Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Bill

Paul Masterton Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 24th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Karen Bradley]

What I am saying is that the Bill does not enable that to be done. I am focusing on ensuring that the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament so that we can use the conditions that it puts in place to get the politicians back. The priority has to be a laser-like focus on getting politicians to agree to come back to restore power sharing at Stormont. That is what is best for the people of Northern Ireland.

Let me repeat that these measures do not set or change policy direction on devolved issues in Northern Ireland. That is rightly for the Executive and the Assembly, and our overriding priority is to see them up and running again. The NICS needs certainty about decision-making powers, and we should not be seeking to direct it on issues that clearly require ministerial decisions.

The various principles are set out in guidance rather than in the Bill, as Departments need a degree of flexibility and discretion to enable them to reach appropriate and necessary decisions, and to ensure the continued delivery of public services in Northern Ireland. That guidance, above all else, must be operable for Northern Ireland Departments if we are to provide the clarity and assurance that are needed to ensure that public services can continue to be delivered in the absence of Ministers. We have engaged closely with the NICS in developing the guidance, and the factual information provided by the NICS strongly informed the approach that we have taken to it.

The Government also recognise that, in the absence of an Executive, there will be some decisions that we should make, for instance in relation to the setting of departmental budget allocations for approval by Parliament to ensure that public services continue to function. As I have told the House before, we remain committed to making the decisions that are necessary to provide good governance and political stability for Northern Ireland. Those are decisions, and actions, that cannot be undertaken without our intervention, particularly when legislation is needed, as it is for budgets and regional rates. When it comes to devolved decisions conferred on Northern Ireland Departments, however, the UK Government and Parliament should not be intervening directly. Therefore, while there is clearly a need to intervene to provide clarity, it is more appropriate for us to set out the framework for decisions to be made by Departments when it is in the public interest to do so, and that is what the Bill will do.

Finally, the Bill addresses the urgent need for key appointments to be made in Northern Ireland and in the UK in circumstances when those appointments require the involvement of Northern Ireland Ministers. Clauses 4 to 6 ensure that key posts can be filled while minimising the extent of UK Government intervention in what are, rightly, devolved matters. Clause 4 allows the relevant UK Minister to make specified appointments, exercising the appointments functions already conferred on Northern Ireland Ministers. As I set out in my written statement on 18 July, these posts are the most pressing appointments. They are essential for good governance and public confidence in Northern Ireland, and include appointments to the Northern Ireland Policing Board, the Probation Board for Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission and the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. These offices are stated on the face of the Bill to address the most urgently needed appointments while minimising the role of UK Ministers in these decisions that should be taken by Northern Ireland Ministers. The Bill takes this narrow approach rather than putting in place a blanket power with a long list of all possible appointments, or transferring these appointments from being ministerial responsibilities to being the responsibility of civil servants. Neither of those alternatives would have been appropriate.

It is important, however, that we provide for a situation in which other vital offices unexpectedly become vacant, or filling other existing vacancies becomes more urgent. For that reason, the Bill includes the provision to add to the list of offices, by means of a statutory instrument, to allow the relevant UK Minister to exercise Northern Ireland Ministers’ appointment functions in relation to additional specified offices.

[Paul Masterton (East Renfrewshire) (Con)]

All the appointments in the Bill are justice-based, and I completely take on board the point about those being the most pressing, but how does the Secretary of State plan to continue to monitor what other areas are pressing, because there are lots of roles in other areas that need to be filled, but that will not happen under the Bill?

[Karen Bradley]

We would use the power only if appointments were urgent and necessary. I would consult the main Northern Ireland political parties before bringing forward regulations, as I did before I introduced this Bill. Essentially, we are allowing appointments to be made to bodies when either a failure to appoint would mean that the body becomes inquorate, or the role is required to command public respect and show full accountability.

A large proportion of appointment functions in Northern Ireland are conferred on Northern Ireland Departments. The provisions that I have already outlined dealing with Departments’ decision-making powers provide clarity that Northern Ireland Departments are able to exercise the appointment functions conferred on them during the period for Executive formation. They would not transfer to them any appointment functions currently conferred on Northern Ireland Ministers.

The lack of an Executive has also had an impact on appointments to UK-wide bodies, as a small number require Northern Ireland Ministers to be consulted on or to agree an appointment by a UK Minister. The most pressing example is the appointment by the Home Secretary of a new chair of the Disclosure and Barring Service. Similarly, there are appointments made jointly by UK and Northern Ireland Ministers. The Bill deals with such appointments by allowing them to be made without Northern Ireland Ministers, but it retains the Northern Ireland input by requiring the UK Minister to consult the relevant Northern Ireland Department. The changes represent a minimal intervention and a careful balance to ensure that the bodies and offices are able to operate as normal, but without UK Government intervention at a policy or operational level.

The powers given to UK Ministers under clauses 4 to 6 expire at the point that Northern Ireland Ministers are appointed and an Executive is formed. Responsibility for the appointment functions affected by the Bill would then, rightly, revert to the Northern Ireland Ministers.

The people of Northern Ireland deserve strong political leadership from a locally elected and accountable devolved Government. Achieving that remains my absolute priority, and that is why the Bill aims to restore the devolved power-sharing Executive and Assembly, and sets out a fixed period in which I will work closely with Northern Ireland parties to encourage them to form an Executive. During this period, the UK Government will continue to deliver on their responsibilities for political stability and good governance. Northern Ireland has made huge progress in recent years, but we can achieve even more with a devolved Government who unlock all the potential that Northern Ireland has to offer. I am focusing on achieving that outcome—it is the outcome that we all want to see—and I commend the Bill to the House.