European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Thursday 7th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn]

No, I will not—unless the Government move on this—because the flaws are so fundamental that they should go away and do their homework again. Not a single person in this Chamber does not accept that legislation is required to undertake the task; we are just saying that it is not the legislation before us.

There is a huge difference between a statutory instrument that proposes in some regulation to delete the words “the Commission” and insert the words “the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs” and a statutory instrument that will, for example, give responsibility for the oversight and enforcement air-quality legislation, which derives from an EU directive, to an existing public body. What assurance can Ministers give us that whichever body is given that responsibility will have the same effective enforcement powers as the Commission has had, including ultimately taking case to the European Court of Justice, and will give the public the same power to hold that body and the Government to account if there is a continuing lack of progress in making sure that our air is pure enough to breathe? If that is not provided for, Government cannot argue that the Bill’s aim is to produce exactly the same situation the day after we leave as existed the day before. Therefore, as many people have said, the Bill will have to produce a mechanism for sifting. We need to sift the proposals that come forward, so that we can distinguish the absolutely straightforward and non-controversial and those that raise really quite important issues of policy, so that we as Parliament can do our job.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

I have a very simple question for the right hon. Gentleman. Does he agree with the proposition put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith) that the Social Security Advisory Committee is a clear model of such a mechanism?

[Hilary Benn]

It was an interesting proposal, but, personally, I think that others can give advice, but in the end the sifting must be done by Parliament or a body established by Parliament and made up of parliamentarians. That is my clear view.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

This has been a fascinating debate so far, and I am delighted that a little bird tells me that the Chief Whip and the Leader of the House are conspiring to try to make arrangements for it to be extended to midnight on the second day.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the debate has been the appearance of logic in what was said by not only the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), but the Chair of the Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), and the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). What they said sounded forensic and logical. The structure of their argument, as I think other Members will recognise, is as follows: “We do not like clause 9, we do not like clause 17 and we do not like schedule 7, and therefore, instead of waiting to see whether they will change in Committee before voting on Third Reading, we will reject the Bill on Second Reading.”

That is not what logicians call logic; it is what they call a non sequitur, which prompts the question, “Why the non sequitur?” The answer is that the three people whom I have just mentioned are among the cleverest people in Parliament. They understand logic perfectly well, and they understand what a non sequitur is. The reason they are engaging in such an argument is that they hope to make some combination of trouble for the Government, or for the Brexit process. Conservative Members should pay not the slightest attention to such “un-arguments” and should get on with the business of examining the Bill as it is.

Having said that, I rather agree—in fact, I strongly agree—with what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), and, indeed, with some of what was said by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry). There is a lacuna here, and we do need to look at those clauses again. I suspect that much of the remedy will lie in the use of a combination of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments as the ultimate body and, for instance, the Social Security Advisory Committee to do the detailed work on what will probably be near on 1,000 technical statutory instruments before the House comes to consider the really serious matters that will need to be dealt with in one way or another.

There is, however, one point that I want to make in advance of the Committee stage in the hope that the Government will consider it between now and then. One fundamental issue has not been addressed in the debate so far. It relates to what we used to call the European Court of Justice or the Court of Justice of the European Union. Members who have read clause 6 will have noticed that, as the Secretary of State pointed out, subsection (4) states that

“the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law”.

That seems to be a fairly important statement, but it is not quite as important as one might think, because the Supreme Court is not bound by itself either: it is the kind of court that can always depart. So I think that it is more of a ritual utterance than anything else.

According to clause 6(3),

“Any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided…in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law”.

In case anyone has any doubt about whether that might be just a drafting error, I should point out that the Government’s own document describing the Bill states:

“Questions on the meaning of retained EU law will be determined by domestic courts in accordance with pre­exit CJEU case law.”

In other words, those parts of the Bill, as currently drafted, enshrine the CJEU, with its expansionist teleological jurisprudence, as the basis for deciding what the law of the land is.

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am sorry, but I will not. I do not have much time. I do not believe that that is a very good way to do it, but if it were a good way to do it, we should certainly remove the reference to the Supreme Court not being bound by it, because it is not one solo parliamentarian who has no legal expertise, but is, rather, the retiring president of the Supreme Court, whom we do have to pay some attention to, who has pointed out that there is an ambiguity here.

