Illicit Arms Trade (Africa)

Debate between Patrick Grady and Stephen Phillips

Monday 16th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Egypt, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Tunisia, Burundi, Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique —all countries in Africa, and all countries in which ongoing conflict, fuelled by the ready availability of small arms and light weapons in particular, continues to claim lives; but—and this is important—the story that informs this debate, which I am grateful to have secured, does not end there.

For across Africa, and most notably in South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, armed violence outside conflict—all too often untouched by law enforcement—has reached epidemic proportions, destroying communities, hampering development efforts and undermining efforts to improve the lives of many of the poorest and most vulnerable in our world.

With UK aid pouring into the continent alongside that of our partners who are meeting their commitments, we can and should ask why and what the Government can do and are doing to prevent the flow of illicit arms that fuel this tale of sorrow, death and destruction in a continent to which significant development aid is dedicated. On all these issues, I hope the Minister can be clear with the House tonight.

Two things that the Government have been clear about: first, the obligation of this country and our partners to meet the target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on international aid, not only because it is the right thing to do but because it is critically important for British security; and secondly, the profound and negative consequences for individuals, societies and, yes, even the citizens of this country if we fail to tackle, at source, the endemic poverty which fuels violence, extremism and hardship, and which ends up manifesting itself on the streets of western capitals in the manner that we saw in Paris last week.

Let us be very clear, as I was on the last occasion I troubled the House on a debate on the Adjournment this late into the evening, when I spoke of the effects of corruption in the developing world and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular: if we fail to tackle the root causes which lead to the disfranchisement and extremism of whole sections of this ever-closer world in which we live, that will end up affecting us just as much as it affects those whose lives are poorer, meaner and harder than anything that we or our constituents ever have to contemplate.

The fight against the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, particularly in Africa, is part of that fight. As the UN Secretary-General pointed out when the matter was debated in the Security Council in May,

“Over the last decade, the world has been afflicted by over 250 conflicts. While no two have been the same, the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons, and their ammunition, is common to all. More than 50,000 men, women and children are killed each year as a direct consequence, and the number of those displaced has reached levels not seen since the Second World War. Civilians, including children, suffer the most.”

The ease of access to illicit small arms in particular—a glut at present, as recent upgrades to assault weapons have led to the ready availability of still lethal arms that have been superseded, but whose price on black markets has fallen considerably—thus undermines much of the effort that the international community puts into ensuring stability and sustainable development.

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way and indicating before the debate that he would be willing to do so, and I congratulate him on securing a very important debate. He will be aware that there was a debate in Westminster Hall recently on the legal arms trade. It was well attended. In that debate, the point was made that the arms trade is always a choice, not a necessity. It stands to reason that many weapons traded illegally must have had a legitimate point of origin or point of manufacture. Does he agree that the Government must continue to work towards their commitments in the arms trade treaty and encourage their global counterparts, especially in Africa, to do likewise?

[Stephen Phillips]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He will know that we have signed and ratified the arms trade treaty, and that a number of countries have done the same, though it remains for many other countries to do so. I am sure he would join me—this is what I think his intervention is really about—in encouraging the Minister to ensure that others sign up to the treaty, as 48 countries have without yet having ratified it, and ratify the treaty as well.

The point that I was coming to is the need to ensure sustainability and stability in our world, especially in Africa. Across Africa, a politician who loses an election, or at least fails to stuff the ballot boxes sufficiently, hands out weapons to their supporters. A politician who experiences disenchantment at the hands of those supporters as a result of economic failure, all too often caused by corruption, fabricates an enemy and deflects criticism by directing armed violence against the scapegoats created. If someone sees the wealth of others and wonders why their own life is mean and brutish, they arm themselves and use violence to take what they should have. All that is made possible by the ready availability of arms too often diverted from the stockpiles of state actors without the means properly to control them.

The electoral violence experienced in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 is as good an example as exists. Following the disputed presidential election of 2010, supporters of both rival candidates armed themselves, a crisis ensued, thousands died and the UN and its peacekeepers had to become involved. Côte d’Ivoire is a long way from the United Kingdom, but notably, in both 2011 and 2012, this country and our allies across Europe saw a marked increase in asylum claims and illegal immigration by Ivorians. What goes on in Africa matters directly here—maybe not immediately, but inevitably in due course.

Monsieur Diakité, the president of the west African network on small arms and himself an Ivorian, told the United Nations of his experience:

“I was peacefully sleeping in my room at the University of Bouaké, where I was in my first year of law school, when I was abruptly awakened by weapon fire from all sides. Some frustrated individuals who had been denied Ivorian citizenship had decided to take up arms—too readily available—to make their claim. We were terrorized for days, hunted like animals, without water, without food, without receiving help, constantly living in the fear of being killed. And we were not the only ones. The rest of the inhabitants suffered as well, regardless of age, sex or status. We all paid the price, but for what? And why? When I returned to the neighbourhood, one of my neighbours was forced, in order to feed her family, to yield to the intimidation and threats of armed individuals. I will never forget the tears on her face depicting her pain and the shame of having been a victim of forced prostitution and rape.”

