financial resources and to recognise the negative impact of fluctuating funding.

The UK Government’s pattern of spending is as unpredictable as the pattern of flooding. Indeed, funding arguably fluctuates reactively in correlation with unpredictable flood events, with budgets topped up above planned levels. The 2016 Budget, for example, committed an additional £700 million in response to the winter 2014-15 floods. The Environmental Audit Committee criticised this for “political calculation”.

The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s initial report was followed by a very disappointing response from the UK Government. Indeed, the UK Government’s response is summed up in one sentence:

“We do not agree that there is a need for substantial change to the existing national and local governance provisions for flood risk management.”

When challenged on the inadequacy of this response, the EFRA Committee received a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey), which noted:

“Although we do not agree there is a need for substantial structural change, we are always looking for ways to improve and adapt the way we work to meet current and future needs.”

How bizarre—the UK Government want improvement, but just not the improvement recommended by two Select Committees.

By ignoring the considered and detailed reports of two Select Committees, the UK Government are missing opportunities to act on a wide range of recommendations that would improve and adapt the way the Government work to meet current and future demands. The failure to improve and adapt existing reactive models of operation is not only wasting money, it is leaving households, communities and businesses across England at risk of disaster. The Government’s response continues to fall far short of the recommendations.

This debate takes place as part of the supply estimates process, a means through which the UK Government technically seek Parliament’s authority for spending plans. These are known as “estimates days”. In practice, these debates are three days of general debate when the one thing that is not discussed is the actual estimates, and generally there is no vote. In fact, this House has largely abandoned all opportunities for direct control of public expenditure by means of debate and vote on the estimates presented to the House.

This is particularly important to Scottish MPs, because the former Leader of the House repeatedly claimed that the estimates process provides an avenue for Scottish MPs to scrutinise the financial implications of Bills from which the English votes for English laws procedure excludes us. I conclude by noting that the arcane estimates process fails to function as an effective method of scrutinising UK Government expenditure, and that is to the detriment of everyone.