Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Debate between Miriam Cates and Matt Western

Consideration of Lords message
Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the cost of going to court and that that will be prohibitive for students and academics, but surely the opposite is true. At the moment, the only provision that students and academics have in the case of their free speech being cancelled is judicial review, which costs tens of thousands of pounds. The whole point of introducing a tort in a county court, for example, is that it is relatively cheap and relatively affordable for anyone.

[Matt Western]

As the hon. Member will know, the tort has been left in the legislation. A compromise was reached in the other place, so that is in the Bill, as far as we know. Our point is that we do not believe that an injunction is at all necessary. Indeed, it will complicate the process for all involved. The Minister will know that I was trying to reach her last week. I was keen to discuss this issue, because I wanted to seek some sort of understanding about what was going on, but for some reason we were not able to speak. I hope that we can do that in future, because I think that will circumvent problems.

To be fair to the Minister, she is clearly aware that colleagues have strong views on the issues linked to the tort—she said as much in her “Dear colleague” letter last week. Perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves of some of those views. Lord Grabiner, an eminent jurist, said that the tort could be used by

“well-heeled trouble-makers for whom the costs issue would be of no concern at all.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 14 November 2022; Vol. 825, c. 709.]

That is the point I was making to the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis). Lord Molyan, a Conservative peer, stated:

“the Government do not know what they want to do about this”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 March 2023; Vol. 828, c. 1692.]

Universities UK, which represents 142 universities, stated:

“our position remains that the tort should not stand as part of the Bill.”

It feels that the original amendments amount to “sensible and acceptable compromise”. It was understood across the sector and in the other place that we had reached a point where the system was workable—they had reservations, but said they would accept the compromise. Given the Minister is clearly aware of those strong views, why has she not paid heed? In her letter, she encouraged us all to support the Government’s motion today, owing to

“limited legislative time to progress with further changes”.

It is pretty ironic for her to invoke the tight parliamentary timetable to push through her regressive motion, given the Bill has benefited from two parliamentary Sessions. We are here today, two years on, only because the Minister has reneged on the position accepted by Government Ministers in the Lords.

In her “Dear colleague” letter, the Minister claims that her motion provides the necessary reassurances on the issue, but she fails to mention that reassurances were already provided by Earl Howe. A satisfactory compromise —supported by Labour—was reached. Indeed, it might be deemed a model case in how to resolve competing interests, reminding us of the shared values we have in common:

“a commitment to freedom of speech and diversity of opinion.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 March 2023; Vol. 828, c. 1685.]

Those are the wise words of Lord Willetts. Yet with this motion, the Minister seems to be reopening Pandora’s box, prioritising tabloid headlines about a permanent crisis in freedom of speech on campus, over and above cross-party consensus and good legislation.

On the two planks of the Government amendment, the first specifies sustained loss as including non-pecuniary loss. The first concession the Minister has made to her Back-Bench rebels is to put in the Bill that “loss” extends to non-pecuniary loss, such as injury to feelings and reputational damage. I understand that was always assumed to be the case by the Government, but the Minister felt compelled to assuage the concerns of Back-Bench Members that such damage could be excluded by the courts.

If non-pecuniary damage is to be a loss recoverable under tort in freedom of speech claims, the question arises as to how the loss will be calculated. That has important consequences for the costs of litigation for universities and student unions. The Minister will no doubt say that that is a matter for the courts but, in the interest of clarity, I would welcome the Minister setting out her understanding of how damages might be awarded for non-pecuniary claims in freedom of speech cases.

For example, will the director for freedom of speech and academic freedom or the Government be setting cost guidelines for the courts to follow; or is it the Minister’s expectation that the courts will follow pre-existing costs guidelines, such as those used in discrimination cases? It is worth flagging that, if the courts were to follow such guidelines, the most egregious cases of non-pecuniary loss arising from a breach of a freedom of speech duty could cost a student union or university up to £56,200 per individual claim, in addition to any further litigation costs, which I am reliably informed range from £75,000 to £125,000.

Members of the House may want to consider, in the context of their local higher education providers, how such costs may detract from the student experience, given the financial pressures across the entire sector. Such monies would be better used to support hardship funding and welfare support, given the rocketing number of mental health cases they are seeing.

The second plank relates to the opt-out of the last resort mechanism for injunction-only claims. The amendment creates an exemption from the last resort mechanism put in place by the Lords for claims exclusively seeking an injunction. It is worth noting that the underlying purpose of the last resort mechanism was to prioritise university internal processes, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, the Office for Students Free Speech Complaints Scheme and the director for freedom of speech and academic freedom. The Government amendment potentially paves the way for that purpose to be inverted.

In effect, the amendment creates a perverse incentive for claimants to bypass the schemes created in the Bill in search of an injunction, including in anticipation of a breach. Was that unintended or intended? Regulatory investigations and internal processes rightly and understandably take time. When competing freedoms are at play, such care is to be expected. While the circumstances in which a court may grant an injunction could be narrow, for vexatious claimants with deep pockets, the amendment invites them to try their luck.

I note Lord Willetts sought to ensure the tort was “sensibly targeted” through his amendment, presumably to limit such vexatious claimants. Does the Minister believe her amendment opens the scope of the tort back up again? What justification does she have for doing that? Has the Minister met Lord Willets, a Conservative peer, to discuss this? I am sure he would welcome such a discussion. As for process, the Minister claims she is

“confident that this will not create a further burden on the courts”.

She plainly omits reference to the burden on institutions and student unions.

We all know that litigation is generally expensive and time consuming. It can soak up management bandwidth, detracting from the ability to focus on more important issues, most obviously the staff and student experience. Anything that risks an increase in the use of litigation in this context is therefore to be greatly cautioned against. In that vein, I urge the Minister to provide greater clarity on how her amendment will keep vexatious claimants at bay, will ensure the protection of institutional autonomy and regulatory processes, and will not expand the scope of the tort to the detriment of the student experience.