The truth of the matter is that the availability of illicit small arms across Africa is such a problem that it has become part of the way of life. The question for the Minister, as I have hinted, is what he will do about it given the billions of pounds that British taxpayers pour into development aid in the continent with the best of motives, which are naturally undermined by the threat to stability and security that those arms pose.

I have used the Ivorian crisis as an example and it is a good one, but I have mentioned it for another very good reason. The arms and ammunition that have fuelled the violence over the last decade in that country have come not just from illegal sources internationally, but from so-called leakages from the stockpiles of state actors and the abandoned arsenals made readily available following the fall of al-Gaddafi in Libya.

Sub-Saharan Africa (Corruption and the Economy)

Debate between Patrick Grady and Stephen Phillips

Wednesday 1st July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Phillips]

Co-operation between the two Departments is obviously critical. Indeed, the Government as a whole must focus on the need to bear down on corruption where it exists, whether here or anywhere else in the world.

One of the problems is that very little effort appears to have been devoted to ensuring that institution building is carried out by donors who too often prefer to focus on the sexier aspects of development, such as education and health—funding areas that are, in any event, losing more money than they are receiving because of the corruption that pervades the region. So it is, although he may not know it, that the Minister is funding education programmes which pay teachers who do not exist; so it is that he is paying for the planting of crops which cannot grow in soil that cannot be maintained; and so it is that he funds programmes as a result of which money routinely finds itself in the hands of the governing class, despite the best efforts of those in his Department who work so hard to ensure that that does not happen.

Unless and until there is an unrelenting focus on changing the institutional environment throughout sub-Saharan Africa, which at present there is not, very little will change. As Dr John Mukum Mbaku argued in his 2007 book on corruption in Africa,

“the institutional environment, not cultural norms, determine a society’s propensity to engage in corruption and other forms of opportunism ...The incentive structures that a country’s market participants face—which are determined by the country’s institutional arrangements, may create opportunities for corruption and provide an environment in which even honest and highly ethical individuals may be forced to engage in corrupt activities in order to survive. Such perverse incentive structures can be changed or modified through democratic constitutional reforms.”

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

May I take up that point about “getting our own house in order”? Does the hon. and learned Gentleman accept that, while some of the corruption that he is describing may not exist in this country, we operate certain systems of patronage about which we must be very careful in view of the example that they might set developing countries?

[Stephen Phillips]

I think that I agree with the hon. Gentleman, although unless he gives some specific examples it is a bit difficult for me to know. However, corruption plainly does not exist in this country to the extent that it exists in large parts of Africa. I would not want to equate the two, or, indeed, give solace to those who engage in corruption in Africa on the basis that there is anything similar going on here, for the simple reason that there is not.

What steps is the Minister taking in this area—not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it is essential for our own security—to ensure there is institution building within sub-Saharan Africa to discourage individual Government officials from engaging in corruption? What structural reforms do the Government intend to make our aid dependent on, in order to root out those who enrich themselves at the expense of those they are supposed to serve? To what extent is our international aid delivered in a manner designed to ensure that it does not find itself in the wrong places and, more importantly, in the wrong pockets?

DFID’s role is crucial. Having met, indeed enshrined in law, our commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on international aid—a decision not always popular, but again essential for our national security—DFID’s efforts in stamping out corruption, while well meaning, none the less give cause for concern in some areas. As the Independent Commission for Aid Impact pointed out in its 2014 report “DFID’s Approach to Anti-Corruption and its Impact on the Poor”,

“DFID’s anti-corruption activities have demonstrated certain achievements but have had little success in reducing the effects of corruption, especially as directly experienced by the poor.”

The report went on to point out that DFID had

“little understanding of what is working with respect to its anti-corruption activities”

and

“does not fully understand which of its activities are addressing corruption or how they will make a difference.”

I appreciate that the Minister is new to his job, and that the Department is always well meaning and more often than not effective in delivering its objectives, but he has to tell the House how it is that, rather than merely paying lip service to the anti-corruption agenda, he now intends to bear down on something that hits the very poorest people in the world the hardest. More bilateral aid must, I say to him, go to the anti-corruption effort. All bilateral aid must be conditional on corruption, in all its forms, being stamped out in the countries to which it is given. If we really want to tackle poverty in the developing world and improve our security, adopting the sustainable development goals this year is all well and good, but part of that effort has to focus, in a way in which it has seemingly not to date, on the eradication of corruption as a way of life, and as a way of government, across the whole of Africa.

Why is that? Let me end where I began, for I must tell the House that the procurement manager and the mother with whom I began my speech are real people. I have spoken to them. I have witnessed the wealth of one and the poverty of the other, and I have played football with the sons. Like other boys across the developing world, theirs will not be an easy life, but it will be a great deal easier and more likely to be worth while if, in growing up, they do not need to bribe their way through school, university and into a job, paying teachers, university professors, lawyers, policemen, judges, healthcare workers and managers to perform the functions for which the state in which they live is already paying on their behalf.

Morally, we owe such boys an obligation to do all we can to stamp out the corruption that robs them and their fellows of their futures, and keeps them in poverty. Lest it be thought that it is not in our interests or not our problem, I end merely by pointing out that, if we do not act, it is they a future Home Secretary will be dealing with at Calais or, worse, on the beaches of some foreign shore where a poverty of existence made possible by corruption has given rise to a radicalisation which is at once both perverse and avoidable.