(10 years ago)
Commons ChamberI said a few moments ago that it had not been possible, in good faith, for the Government to recommend an amendment that the House could responsibly be invited to support. Since further amendments or developments of the Bill are a matter for the House I will ensure that advice and help is provided, but these matters must be considered and there is no guarantee that a form can be found that avoids the practical difficulties. The hon. Gentleman’s more fundamental point is a matter for this House and the other place, and any amendments would return to this House to be determined.
Let me set out some of the challenges in the new clauses, although some have been expressed already. The definition of misconduct is based on the common law offence in England and Wales, but its test is not just the criminal offence. As drafted, it could capture behaviour that would not be a criminal offence, including in an MP’s private affairs, and it would be for the court to judge whether certain behaviour in a Member’s private life amounted to misconduct. The election court would have to apply the test of whether the MP had committed
“misconduct to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust”.
I understand and appreciate the aim of linking misconduct to an MP’s standing in the eyes of the public, but as drafted it is a rather subjective test. The House will want to take a view on the kinds of evidence and analysis that a court might draw on to judge whether the public at large felt there had been a betrayal of trust, including where no criminal offence was alleged to have been committed.
My right hon. Friend will be aware that that position has been discussed by the House as it relates to the Committee on Standards, and it was rejected.
I am grateful for that intervention. It is now clearly on the record and Members can reflect on the view taken by the Committee.
Let us consider the body that would make the judgment about alleged misconduct. Election courts are convened to consider cases that question the outcome of an election, and they do not meet unless a petition has been brought. At the end of the hearings, the court determines whether the election was valid or void, which can take several months to a year. The court has no investigative capacity but hears views from relevant parties. Giving this new role to an election court would mark a significant departure from current practice, and as I said, it lacks the capacity to launch an investigatory process. Furthermore, no appeal is provided for in the new clauses; indeed, the election court is not currently subject to appeal but only to limited judicial review. That raises the question of whether the election court model is the right basis for the proposal. If it is, I suspect that a number of questions could usefully be asked when fleshing out the detail, including whether there should be an appeals mechanism.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge proposes to set the number of petitioners necessary for the election court to consider an allegation of misconduct at 500. Of course, if it is alleged that a criminal offence has been committed it takes only one person to make a complaint and to have it investigated by the police. Arguably, if the complaint is valid, it should be taken forward regardless of the number of complainants. On the other hand, as a test of popular will the House will want to take a view on the right number of petitioners. The new clause increases to 15% the percentage of electors who need to sign the petition to trigger recall, which is higher than for the other conditions. However, 500 is a lower threshold for the initial trigger.
If there are to be such additional triggers in the Bill, the House must consider whether to set out the relationships, or hierarchy, between the different recall conditions. An election court could look at issues that could also be considered by the Committee on Standards, which operates on a trigger, or by the police as the gateway to a criminal conviction. If the defence was rehearsed before an election court, or if the court’s finding was considered prejudicial to an MP’s presumption of innocence, it may not be possible for them to have a fair trial. The fact that an MP had to answer allegations in an election court could prevent him or her from facing criminal prosecution for misconduct that amounts to a criminal offence.
Finally, let me turn to the issue of parliamentary privilege. New clause 3 includes a provision stating that section 9 of the Bill of Rights will not be affected. I understand that this is intended to ensure that privileged matters are not the subject of judgment by the electoral court. However, the use of the word “affecting” could be read in one of two contradictory ways by a court: either as a statement that privilege matters are excluded; or as an admission that the Bill overrides the Bill of Rights, and therefore impacts on privilege but only for these limited purposes, thereby inviting an election court to consider privileged issues as part of a case. If an exclusion is desired, it could benefit from clarification.
In conclusion, the Government were clear on Second Reading that we are open to ways to improve the Bill and we stand by that commitment. My intention has been to summarise and highlight some of the points the current drafting raises. It is right that the House votes in full knowledge of the technical and policy challenges that remain, as well as the principles behind the amendments. I look forward to hearing the views expressed during the remaining part of this debate.
We still have not had an answer—perhaps we will shortly—to the question of how the extra black hole that has opened up will be funded, and whether that will come from local government, but I will answer the hon. Lady’s question. Three years ago, one of the predecessors of the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint) as Minister for local government, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), complained that only one in five councils was using charging to its full potential. Indeed, the last Government issued statutory guidance to force councils to charge more for parking, for example. Council charging doubled under Labour. Unlike the last Government, we will not force councils to increase their charging.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is great cost variation in like-for-like authority provision? Therefore, it is inappropriate to judge the quality of services by the amount of other people’s money—that is, taxpayers’ money—spent on them.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. His record in leading Wandsworth, which was transformed under his leadership—I am pleased to say that that transformation has continued under the leadership of Sir Edward Lister, whom I am sure the House will congratulate on his knighthood—shows what can be done when there is a Conservative council that takes the economies seriously.