Defamation Bill

Debate between Paul Farrelly and Robert Buckland

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Buckland]

The Bill is silent on that. Clause 11 merely amends the relevant parts of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the County Courts Act 1984, which allow a trial by jury unless the trial requires prolonged examination of documents and so on. The practice could develop in secondary legislation, but I doubt whether that would be seen as an appropriate mechanism to guide judges. I rather think that it will evolve as a matter of judicial discretion. I would be cautious about supporting secondary legislation that sought to prescribe the circumstances in which a jury trial ought to be ordered.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael) made about streamlining procedures is important. As the Joint Committee on the draft Bill pointed out, whether or not there are jury trials, there has to be proper reference to alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation and neutral evaluation by a third party—all the mechanisms that serve to deliver justice and the redress of grievance not just to the millionaire in his Belgravia townhouse but to Mrs Trellis of 22 Acacia grove, who does not have the means to spend a lot of money on expensive litigation but who has been the victim of a wrong that needs to be corrected.

[Paul Farrelly]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that because we need speed, which reduces costs, and because we need streamlined procedures and better case management, it would be useful to adopt the draft changes to the civil procedure rules that the Joint Committee recommended? They would give effect to the changes proposed in the Bill and could be amended further as the Bill progresses.

[Mr Buckland]

Such changes to the civil procedure rules could, and I think should, take place. They would not affect the passage of this primary legislation, so they would not require amendments to the Bill, but I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s point about the need for minds to be concentrated so that the Joint Committee’s noble aspirations can be translated into reality. That point is well made and entirely relevant in the context of the Leveson process. If Leveson achieves nothing else, I want it to provide a mechanism by which the ordinary person in the street can obtain redress of grievance with the minimum cost and at the maximum speed.

Before I was slightly diverted by interventions, I was making a point about the changing context of libel. In the 19th century, the only window into the private lives of the rich and famous was often through the device of the libel trial. How the world has changed. We live in a world in which we have an open door into celebrities’ private lives for the instant gratification of millions of readers, in many cases by the choice of the celebrity concerned. For many celebrities, that is a means by which they make a living. I do not seek to make any pejorative comment about that, but it is a simple fact of modern life.

Not only does the risk to reputation continue to be important, but joined with it is intrusion into people’s private lives. The two issues are different, and I accept that privacy cases are not about correcting falsehoods, as defamation proceedings are. However, they become inextricably linked in many ways when we examine the issues that characterise the debate in both scenarios.

I was part of the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, along with the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) and others. We were grateful to have among our number the noble Lord Mawhinney, who chaired the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, and his input was invaluable in informing us speedily of the progress and deliberations of the latter. The outcome of the investigation by the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions was somewhat less co-ordinated than that of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill. There were a number of views and a multiplicity of divisions, but at the end of the process I believe that our contribution to the debate about privacy was important. We characterised some of the issues that have been raised today.

The hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley), who is not in his place now, made remarks about changing and codifying the law. I would not go so far as to support his assertion that we need statutory regulation of the press, but I thoroughly agree with his observation that now is the time for Parliament to take a lead on codifying the law of privacy. Indeed, I put that proposal to the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions at the end of its deliberations. I was not successful in persuading the majority of members of its merits, but I make no apology for returning to the subject today. I believe not only that the law of defamation should be codified, as it is in this welcome Bill, but that Parliament should take a lead and do likewise to the law of privacy. We should bring together data protection legislation and all the other areas of legislation that deal with intrusion into individuals’ private lives.

Academies Bill [Lords]

Debate between Paul Farrelly and Robert Buckland

Monday 19th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Buckland]

First and foremost, I think that the governing body must always have that responsibility. We already have examples of previous practice in foundation schools, which were the creation of the previous Labour Government in the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. The hon. Gentleman will probably agree that there have been a number of cases where governing bodies, for whatever reason, have not had the wherewithal to respond to a parental complaint about a lack of provision. It has been very difficult for parents to know precisely where to go to get that help. The answer must be clear, and I am confident that in the course of the debate in Committee we can address that issue.

What about children who do not have full statements but who are perhaps under the provisions of school action or school action plus? Their position is somewhat more difficult because they do not enjoy the advantage of statutory protection or statutory force when it comes to the implementation of their school plan. When a school is breaching the SEN code of practice in relation to those children, where will those parents go for redress? The governing body, as I said in response to the intervention made by the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) a moment ago, would be the first port of call but, again, I would welcome some clarity on that point. The basis of accountability comes in the form of the contract that will exist between academies and the LEA, but, as I have said, that point needs some clarification.

Further clarity is required should there be a dispute over the admission of a child with SEN or a child on school action or school action plus. The new model funding agreement for admissions to academies is clear and I welcome it, but I would go further and suggest that we will need some more detail on the time frame within which admission disputes between parents and schools should be resolved.

[Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

If more and more schools are to be encouraged to opt out of local education authority control, would it be his preference that in due course they should eventually gain control of their own admissions procedures?

[Mr Buckland]

As I have said, I think that the principle of selection has not been part of the argument when it comes to academies. It is not about selection, and that is why I made my earlier observations about the hon. Member for Bolton South East. This is all about excellence, and the Bill strikes the right balance on admissions and the criteria for admissions procedures.