European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

There was one question on the ballot paper, and that was whether we should stay in the EU or leave the EU. There was no second question about the terms of leaving. It is impossible to extrapolate, but I would be staggered if most people thought that this House should not have a proper grip of the available options in two years’ time and hopefully beyond. I expect that they would have said, “Of course we want Parliament to be fully involved. We would expect accountability and scrutiny, and we would expect votes.”

I shall conclude, because we only have two hours and other people wish to speak. These are simple amendments that would improve the article 50 process. They have obtained cross-party support and large majorities in the Lords, they are the right amendments on vitally important issues, and the obsession with the idea of a clean, unamended Bill should not triumph over decency and principle.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

I agree with what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said about amendment 1, but I wish to speak about amendment 2. The operative provision is subsection (4) which states—I want to remind the House as it is material to what I am about to say:

“The prior approval of…Parliament shall…be required in relation to any decision by the Prime Minister that the United Kingdom shall leave the European Union without an agreement”.

I have already argued in past debates exactly what my right hon. Friend argued today—namely, that if that subsection were to have its intended effect, it would be inimical to the interests of this country, because it would have the undoubted effect of providing a massive incentive for our EU counterparts to give us the worst possible agreement. I agree with him about that. However, I think that the situation is worse—far worse—than he described, because the operative subsection is deeply deficient as a matter of law. The reason for that is not just the one that Lord Pannick admitted, or half-admitted, in the House of Lords, but because under very plausible circumstances this subsection will not have anything like its intended effect. Let me briefly illustrate why that is the case.

Article 50 of the treaty on European Union is, for once in treaties, entirely clear. Paragraph 3 of the article states:

“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question…two years after the notification…unless the European Council… unanimously decides to extend this period.”

Let us imagine that what the Secretary of State, the Government, all my hon. Friends and, I suspect, all Opposition Members hope will not be the case—namely, that the negotiations for a proper comprehensive free trade agreement break down—actually happens. We all hope that will not happen, but we cannot preclude the possibility that it will happen. If it does happen, I think all Members on both sides of the House must have the emotional intelligence to recognise that in all probability that would be under circumstances of some acrimony.

How likely is it that under such circumstances, with agreement having broken down in some acrimony, the European Council would be able to achieve a unanimous agreement to allow the UK to remain a member beyond the two-year period? I speculate that it is very unlikely. If we assume that that were to occur, we need to ask ourselves what would actually happen under those circumstances. One thing can be predicted with certainty: there would be litigation. The litigation would ask, ultimately, the Supreme Court to decide the question, “What has happened here? Has the Prime Minister made a decision, or has the Prime Minister not made a decision?” That could be decided in one of two ways. I rather think that Members on both sides of the House would agree with me that the Supreme Court must decide either that the Prime Minister has made the decision or that the Prime Minister has not made the decision.

Let us suppose for a moment that the Supreme Court decides that the Prime Minister has not made a decision, because it has been made instead by the European Council—a perfectly plausible outcome of the Court’s proceedings. In that case, subsection (4) is totally inoperable. It has no effect whatsoever, because what it does, purportedly, is to prevent the Prime Minister from making a decision without a vote. If the Prime Minister has, in the ruling of the Court, made no decision, it is impossible for her to have made a decision without a vote; therefore, the law has been conformed with, and Parliament is not given any ability to vote on the matter.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend, and there is a further point. When it comes to the competing legislation at that point, it would be for the courts to consider whether or not the provisions in the Lisbon treaty that dealt with the question of article 50 had somehow been qualified, amended or repealed by a subsequent enactment.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, but it seems to me that for this purpose we do not even need to raise that question, because there is only one other possibility in this Court action—that the Court decides that the Prime Minister has implicitly made the decision. I do not quite know how the Court would get to that answer, but we could speculate that if the Prime Minister had acted differently in the course of the negotiations, the European Council would have acted differently, so implicitly the Prime Minister has made the decision.

Under those circumstances, subsection (4) would, purportedly, come into effect. That is, I suppose, what its authors intended. However, if the European Council has not by the end of the two-year period made a unanimous decision and if the courts decided that the Prime Minister had thereby implicitly decided, the courts would be requiring Parliament to do something that it is impossible to do—namely, to get the Prime Minister to reverse a decision that, as a matter of ordinary language, the Prime Minister would not have made at a time when the Prime Minister could not undo a decision that, as a matter of ordinary language, the European Council had made.

I am perfectly aware that it is of the greatest importance for Members of this House to show due deference to the other place, and I also genuinely admire the skills of the authors of the amendment, but I put it to them that even the House of Lords in all its majesty cannot compel the Prime Minister to do something that is impossible. That is beyond the scope of any human agency.

[John Redwood]

Is that not evidenced by Lord Pannick himself arguing seriously in court that the letter is irreversible?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I agree with my right hon. Friend, although the Supreme Court went to great pains not to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice, for very good reasons, so we can leave even that argument aside.

My point is very simple. Either subsection (4) would have its intended effect or it would not. If it did, it would be inimical to the interests of this country, because it would induce the worst possible agreement to be offered—as a matter of fact, it will not have that effect in plausible circumstances—and if it did not, it would be bad law. I put it to you, Mr Speaker, that this House should not be passing legislation that either is inimical to the interests of this country or constitutes bad law, and that we should therefore reject the amendment.

[Stephen Gethins (North East Fife) (SNP)]

This is a very timely debate about amendments that go to the heart of the situation in which we find ourselves. The Scottish National party has made it very clear that we want much more detailed reassurance—perhaps the odd detail or two from the Government—and that is where parliamentary scrutiny should have been involved. We should also be having a debate about the kind of country in which we want to live, and the kind of country that Scotland becomes and the United Kingdom becomes. That is where the amendment on EU nationals comes in.

The Secretary of State may have caught the First Minister’s statement earlier today, in which she made it very plain that this was not the situation in which we wanted to find ourselves. In fact, the Scottish Parliament voted by 92 votes to zero, across political parties, that we should look at ways of securing our relationship with Europe. It is a critical relationship that we have with our European partners, one that has an impact on, and benefits, each and every one of us; but, nearly nine months after the EU referendum, we still do not have that much in the way of detail from an increasingly clueless Government.

The most detailed response to the referendum so far came in the form of a compromise proposed by the Scottish Government just before Christmas. That compromise—let us not forget this—would have meant Scotland leaving the EU against its will to protect our place in the single market. It was a big compromise, and it took a lot from the Scottish National party to put it forward, especially given that Scotland had voted overwhelmingly to remain part of the European Union. We did it in order to protect jobs, the economy, and opportunities for young people and their environment in the face of a hard Tory Brexit.

The Fraser of Allander Institute has suggested that we could lose up to 80,000 jobs in Scotland alone as a result of the Government’s plans. We have a responsibility to protect those jobs, we have a responsibility to think about opportunities for young people, and we have a responsibility to think about the rights that we receive from our membership of the European Union. We have a responsibility not to just roll over in the face of a disastrous Tory plan.