Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Mike Gapes and Ben Wallace

Tuesday 19th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2017, which was laid before this House on 18 December, be approved.

The threat level in the United Kingdom, which is set by the joint terrorism analysis centre, remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack on our country is highly likely and could occur without warning. We can never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, but we are determined to do all we can to minimise the threat to the United Kingdom and our interests abroad, as well as to disrupt those who would engage in it. Recognising that terrorism is a global threat that is best tackled in partnership, it is also important that we demonstrate our support for other members of the international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism wherever it occurs.

Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to disrupt the activities of terrorist groups and those who provide support to them. The order would add four groups to the list of proscribed organisations by amending schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000: al-Ashtar Brigades, including its aliases Saraya al-Ashtar, Wa’ad Allah Brigades, Islamic Allah Brigades, Imam al-Mahdi Brigades and al-Haydariyah Brigades; al-Mukhtar Brigades, including Saraya al-Mukhtar; Hasam, including Harakat Sawa’d Misr and Harakat Hasm; and Liwa al-Thawra. This is the 22nd proscription order under the 2000 Act.

The proscriptions send a strong message that terrorist activity is not tolerated wherever it happens. Under section 3 of the Act, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. The Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors in considering whether to exercise that discretion. These include: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and unable to operate in the United Kingdom. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, invite or provide support for, or arrange a meeting in support of, a proscribed organisation. It is also an offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public, such as flags that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or a supporter of a proscribed organisation.

Proscription sends a strong message to deter fundraising and recruitment for proscribed organisations. The assets of a proscribed organisation can become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. Proscription can also support other disruptions of terrorist activity, including for example the use of immigration powers such as exclusion from the UK where the individual is linked to a proscribed organisation and their presence in the United Kingdom would not be in the public interest. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary only exercises her powers to proscribe after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence of an organisation. This includes information from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across Government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-Government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in this decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of each case, but given the impact the power can have, it is appropriate that proscription must be approved by both Houses. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra are currently concerned in terrorism.

Although I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide a summary of each group’s activities in turn. The first group the order proscribes is al-Ashtar Brigades and its aliases. It is a Bahrain-based Shi’a militant organisation established in 2013. Its aim is to overthrow the Bahraini al-Khalifa ruling family through violent militant operations. It lists the ruling al-Khalifa family, Bahraini security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attacks. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Bahrain, including a jail break of 10 convicted terrorists that led to the death of a police officer in January 2017; an improvised explosive device attack in a bus station in Sitrah, which was claimed by the group under the name Wa’ad Allah Brigades in February; and an attack on a police vehicle near the village of al-Qadeem in July. More generally, the group has incited violent activity against the Bahraini Government, as well as the British, American and Saudi Arabian Governments on social media.

The second group the order proscribes is al-Mukhtar Brigades, also known as Saraya al-Mukhtar, a Bahrain-based Shi’a militant organisation established in 2013. It lists the al-Khalifa ruling family, Bahraini security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attacks. The group’s activities include the continued promotion and glorification of terrorism via social media throughout 2017.

The third group to be proscribed is Hasam and its aliases. Hasam is an extremist group targeting Egyptian security forces and the overthrow of the Egyptian Government. It announced its creation on 16 July 2016, following an attack conducted in Fayoum Governorate in Egypt. In September 2016, the group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of Assistant Prosecutor General Zakaria Abdel-Aziz and the attempted assassination of former Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa a month earlier. The group has claimed responsibility for over 15 attacks between March and September this year in Cairo. It carried out small arms fire attacks in March, May and July, and bomb attacks in March, June and September, the latter exploding close to the Myanmar embassy in Cairo.

The final group to be proscribed is Liwa al-Thawra, another extremist opposition group using violent tactics against Egyptian security forces and aiming at the end of the Egyptian Government. It announced its creation on 21 August 2016, following an attack in Monofeya. The group has claimed responsibility for attacks, including bombings and assassinations, including the attack in Monofeya in Egypt, the assassination of Egyptian Brigadier General Adel Regali in October 2016, and in April 2017 the bombing of the Egyptian police training centre in Tanta, Egypt.

In addition to adding these groups, we propose to remove Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin from the list of proscribed organisations. The HIG—for short—is an offshoot of the political Hezb-e Islami party and was formed in 1977 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You must forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, for my mix of Arabic and Lancashire—it does not make for the best dialect of Arabic or Pashtun, but we will get there. The HIG—I will go easy on people’s ears—is anti-western and seeks the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan. Since 2001, its main objective has been the removal of western forces and influence in Afghanistan as well as restoring Islamic law.

The HIG has been proscribed in the UK since October 2005. However, on 22 September 2016, the group agreed to a peace deal with Afghanistan’s Government. After careful consideration, the Home Secretary has concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the HIG continues to be concerned in terrorism as defined by section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that section, the Home Secretary has the power to remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations if she believes that it no longer meets the statutory test for proscription. Accordingly the Home Secretary has brought forward this order. If the order is approved, HIG will be removed from the list of proscribed organisations, which means that being a member of HIG, or inviting or providing support for it, will cease to be a criminal offence on the day that the order comes into force.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I broadly support the Minister’s proposals, but how can we be sure that adding organisations to the list in any way makes our authorities effective in combating them, given that in the last few months terrorist organisations have been parading openly with their flags—in Arabic—in the centre of London, and prosecutions have not occurred?