[Mr Grieve]

It is by no means the only ambiguity in this Bill, but I agree entirely that to ask the judiciary to carry out an interpretation of something that is so oddly and, I have to say, vaguely worded is a recipe for disaster and is something this House should avoid doing.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend about that and hope that in Committee we will be able to address that head on. My personal belief is that we should address it in the form of changing clause 6(3), to ensure that it is open to—indeed, that we give an inducement to—our courts to move back to the plain words of the texts of the treaties and directives, so far as they judge that can be done without injustice to individuals. That is the principle that most people who voted for leave, and indeed many of us who voted on balance to remain but have been extremely sceptical about the activities of the ECJ and the Court of Justice of the European Union for many years, would wish to see enshrined in this legislation. I suspect that I might even carry my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe on that point, because he was, somewhat surprisingly, very sceptical about the ECJ on many occasions—I say surprisingly, because, despite his enthusiasm for the EU, which I never quite managed to share, actually he is a very good parliamentarian and a very good lawyer and recognises that we do not want a court that makes its own law. So I think we have a way forward that we can seek to follow in Committee.

None of that should obscure the fact that this is a good and necessary Bill. Nothing that the Opposition have said has suggested that there is any structural deficiency. Therefore, I will vote for it, and I hope all my friends and colleagues on the Conservative Benches and, indeed, many on the Opposition Benches will do the same.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield) on her maiden speech, which I greatly enjoyed. Canterbury is a city I know well: it is where I spent many of my early years at the Bar, cutting my teeth as an advocate. I hope I can remind myself of some of the lessons I learned there in contributing briefly to this debate.

I shall support the Government in the vote on Second Reading. The Bill is vital: we cannot leave the European Union sensibly without such a Bill on the statute book. The Government need support, and they will have it from me. Nevertheless, I regret to have to say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that unless the Bill is substantially improved in Committee, I will be in no position to support it in its current form on Third Reading.

In many respects, it is an astonishing monstrosity of a Bill. Its first failing is its entreatment of EU law itself. I do not much care for EU law—I did not much enjoy practising it, although I had outings to the European Court of Justice when I was Attorney General—but it is a different form of law from our own, which we imported, and which, in many ways, has filled vast areas that otherwise we would have developed in our own domestic law. So we need to nurture it, because we cannot get rid of it overnight without leaving enormous gaps. In addition, there are safeguards within EU law that do not exist within our law and need to be retained, because otherwise EU law will act unfairly. Again, they are different from our own.

I have a number of areas of concern. The Bill does not deliver clarity. Its importation of EU law is hedged around with ambiguities that undermine one of the key pillars of the rule of law, which is certainty about what the law is. One example is given by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), but there are numerous others. For example, Clause 2(1) is so widely drawn that retained EU law will include domestic law that was implemented entirely domestically but has a link to the EU. That would then make something like the Equality Act 2010 susceptible to change by statutory instrument in clause 7—something which I suspect everybody in this House would regard as completely unacceptable.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that we could address that in Committee not through a change to clause 2, which is pretty fundamental, but through changes in clauses 7, 8 and 9, with which we are already concerned?

[Mr Grieve]

Absolutely. I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. These are all curable, and readily curable, with just a little bit of will.

There is another example on which we have already touched. EU law never used to be divided between primary and secondary legislation. Interestingly, it is all being treated as primary, which has the nice merit—I am sure that someone in Whitehall dreamed this up—that none of it would be susceptible to be quashed by a challenge under the Human Rights Act. That may not matter, but it is capable of causing unfairness when it is linked to the fact that the other area of challenge that would normally be available, which is a challenge because something is in breach of the general principles of EU law, has been delicately removed along with the charter of fundamental rights.

I hope that I may be forgiven for saying this about my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. I have had some wonderful times with him—journalists once said of him that he used to stand up and club Labour Home Secretaries over the head and then I would come along and dissect them in public with a legal scalpel—but I just slightly detect that he was looking a bit like a fugitive as the legal scalpel started to move in on him. I do not know where that idea came from, but somebody will have to sort it out. We will have to do it at the Committee stage of the Bill. There are other examples that I could give, but I do not have the time to do so right now, so I shall leave them for the Committee stage in which I intend to participate actively.

Let me move to the Henry VIII clauses. The current situation is ridiculous. I recognise that there will have to be Henry VIII clauses. Of course we cannot carry out this massive revolutionary transformation by primary legislation alone, but we can ensure that we have the necessary safeguards in place. The most obvious one is to have an established parliamentary system of scrutiny to ensure that the different types of statutory instruments that will be needed are correctly farmed out. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend is right that the vast majority of them will be technical and of very little account, but some will be extremely important and will need to be taken on the Floor of the House. We need to have a system in place to do that.