Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Hollobone]

As always, my hon. Friend is on top of matters. He makes an extremely pertinent point, and he is quite right to bring us back to Iran.

Yes, this is about Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Would we be having this debate if the state of Israel did not exist? Perhaps, but the threat of Iran deploying a nuclear weapon would not be nearly as great. The mad and bad people in Iran have said often enough how much they despise the state of Israel. There has been argument about whether they have said that Israel should be wiped off the map, but that is clearly the intention of some people in positions of authority in Iran.

Iran is the biggest state sponsor of terrorism worldwide, not just in the middle east but in Europe and further afield, and it has an appalling human rights record. It is a very unpleasant country led by a very unpleasant regime. The idea that it should have at its disposal the ability to deploy a nuclear warhead or warheads should fill the world with absolute horror. Ever since 1945, with a brief interruption for the Cuban missile crisis, the assumption has been that nuclear weapons are so horrible that they will never be used, but I think that we could envisage a situation in which Iran, if it had a nuclear warhead, might well use it. If a future regime had the ability to manufacture a warhead and the ballistic capability to deliver it on Israel, it might well decide to take the chance to wipe out 7 million Israelis.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this most timely debate. Does he agree that although we have been talking about Israel, we must underline the fears and anxieties of many of Iran’s Arab neighbours? Should we not be concerned about reports that Saudi Arabia will look elsewhere to bolster its nuclear capability, or investigate the possibility of so doing, if Iran is given what it considers to be a good deal? A good deal for Iran would, of course, be a bad deal as far as everyone else was concerned. Not only Israel and the west but Iran’s Arab neighbours are concerned about the situation.

[Mr Hollobone]

The right hon. Gentleman knows more about religious divides than most of us in the House. In many respects, the split between Protestants and Roman Catholics is similar to that between Shi’as and Sunnis. The divides between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia date back centuries. If Saudi Arabia feels that the wrong deal is negotiated in Geneva, there is a real chance that the Saudis will buy nuclear weapons from Pakistan, because they will want to defend themselves against the threat from Iran.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that the situation is not just about Israel versus Iran; it is about Iran versus, frankly, the rest of the world. That is yet another reason why the international community simply cannot allow Iran to have nuclear weapons, because the likelihood of its wanting to use them in future is simply too great. That comes back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). Iran’s horrible regime is far removed from any process of democracy, and we can easily envisage circumstances in the near, medium or distant future in which someone in authority in the country might decide, “We have got a nuclear weapon. Let us use it.” That is a frightening prospect, which puts our worries about places such as Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia into the shade. It is the big issue on which the international community must concentrate.

I am in no way an expert on nuclear technology, but I have read enough to be convinced that Iran does not want to develop nuclear technology simply to provide power for its own people. It is hellbent on developing a nuclear weapons programme. The Foreign Secretary confirmed to me on the Floor of the House that the UK Government are convinced that Iran has enriched uranium to at least 20%. That is way beyond the 3.5% needed for civilian nuclear use, which suggests that the country is trying to develop a military capability. My understanding is that uranium for use in a nuclear warhead must be enriched beyond 90%, and although the gap between 90% and 20% might seem large, in nuclear physics terms it is actually quite small. Uranium enriched to 20% is more than half way to weapons-grade uranium. One of the worries about the potential deal now supposedly being negotiated in Geneva is that Iran might be left with a stockpile of uranium enriched to 20%, which it could bank and use to develop a nuclear warhead in the future. Any interim agreement that allows the Iranians to hang on to their nuclear stockpile is not worth having.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hollobone]

The hon. Gentleman speaks a great deal of sense and makes some extremely pertinent points. I hope the Foreign Office has taken note of his intervention. I suspect that, going back to the 1930s, the default position of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence is to try to arrive at an agreement to solve our problems through international accord. Of course, all of us see a lot of sense in that, but it must be stated in this case that no deal is probably far better than a bad deal. A bad deal will not solve anything. In fact, a bad deal will allow the Iranians under their present leadership, with all the other people behind the scenes, to cross that nuclear finish line. Once Iran has a nuclear weapon, the negotiating stance of the Foreign Office and the international community will be blown out of the water. This is our best chance to stop nuclear proliferation in the middle east.

[Mr Dodds]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that whatever the merits of the argument about an interim deal giving Iran the time to develop nuclear weapons, the issue is about Iran being allowed to retain the capacity to do so? That is crucial, as is the easing of sanctions. Surely one of the greatest issues for the Iranian regime is the crippling effect of sanctions, and one of its main desires is to ease that situation. It is estimated—I would be grateful if he gave us more information about this—that the easing of sanctions might be worth up to $20 billion to the Iranian regime, which is a major motivating factor and a good one. Iran’s retention of the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, rather than its willingness to do so or its actually doing so, is the key issue.

[Mr Hollobone]

The right hon. Gentleman’s powerful intervention is absolutely right. I hope the Foreign Office is better informed than I am and can give us the statistics. I am not sure, however, whether sanctions have brought the Iranians to the table; I do not know. It might well be that that is nothing to do with sanctions, but is all a ruse for Iran to buy diplomatic cover. What do I mean by that? If Iran can be seen to engage with the P5+1, it makes it much more difficult for the Israelis to take out Iran’s nuclear programme with military strikes. That is the point of the rapprochement.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that any agreement, interim or full, that allows the Iranians to retain their capability to make a weapon—perhaps not now, but in the future—would be a bad deal that was not worth having. From the perspective of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and I hope ours, any capability left in Iran that enables the regime or a future one to develop nuclear warheads should be completely unacceptable.

Iran currently has all sorts of capability. The centrifuge capability has recently been beefed up, with IR-2 centrifuges that can enrich uranium five times faster than the old ones. There is the heavy water production plant at Arak, which nuclear inspectors have never been allowed inside. There is a facility at Fordow that is underground for one reason—so that nobody can get to it. There is also the centrifuge capability at Natanz.