[Mr Wallace]

Proscription opens up a whole new level of offences for which people can be prosecuted. Proscribing an organisation allows asset-freezing and prosecution, but other offences can be linked to such activity. The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that it is often hard to prove membership—very few of these organisations have membership cards and joining ceremonies—but the order gives our law enforcement agencies more powers with which to prosecute a campaign against them.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned flags, no doubt referring to Hezbollah and Hamas. Those organisations are not proscribed in their entirety. Their military wings are proscribed, but as Hezbollah forms part of the Government in Lebanon and Hamas plays an active role in its part of the region as a member of a Government, the proscription applies only to the military wing. In some cases the flags are identical, but that does not mean that if people participate in Hezbollah-supporting actions here that constitute terrorism or anything linked to it, our police and law enforcement agencies will not act. We have acted in respect of Hezbollah and Hamas in the past, either to disrupt activity or to bring prosecutions.

We do not condone any terrorist activity, and we always take a cautious approach to de-proscription. De-proscription of a particular group should not be interpreted as the UK Government’s condoning any previous activities of that group. We have always been clear about the fact that HIG was a terrorist organisation. Groups that do not meet the threshold for proscription must remain within the law, and are not free to spread hatred, fund terrorist activity or incite violence as they please. The police have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals who engage in such activity, under the criminal law. We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threat, whether home-grown or international. Proscription is just one weapon in the considerable armoury that is at the disposal of the Government, the police and the security services to disrupt terrorist activity.

The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner, in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription potentially interferes with individuals’ rights, particularly those protected by article 10—freedom of expression—and article 11 —freedom of association—of the European convention on human rights, and should be exercised only when absolutely necessary. The order demonstrates that when proscription is no longer necessary, we are prepared to act to de-proscribe groups that are no longer “concerned in terrorism”.

I believe that it is right to add these four groups—al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra Brigade—and their aliases to the list of the proscribed organisations in schedule 2 of the Act, and, equally, that it is proportionate to remove HIG from the list. Subject to the agreement of both Houses, the order will come into force on Friday 22 December.

Iran

Debate between Mike Gapes and Ben Wallace

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention. He rightly says, first, that Ahmadinejad will not be able to stay in power, because he is term limited; this is the end of his term as President and someone else will emerge in the next elections. My hon. Friend is also right about maintaining the momentum of the Arab spring. We must double our efforts on maintaining the momentum on the street. I approve of BBC Persian and I approve of doing much more work to support, externally and internally, opposition groups on the streets of Iran. I have not forgotten the lesson of the cold war, where Poland and the printing presses made so much difference. We should bring those lessons into Iran as much as possible.

We need to maintain the momentum of the Arab spring, although Persia is not Arab, and be consistent in Bahrain and Syria. If we unlock Bahrain and Syria, I would pledge that, in that instance, Iran would start to turn and those middle classes and those on the streets would begin to see a difference. In Bahrain, where the Shi’a majority rose up against a Crown prince, we saw a rather lukewarm response from the west, but it was different in Libya and Syria. Let us be consistent, and push that momentum, which will help to make a difference to solving the problem.

On the diplomatic track, I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary has reiterated that we have not broken off diplomatic relations with Iran. I urge the Foreign Office to examine whether we can send a diplomat back to Iran. We do not have to open up the embassy—we did not break relations. We need to be there. The Union Jack means something to many people on the street, and it means something to the opposition. The embassy is well used to co-ordinated protests, stones, and streets being called Bobby Sands avenue next to it as a reminder, apparently, of British imperialism. The Foreign Office used to stand for the Union Jack around the world, and we should be a bit stronger than that.

[Mike Gapes]

Is there not a big difference between what happened to British embassies in previous years and what was carried out, co-ordinated by elements in the regime, just a few months ago? It is not just the naming of streets but the ransacking of diplomats’ homes and of the embassy complex.

[Mr Wallace]

I fully agree that it is very different. I do not propose that we open the embassy as if nothing happened. If we had a diplomat in another embassy, as we have done before, we could provide visas. The strength is to open and maintain transport links to and from Iran so that people can see what is going on in Iran. Iranians could come and see what is going on in the real world outside, away from some of the manipulation. If we could secure a consulate section in another embassy, that would help.

Every protest outside the embassy was co-ordinated by the regime, and that has been the case for 30 years. It is not new—most of this is not new. In dealing with Iran, we have to know them as well as they know themselves if we are to secure a diplomatic solution. Trying to do that in isolation, or trying to do it with the E3 plus 3 that sometimes works, but sometimes does not, depending on the mood of China and Russia, is one of our biggest challenges. Most of the sanctions that have been mentioned are unilateral, and are not United Nations sanctions. It would be worrying to set off down that path if we did not remember that, at the end of the day, if we were going to take the next step to military action, we did not have UN sanctions. I urge the Government, who are doing the right thing—the Foreign Secretary made the position clear—to ensure that we never stop the effort to achieve a peaceful resolution to this problem.