Legislative Definition of Sex

Neale Hanvey Excerpts

Monday 12th June 2023 Westminster Hall

[Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba)]

I have an observation to make before I turn to my remarks. I have worked in clinical practice for 25 years and it is absolutely anathema to me that any clinical member of staff would seek to allow their feelings to trump the privacy, dignity and rights of any patient in their care.

The one thing that I hope all sides can agree on in this debate is that the principle of equality is one that we should all embrace, cherish and protect. Our understanding of what that means and how it is achieved is the nub of this debate, as is our willingness or otherwise to accommodate each other.

I want to consider that foundation first. The notion of equality and its role in law is not new. Going back millennia, Aristotle argued:

“Equals should be treated equally, and unequals treated unequally.”

That enduring principle of equality requires that individuals should be treated the same, unless, of course, they differ in ways that are relevant for consideration to maximise their equality before the law. Understanding how we differ requires a shared and clear language to delineate and apply those considerations effectively. As in the days of Aristotle, sex, who is male and who is female has been the bedrock on which we have accommodated fundamental differences.

As a same-sex-attracted male, my sex and the sex of my partner is a primary defining characteristic of my identity and my protection in law. If sex were to mean anything other than the biological category of natal male, it would no longer be possible for me to delineate or describe who I am within the law, or for other gay men like me to be protected. That is true of other protected characteristics in the Equality Act, including the protection of the trans population, under the characteristic of gender reassignment.

I remember when I was first asked whether I believed that trans women were women. I was puzzled by the question, as it implied the need to subvert and subsume the meaning of “woman” as it is commonly understood. But it was not just that, because I see absolutely nothing controversial in calling a trans woman a trans woman, and a trans man a trans man. These are necessary biological categories for society and the Equality Act to accommodate, value and protect.

To deny that a trans woman is a trans woman suggests that there is something less, something other, about a trans identity—something to be hidden away in someone else’s identity. I reject that suggestion entirely. Now, as then, I value trans people and respect those who have chosen to make such a profound change to their lives in search of inner peace. But the act of subsuming rights or clouding language around equality goes far beyond those considerations. Without a stable, codified language, the whole meaning of protected characteristics, hitherto based on sex, comes tumbling down, which risks ushering in a chaotic and anarchic approach where equality legislation based on Aristotle’s fundamental principle becomes utterly impossible. Everyone suffers.

Children should be free to be their own individual, carefree, special selves, without adults imposing their gendered stereotypes on them. Telling children there is something intrinsically wrong with them is absolutely unforgivable. But if equalities legislation is to protect anyone, it must be able to effectively describe everyone.